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 Abstract 
Eco-driving has the potential to reduce fuel consumption and therefore 
emissions considerably. Previous research suggests that drivers already 
possess a certain level of eco-driving capability, which they do not practise 
in their everyday lives. The studies reported in this thesis are based on a 
mental models approach, which enabled an in-depth exploration of eco-
driving knowledge and skills and broadened the understanding of the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms. 
This thesis describes two driving simulator experiments aiming to measure, 
activate and ultimately interrupt eco-driving mental models in a variety of 
scenarios, relevant for safe and eco-driving. The studies used simple driving 
task instructions, text message interventions as well as a workload task. 
Changes in the participants’ behaviour and thoughts were analysed with a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. 
The results suggest that drivers have mental models of eco-driving on 
several levels, ranging from knowledge and strategies to tactics in specific 
situations to automated behaviour. However, in the first experiment they did 
not use them when they were instructed to ‘Drive normally’. In the second 
study text message primes and advice provided over two weeks were not 
able to replicate the effect of experimental instructions given directly before 
driving. Behavioural changes following these instructions were abandoned 
when performing a workload task, and not resumed afterwards. 
Future research needs to consider alternative methods to prompt drivers to 
use their existing eco-driving knowledge and skills. Studies with a larger 
number of participants, and in real-world settings can then validate findings. 
It is suggested to expand the mental models approach into other fields such 
as sustainable transport in general. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2012 road transport was responsible for almost a fifth of the total carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions in the EU (European Environment Agency, 2014). It 
is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the role of CO2 emissions in 
climate change (cf. Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). Particularly passenger 
cars are responsible for the major share of the EU carbon emissions 
(European Commission, 2007). Besides reducing road traffic and developing 
hybrid and electric vehicles, eco-driving has the potential to further reduce 
emissions, as it promises to reduce fuel consumption and therefore CO2 
emissions by 5 to 10% (Barkenbus, 2010). Eco-driving is defined as a set of 
behaviours that drivers can practise to save fuel (Mensing et al., 2014). 
Effective practises include, for example, the maintenance of an efficient 
speed by avoiding strong acceleration and braking actions (Hof et al., 2012). 
In order for eco-driving to contribute to a global reduction in CO2 emissions, 
the way many people drive needs to be changed. These large-scale 
behavioural changes, however, are not easy to achieve. It has been shown 
that the provision of educational material does not address the problem 
(Delicado, 2012, Martin et al., 2012). In contrast, behavioural changes in 
several studies indicate that drivers already possess the required knowledge 
and skills to reduce their fuel consumption (Birrell et al., 2010, van der Voort 
et al., 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980). To date no study has investigated 
these existing eco-driving knowledge and skills in detail. Hence, this thesis 
begins with an in-depth study using a mental models approach in order to 
explore them from a variety of perspectives. It then investigates the problem 
of changing drivers’ behaviour in a way that makes drivers use their 
available expertise, thus to activate their eco-driving mental models. 
The following paragraphs draw an overview of the contents of the present 
thesis: 
Chapter One sets the scene for the current thesis by describing the need to 
reduce CO2 emissions, and the problem of changing the behaviour of the 
driving population. It then discusses why mental model research is suitable 
for exploring what drivers know about eco-driving, and why it is so difficult to 
encourage them to use their knowledge and skills. 
Chapter Two begins with a discussion of environmentally friendly behaviour, 
its importance and impact. It then provides a literature review of behaviour 
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change and the barriers, one of which is central to the second study in the 
present thesis: habits.  
Chapter Three provides a background in mental models. It begins with a 
journey into philosophy, describing how Immanuel Kant and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein formed the way we think about human cognition. Then it 
outlines a number of views and approaches before introducing practical 
applications of the theory, and thereby leading into mental models in the 
driving domain. 
Chapter Four describes the first of two studies in this thesis, an in-depth 
exploration into eco-driving mental models of regular drivers. This 
experiment used a desktop driving simulator in addition to qualitative 
interviews and think-aloud protocols. It showed that drivers possess mental 
models that enable them to reduce their fuel consumption. The problem is 
that they do not use their knowledge and skills to their full potential during 
‘normal’, baseline driving. 
Chapter Five describes the second study, which attempted to activate eco-
driving mental models with regular primes, advice as well as simple 
instructions by the experimenter. This experiment was conducted with a 
motion-based driving simulator. Every participant was invited to two 
sessions, with two weeks in-between, in which the interventions took place. 
Eventual behaviour changes were then challenged with a workload task in 
order to interrupt eco-driving mental models, resulting in the drivers reverting 
to their usual, more familiar habits. 
Chapter Six summarised the findings of this thesis, addressing the research 
questions posed at the beginning and emerging from the first study. It 
highlights the acquired insights into eco-driving mental models, and 
discusses potentially effective ways to activate them and therefore to change 
drivers’ behaviour. 
 
1.1 Statement of the problem 
1.1.1 Environmental issues 
The share of passenger cars contributes to 12% of the overall CO2 
emissions in the EU (European Commission, 2007). Although manufacturers 
have been decreasing the CO2 emissions of light-duty vehicles since 2005 
(USEPA, 2011) their share of the total emissions is still rising. Besides 
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reducing road traffic and developing greener technology, eco-driving is 
considered a major contributor in generating a substantial impact on CO2 
emissions in the transport sector. 
 
1.1.2 Behaviour change 
In order to achieve a considerable reduction in emissions with eco-driving, 
the behaviour of a large share of drivers needs to be changed. A number of 
programmes attempted to educate drivers. For instance, Delicado (2012) 
described a driving simulator designed to teach eco-driving, but it failed due 
to the underlying idea that such behaviour change can be achieved by 
mending an education gap. Martin et al. (2012) asked tested an website 
called EcoDrivingUSA by asking an experimental group to browse this 
website. A questionnaire showed that attitudes and self-reported behaviours 
changed for a subgroup, which was more educated and more concerned 
about climate change and fuel prices than the average participant. 
Numerous studies with training programmes provide evidence for their 
positive impact (e.g. af Wåhlberg, 2007, Beusen et al., 2009, Sullman et al., 
2015), and several researchers recommend campaigns in order to raise the 
necessary awareness (Barkenbus, 2010, Chapman, 2007). In sum, eco-
driving education can improve drivers’ knowledge, which is a prerequisite for 
behaviour change, but relevant knowledge alone may not be enough to 
ensure that drivers use that knowledge. Similarly, addressing motivations to 
eco-drive can be effective, but this does not solve the problem. Recent 
research suggests that monetary savings may not be a sufficient motivator 
for people to take on the effort of practising a new driving style (Stillwater 
and Kurani, 2013, Tulusan et al., 2012). Some studies suggest to emphasise 
environmental reasons (Dogan et al., 2014), but drivers tend to rate them 
even lower than financial gains (Cristea et al., 2012, Harvey et al., 2013). 
However, the situation is not hopeless and behaviour change has been 
achieved by several means. 
It has been shown that in-vehicle technology has the potential of attaining 
some behavioural change by providing continuous real-time feedback on 
parameters such as pedal pressure, gear or miles per gallon (e.g. Kim and 
Kim, 2012, Nouvelière et al., 2012, van der Voort et al., 2001).  
Most studies researching eco-driving test whether an eco-driving 
intervention results in a reduction of fuel consumption (af Wåhlberg, 2007, 
Birrell et al., 2014, Boriboonsomsin et al., 2010, Graving et al., 2010, 
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Hellström, 2005, Kamal et al., 2010). Drivers may already have some 
understanding of eco-driving and therefore need guidance in a different form 
than currently assumed (Stillwater and Kurani, 2013). Hence, there is still a 
need to further research drivers' actual knowledge and skills of eco-driving 
as well as the decision making processes that lead drivers to practise and 
use eco-driving techniques (Stillwater and Kurani, 2011, Stillwater and 
Kurani, 2013). 
 
1.2 Mental models as a novel approach to study eco-driving 
In this research the concept of mental models was utilised for studying eco-
driving. Mental models are defined as representations of reality in people’s 
minds (Johnson-Laird, 1988). These representations make decisions about 
actions and perceptions (Schank and Abelson, 1977). They are organised 
on different cognitive levels and therefore range from strategic and easily 
accessible knowledge to rules guiding highly automated action sequences 
(Anderson, 1982, Rasmussen, 1983). In the present thesis it is assumed that 
humans possess a library of mental models in their long-term memory (cf. 
Johnson-Laird, 1983) and retrieve them for their use in the working memory, 
which is limited (Miller, 1956, Simon, 1969). The mental model approach 
offers a research paradigm that is different to the common quantitative and 
model-driven approach in driving simulator studies. Hence, it does not 
include standard questionnaires measuring factors that predict behaviour 
such as motivations to eco-drive (e.g. Dogan et al., 2014, Harvey et al., 
2013), people’s awareness of environmental issues (e.g. Christie and Jarvis, 
2001) and the locus of control (Hines et al., 1987). Successful approaches 
for behaviour change include socials norms (cf. Ajzen, 1991) and cognitive 
dissonance (Thøgersen, 2004). These approaches use people’s need to 
conform to others’ expectations as well as consistency with their self-image 
and can cause discomfort with regards to unsustainable behaviours. These 
concepts are defined and explained in the literature review in section 2.3.1, 
although they did not inform the design of the studies presented here. This 
research focusses on individual drivers, and their existing knowledge and 
skills, and then attempts a novel approach to induce eco-driving behaviours 
using primes. At the same time, studying driver distraction by using abstract 
tasks during driving (e.g. Chiang et al., 2001, Chisholm et al., 2007, Dingus 
et al., 1989, Tijerina et al., 1998), is not part of this work. Instead, in chapter 
5 it was attempted to challenge the strength of activated eco-driving mental 
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models with a workload task that was designed to be simple and natural, 
using findings from distraction studies to hypothesise its effects. Numerous 
concepts of mental models are introduced in chapter 3. Some of them are 
formulated in an abstract manner, similar to programming languages (e.g. 
Charniak, 1972, Simmons, 1972, Winograd, 1972), or created for complex 
problem solving (e.g. Halasz and Moran, 1983, Johnson-Laird, 1983) rather 
than driver behaviour. Others are visual-spatially oriented and used to 
understand the comprehension of texts, for example (e.g. Bower and 
Morrow, 1990, Graesser et al., 1994). Several studies, particularly in the 
health sector (e.g. de Bruin et al., 2007, Vogt and Schaefer, 2012), compare 
patients’ with experts’ mental models to identify knowledge gaps. A similar 
approach was utilised in the studies presented here, in which drivers were 
asked about their eco-driving knowledge. The replies were then compared 
with results from research investigating effective eco-driving techniques.  
Several mental model paradigms were deemed suitable for the studying 
actual behaviour using a driving simulator. These include Rasmussen’s 
skills, rules and knowledge (SRK) taxonomy (Rasmussen, 1983). The SRK 
taxonomy has been used to study behaviour on different cognitive levels, 
which drivers are able to control to differing degrees. This taxonomy is 
related to ecological interface design (Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989) which 
has been utilised in the design of eco-driving support systems (EDSS, 
McIlroy and Stanton, 2014, McIlroy et al., 2013). EDSS are introduced in 
section 2.3.4 as an example of effective means to change driving behaviour, 
but such systems, for example their acceptance, are not the focus of the 
work, besides a small number of design recommendations made at the end 
in chapter 6. In order to further explore instant decision-making on the rule-
level during driving, a method to  measure and represent mental model 
boundaries was applied with ‘normal’ and eco-driving in chapter 4. The 
present thesis is the first work known to the author to explore a variety of 
existing mental models of eco-driving in an in-depth manner. Therefore, this 
research incorporates a substantial amount of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. 
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2 Environmentally friendly behaviours and eco-driving 
2.1 Introduction 
Climate change is becoming an increasingly pressing problem and 
greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions play a major role 
in it (Wuebbles and Jain, 2001). In 2012 road transport accounted for 19% of 
the total CO2 emissions in the European Union (EU, European Environment 
Agency, 2014). Governments have been able to tackle some of these 
emissions with restrictions via a plethora of means such as taxation, 
incentives and the provision of infrastructure for sustainable transport.  
Reviewing several eco-driving studies, Barkenbus (2010) estimated that 
about a third of US drivers are potentially able to save 5% with an initial 
training and 10% with support systems. Accordingly, in order to achieve a 
considerable reduction in transport emissions, the behaviour of a large 
number of drivers needs to be actually changed. Semenza et al. (2008) 
argue that individual environmentally-friendly actions have the potential for 
substantial impact. There is a variety of behaviours individuals can practise, 
not only related to personal transport, but also to home energy use, 
consumption and waste generation. 
The decrease in fuel consumption due to eco-driving is proportional to a 
reduction in CO2 emissions, and is crucial in optimising the efficiency of 
electric vehicles (Knowles et al., 2012). With money-savings accruing in the 
long-term as well as a relaxed and safe driving style (Young et al., 2011), 
drivers can benefit from eco-driving. Despite the environmental and financial 
benefits, it is a challenge to achieve wide-ranging and long-lasting 
behavioural changes among the population. 
This chapter begins with an overview of environmentally friendly behaviours 
in general and eco-driving in particular. The subsequent section is dedicated 
to behaviour change. One important barrier is the disconnection between 
attitudes towards environmentally friendly behaviour on the one hand and 
effective actions on the other. Another issue is the difficulty of changing 
ingrained habits. The chapter ends with some successful ways to change 
people’s behaviour towards environmentally friendly behaviours and eco-
driving, and possible explanations for these changes. 
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2.2 Environmentally friendly behaviours 
2.2.1 Environmentally friendly behaviours and their impact 
It is undisputed that governments and the industry have the capacity to 
implement actions that reduce CO2 emissions substantially (Jackson, 2005). 
However, private individuals have the option to practise a number of 
behaviours that may achieve considerable reductions as well. 
Widespread sustainable household behaviours include limiting energy 
consumption by switching off lights and appliances as well as the avoidance 
and recycling of waste (Semenza et al., 2008). Although many people are 
not convinced of the impact of their individual actions (Blake, 1999), it has 
been shown that private households are well capable to achieve energy 
savings that are substantial, even with significant effects in relation to a 
country’s entire emissions. Dietz et al. (2009) estimated that with reasonable 
changes US households are able to reduce their emissions by more than 
13% within 5 years. Using efficient shower heads, water heaters and other 
technology can make a difference without compromising living habits. 
Transport-related behaviours are particularly crucial, because transport is 
the only sector that witnessed a rise in greenhouse gas emissions in the EU 
from 1990 to 2012 (European Environment Agency, 2015). Aviation, which is 
predicted to grow by 4.1% yearly until 2034 (International Air Transport 
Association, 2014), is particularly disconcerting (Chapman, 2007). Hence, 
changes in travel behaviours by individual households can have a large 
impact on emissions. Car-sharing and the use of alternative transport means 
have a strong potential (Dietz et al., 2009). Eco-driving is the behaviour 
examined in the current thesis, due to its potentially immediate effect using 
the current vehicle fleet. For example, in 2012 passenger cars emitted 
around 450 million tonnes CO2 globally (Olivier et al., 2013). This means that 
if only 10% of the driving activity is conducted with eco-driving, and achieves 
a 10% reduction, a total of 4.5 million tonnes of CO2 can hypothetically be 
avoided.  
 
2.2.2 Eco-driving practises 
Eco-driving is a set of behaviours that drivers can practise to save fuel and 
reduce emissions (Mensing et al., 2014). The first studies in eco-driving 
known to the author emerged during the energy crisis in 1979, when the US 
Department of Energy launched the Driver Energy Conservation Awareness 
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Training (cited in Barkenbus, 2010, DECAT, US Department of Energy 
(USDOE), 1980). At that time driving techniques to reduce fuel consumption 
were first explored (e.g. Evans, 1979, Waters and Laker, 1980). The five 
Golden Rules of eco-driving (Austrian Energy Agency, 2013) comprise the 
following practices: 
 
 anticipation of traffic flow 
 maintenance of a steady speed with a low RPM 
 early gear shifts 
 frequent tyre pressure checks 
 additional energy requirements, for example due to air conditioning or 
excess vehicle load 
 
Hof et al. (2012) provided an overview of measures that are at present 
considered effective. In their wider scope, they include regular vehicle 
maintenance, tyre pressure checks and an optimal route choice. When the 
vehicle and route are given, eco-driving involves maintaining a constant 
speed, avoiding unnecessary braking and accelerating where possible by 
anticipating traffic situations, using higher gears and optimal acceleration.  
Mensing et al. (2014) discussed whether the prefix ‘eco’ stands for economic 
or ecologic driving. They found that swift accelerations to efficient speeds 
can be fuel-efficient, thus economic. At the same time, the high torque 
causes a rise in the emission of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons. Hence, 
they stated that ecologic driving involves lower acceleration rates. In order to 
have a clear definition of ‘eco-driving’, which can be succinctly 
communicated to experimental participants, it was decided to place the 
emphasis on the aim to reduce fuel consumption during driving.  
A focus on economic driving does not fully clarify what constitutes optimal 
acceleration. In some studies it has been found that lower acceleration rates 
can result in fuel reductions (Ericsson, 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980). 
Others suggest swift acceleration rates to an efficient speed, which is then 
held constant (Mensing et al., 2014, Mensing et al., 2013). In a recent study 
Mensing et al. (2013) modelled ‘normal’ and eco-driving on a computer. 
Compared to the former, they achieved a 34% reduction of fuel consumption 
with fast accelerations to optimal speeds, which were then maintained as 
much as possible. Such speed maintenance, during free-flow traffic 
conditions, is known as cruising. Avoiding very strong accelerations can be 
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beneficial for fuel savings, for example by pushing the throttle not more than 
50% (Johansson et al., 1999). Indeed, there is some certainty that pushing 
the accelerator pedal excessively is inefficient (Birrell et al., 2014, El-
Shawarby et al., 2005, Ericsson, 2001, Johansson et al., 1999). Hence, it 
can be concluded that eco-driving involves swift, but not aggressive, 
accelerations to efficient speeds. Eventually, the exact effects on the fuel 
consumption strongly depend on the vehicle model (USEPA, 2011). 
Depending on the road situation as well as the available gears, choosing an 
optimal speed can further improve fuel savings. Samaras and Ntziachristos 
(1998) conducted detailed real-world measurements and concluded that 
efficient speeds range from 60 to 80 km/h, which would allow staying at 
around an urban speed limit of 40 mph (64 km/h), but suggest driving below 
the motorway speed limit of 70 mph (113 km/h). 
It has been found that lower variations in speed can affect fuel savings 
positively (Mensing et al., 2014, Mensing et al., 2013). These can, amongst 
other means, be achieved with smooth decelerations using coasting by 
releasing the throttle without stepping on the brake pedal and staying in 
gear. Coasting is commonly used as one attempts to avoid stopping in 
situations such as crossings with red traffic lights (Johansson et al., 2003), 
and therefore a subsequent acceleration. This example signifies that 
anticipation is crucial to maintain a constant speed. It involves monitoring the 
road situation in order to prevent strong speed fluctuations. By predicting the 
behaviour of other road users and changes of traffic lights drivers are able to 
act early on. When hazards are expected, anticipatory behaviours can 
include accelerating at lower rates, coasting early on and generally keeping 
higher safety margins (Andrieu and Pierre, 2012, Delhomme et al., 2013, 
Johansson et al., 1999). A real-world study with electric vehicles found that 
eco-driving was especially effective in an urban setting, compared to rural 
roads and motorways. Higher fuel savings were possible due to more 
occasions for braking and accelerating (Knowles et al., 2012), and therefore 
more potential for anticipatory driving behaviours. 
In most situations eco-driving can increase driving safety. Besides opting for 
lighter vehicles or alternative transport means, lower speeds and anticipation 
are beneficial practises for both safe and eco-driving (Haworth and 
Symmons, 2001). In trade-off situations drivers tend to prioritise safety. 
Dogan et al. (2011) asked drivers to eco-drive, but the participants 
abandoned the eco-driving goal, when the driving situation became complex. 
However, eco-driving can have negative implications for safety in some 
10 
 
occasions, for example where safety margins are in conflict with the aim of 
maintaining a constant speed (Young et al., 2011). For instance, when traffic 
lights switch to amber when a driver is close to them, but it is still safe to 
stop, eco-driving could lead to a crossing of the junction. Similarly, during 
busy motorway traffic one could avoid stepping on the brake pedal by 
accepting shorter headways. Driving safety can be compromised by support 
systems as well. In a driving simulator study drivers gazed at eco-driving 
feedback, even in demanding conditions (Jamson et al., 2015b). 
 
2.3 Behavioural change 
2.3.1 Inducing behavioural change 
Changing drivers’ behaviours can have a substantial impact on CO2 
emissions. However, when drivers do not eco-drive, it may not be correct to 
assume that the underlying reason is a gap in their knowledge and skills that 
simply needs to be mended with education and training. Delicado (2012) 
exemplified this by showing how a driving simulator designed to teach eco-
driving missed this goal. Different user groups driving the simulator at an 
exhibition misunderstood its purpose. Several people were using it as a 
computer game, attempting to race rather than to reduce their fuel 
consumption. In addition, the assumption that being sufficiently motivated to 
eco-drive is sufficient to attain eco-driving behaviours is obsolete. Both, 
reducing one’s impact on the environment as well as monetary incentives 
are ascribed potential to change behaviour in several studies (e.g. Man et 
al., 2010, Syme et al., 1987). However, Harvey et al. (2013) organised focus 
groups and conducted a questionnaire survey in the UK and the Czech 
Republic, and found that only 20% of the respondents would be motivated 
by environmental considerations. In addition, fuel savings of an estimated £5 
per week did not justify behaviour change. Hence, getting drivers to eco-
drive poses a challenge for institutions, researchers and vehicle 
manufacturers. 
A lot of research has been conducted in the field of environmentally friendly 
actions. Past studies based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), 
discussed in section 3.2.1, used questionnaires to identify strong factors that 
are meant to predict such behaviours. Firstly, it is important that people are 
generally knowledgeable and aware of environmental issues (Hines et al., 
1987, Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). At the same time, one needs to 
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possess relevant knowledge and skills to take action (Abrahamse et al., 
2005). It can be expected that abilities to act environmentally friendly vary in 
the population, but also that even a minimum level of knowledge, for 
example that switching off water taps and lights when they are not needed 
can save energy, can make an impact when it is applied (Dietz et al., 2009). 
Hence, motivations and capabilities are prerequisites for acting 
environmentally friendly, but these alone do not cause behaviour change. It 
is important that people have a sense of control over the outcomes of their 
actions. People who are convinced that, due to high levels of pollution 
caused by the industry as well as emerging countries, their actions do not 
have an impact, are less likely to act environmentally friendly (Bamberg and 
Möser, 2007). The belief that one is able to influence outcomes was termed 
internal locus of control (Hines et al., 1987). In addition, a sense of personal 
responsibility, positive attitudes towards the behaviours, and situational 
factors play a role (Hines et al., 1987). Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) stated 
that personal motivation is crucial. Stern et al. (1993) suggested that the 
motivation for ecological action first of all stems from one's egoistic 
orientations such as money savings. However, the motivation may also be 
socially and environmentally oriented. Social factors include altruism, or 
'actively caring' for the community, and are assumed to have an influence on 
acting selflessly (Schwartz, 1977) or ecologically (Borden and Francis, 
1978). 
Educational campaigns can inform, persuade and motivate people to change 
their behaviour (Rice and Atkin, 2002). Barkenbus (2010) as well as Cristea 
et al. (2012) particularly recommended the use of social norms, related to 
environmental impacts. Social norms define the behaviours that are 
acceptable in societies or groups. They are well suited for campaigns, for 
example by stating that other people conduct and expect certain behaviours 
(cf. Ajzen, 1991). Such a campaign could communicate that people similar to 
the addressee value the environment and regularly eco-drive. Social norms 
have also been successful in programmes such as promoting eco-driving 
within organisations. Siero et al. (1989) studied the effects of such a 
programme in a mail delivery organisation and concluded that the collective 
nature of the intervention was one reason of its success. Similarly, 
campaigns can challenge the self-identity of drivers (Whitmarsh and O'Neill, 
2010). People tend to see themselves as being concerned with the 
environment (Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 2006). When 
inconsistent behaviour is pointed out, cognitive dissonance, defined as 
conflicting thoughts, beliefs or attitudes, can arise (Thøgersen, 2004). This 
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cognitive dissonance can then be decreased by actually behaving more 
environmentally friendly. For example, someone who is buying organic food 
could make attempts to eco-drive.  
Hendrickx and Uiterkamp (2006) discuss the effects of technology on 
behaviour in the choice of passenger transport. The model of relative 
importance of car characteristics for car type choice by Van Oijen (as cited in 
Hendrickx and Uiterkamp, 2006, 1996) indicates how innovations in vehicles 
can boost or reduce sales. Lightweight materials and alternative fuel 
vehicles can reduce perceived safety and lead to a decrease in sales. A 
reduction of cost on the other hand, can attract buyers and support 
innovative technologies. Tertoolen et al. (1998) argue that mode choice is 
influenced by similar determinants. Cars are desired, because they are 
convenient, fast and comfortable. They suggest that these determinants 
need to be increased in more sustainable transport modes, and decreased 
in cars, in order to change behaviour. 
When it comes to eco-driving, a number of concepts have been tested, and 
some of these have shown some success in changing behaviour. In a 
questionnaire drivers rated monetary incentives higher than environmental 
considerations (Cristea et al., 2012). A survey among US truck drivers found 
a similar result, that drivers expect to be sufficiently motivated by money 
(Schweitzer et al., 2008). During a focus group in Australia drivers stated 
that financial savings would  motivate them too (Boriboonsomsin et al., 
2010). However, during actual driving, eco-driving yields small savings. In 
addition, fleet drivers are not motivated by financial savings. Instead, 
environmental feedback tends to have more meaning and therefore stronger 
effects (Dogan et al., 2014, Harvey et al., 2013).  
Feedback such as information on personal energy consumption has been 
shown to induce behavioural change. Seligman et al. (1981) explained the 
effectiveness with the teaching, rewarding and motivating functions of 
feedback. For example, the simple provision of fuel consumption information 
(af Wåhlberg, 2007) or regular meetings with collective feedback (Siero et 
al., 1989) can encourage drivers to eco-drive. Fuel saving advice and 
feedback are especially effective when provided repetitively, possibly in real-
time (Hibberd et al., 2013, Stillwater and Kurani, 2013). Because learning 
effects can decrease over time, it might be beneficial to personalise 
feedback and ideally adapt it to the drivers' skills, as they become more 
proficient in eco-driving (Hiraoka et al., 2011, Stillwater and Kurani, 2013). 
Different types of eco-driving feedback are further discussed in section 2.3.4. 
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Once a continuous practise is maintained, new behaviours can become 
automated (Rasmussen, 1983). This leads to increased entropy, which can 
be observed and measured in more systematic, consistent and predictable 
actions (Boer and Goodrich, 2005).  
 
2.3.2 Barriers to behavioural change 
One prerequisite for environmentally friendly behaviour is the awareness of 
environmental issues. For many people such awareness is limited by indirect 
and delayed experiences of environmental destruction (Kollmuss and 
Agyeman, 2002). Reports based on questionnaires claim that a large 
proportion of the UK population carries a positive attitude towards 
environmentally friendly behaviours (Christie and Jarvis, 2001). However, a 
large-scale attitude survey found that these attitudes are not reflected in self-
reported behaviour to the same extend (Christie and Jarvis, 2001). This 
mismatch was termed the value-action gap by Blake (1999). Kollmuss and 
Agyeman (2002) argued that a part of this gap can be explained with 
research-methodological problems. When attitudes and behaviours are 
measured in surveys, but the predicted behaviours are not verified later, a 
mismatch is likely. However, there are numerous personal barriers that 
prevent people from acting environmentally friendly. Kollmuss and Agyeman 
(2002) emphasised that such behaviours are influenced normatively by the 
society, by demographic, economic, and also internal and psychological 
factors. 
Paul Stern (2000) distinguished intend- and impact-oriented behaviour, 
explaining that good intention alone does not necessarily lead to the most 
effective actions. Only a small proportion of people are actually performing 
actions with a substantial impact in mitigating climate change (Whitmarsh, 
2009). The actions taken are often the actions that are convenient, such as 
recycling, or cost saving. Sustainable travel behaviours, which are 
considered impact-oriented actions (Chapman, 2007), are often difficult to 
incorporate into daily lives. Many people tend to overestimate one's actions 
towards mitigating climate change, while underestimating negative impacts 
through car use, for example (Whitmarsh, 2009). Eco-driving is one feasible 
means to act environmentally friendly, because of its cost-saving potential, 
without drastically compromising on travel time or safety. The downside is 
that drivers might have the impression they strongly contribute to the 
mitigation of climate change and therefore either drive more or neglect other 
impact-oriented actions (Vlek and Steg, 2007). 
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An external locus of control, the sense that one’s actions do not have an 
impact in the grand scheme of things, is another common barrier (Blake, 
1999). Hence, it is understandable that comparing one’s potential fuel 
savings within the global vehicle fleet can demotivate. Flynn et al. (2009) 
added a perceived lack of agency and responsibility of others. Even when 
the right attitudes and knowledge are present, Flynn et al. (2009) stated that 
situational factors, a reluctance for change and ingrained lifestyles, related to 
one’s energy use behaviour, are major culprits in behaviour change. 
Behavioural changes towards environmentally friendly actions are 
particularly difficult when it comes to personal car-use. Cars are linked to 
one’s status (Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 2006), and changes in 
travel habits can signify particular efforts and sacrifices (Stradling et al., 
2008). Apart from changing transport modes and driving less, getting people 
to eco-drive is a challenge. The horsepower of cars has increased since the 
early 1980s (Alson et al., 2014). Barkenbus (2010) argued that cars are 
often marketed communicating powerful engines and their ability to 
accelerate quickly and achieve high speeds, which contrasts the principles 
of eco-driving. The fun and comfort of travelling fast on motorways adds to 
the problem. A study by Harvey et al. (2013) involving focus groups and 
questionnaires revealed that the perceived costs of eco-driving can outweigh 
the rather small monetary benefits. One of these ‘costs’ is the threat of 
increased travel time. There are further studies showing that people expect 
eco-driving techniques to make them drive more slowly and to lose time 
(Dogan et al., 2011, van der Voort et al., 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980). 
However, in experiments where participants were guided by feedback 
devices time losses were either low or not present at all (Birrell et al., 2010, 
van der Voort et al., 2001). Such results exemplify how gaps in the 
knowledge and skills can present a barrier to eco-driving.  
 
2.3.3 Long-term behavioural change 
Changing behaviour in the long-term poses a particular challenge, especially 
with regards to habitual behaviour. Habits are practised repeatedly without 
deliberation (Goldenbeld et al., 2000) and are therefore relatively automated 
(Rasmussen, 1983). Although people can have access to information, and 
possess the knowledge enabling them to perform desired actions, 
automated habits can cause them to ignore information that is in conflict with 
ingrained behaviours (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). For example, the diminishing 
effects following an eco-driving course indicate their failure over time. A 
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reversion to ‘normal’ driving has been shown with fuel consumption data (af 
Wåhlberg, 2007) as well as acceleration rates and idling time (Beusen et al., 
2009). Drivers, who use a support system and then discontinue it, tend to 
return to old behaviours soon (van der Voort et al., 2001). It is possible that 
such systems need to be tested over a long time period before achieving 
learning or behavioural change effects (Jamson et al., 2015b). However, 
social norms and expectations, particularly when an individual is motivated 
to comply, can create enough pressure to break old habits (Ajzen, 1991).  
Approaches to change behaviour need to be sustainable. This means they 
are ideally both cost-efficient and effective in the long-term. Detailed and 
continuous feedback can change behaviour sustainably, because they form 
new behaviours with reinforcement, as studies with household energy 
consumption have shown (e.g. Seligman et al., 1981). Similar studies have 
found that positively phrased messages can be particularly effective 
(Fischer, 2008). However, it might not be ideal to continue providing the 
same kind of feedback for a long time. Van der Voort et al. (2001) suggested 
giving more detailed advice to novice drivers while reducing the amount of 
information presented to experienced drivers. They reasoned that 
experienced drivers would become annoyed by unhelpful information. 
Conversely, a system developed by Wada et al. (2011) increases the 
difficulty level when drivers' eco-driving skills improve. The ecoDriver project 
(Hibberd et al., 2013) involved a study with prolonged exposures, of about 
12 minutes for each condition, to visual and haptic EDSS in a driving 
simulator. The study found that haptic pedals were superior over visual 
systems in subjective criteria such as workload, usefulness and satisfaction.  
Successful behaviour change over time can result in altered habits. Paul 
Fitts (1964) described the formation of new habits in three stages. John 
Anderson (1982) summarised them as a declarative stage, where new 
information challenges old patterns, followed by a knowledge compilation 
stage, where a new set of behaviours is practised for the first time. Lastly the 
new habit is automated in the procedural stage. Hence, habits become 
stronger with the frequency of their practise and therefore the frequency, 
relevance and strength of their reinforcement. However, there is a risk that 
behaviours are too strongly reinforced, which can result in people justifying 
unsustainable actions instead. Instead of changing behaviours, they adjust 
their goals, which can even lead to giving up on environmentally friendly 
actions altogether. 
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2.3.4 The effects of eco-driving campaigns and support systems 
In order to encourage drivers to eco-drive, a number of different approaches 
have been successful. It is known that education, altered road design as well 
as in-vehicle messages can change habitual driving behaviour (Hof, 2008). 
Barkenbus (2010), for example, advocates public campaigns, because they 
have the potential to create awareness. This awareness can affect well-
planned, conscious decisions such as the purchase of a new car (Chapman, 
2007). When campaigns use social norms, they are even able to overcome 
habits, and convince drivers of eco-driving (Cristea et al., 2012). Public 
education campaigns increase awareness and can partly change behaviour. 
Martin et al. (2012) show how the EcoDrivingUSA website helped to change 
self-reported driving habits of a subset of their experimental group. The sub-
group is on average more educated and wealthy, as well as more concerned 
about climate change and fuel prices. It seems that these people already 
have a raw or a hidden eco-driving mental model in place, which can be 
completed, enhanced or brought into use with education. Simply asking 
people can be effective in the short-term. In an experiment by Waters and 
Laker (1980) a convenience sample was asked to drive normally and then 
eco-friendly around a specified course. The eco-driving session improved 
the average fuel efficiency by around 8%. This was achieved with slower 
speeds and higher gears. This result indicates that drivers have mental 
models of eco-driving that could be brought to use by prompting them.  
Hof et al. (2012) reviewed the latest developments in eco-driving support 
systems (EDSS). Several car manufacturers have created their own 
technologies. In the same time navigation systems were extended and 
applications for other nomadic devices were programmed. On the market 
one can find among others pre-trip route planning systems, which optimise 
driving conditions with regards to road types and traffic. During driving in-
vehicle systems provide visual, audio and haptic feedback. For example, 
Birrell et al. (2010) developed a haptic eco-driving pedal, which vibrates 
when the throttle is pressed beyond 50%. Post-trip systems inform about 
past eco-driving performance. The system of the Trafisafe project provided 
safety and eco-driving scores and compared the drivers’ performance with 
their peers (Tarkiainen et al., 2014). A considerable amount of literature has 
been published on user acceptance across these technologies. With a large-
scale survey across Europe Trommer et al. (2012) investigated the 
perceived usefulness (Davis, 1989), the perceived impact on fuel 
consumption and the environment, and the willingness to pay for different 
17 
 
categories of EDSS. All categories, pre-, in- and post-trip systems, were 
rated as useful. However, the personal benefits of trip-planning systems 
were not rated as high. This lower rating can be explained with longer travel 
times and general distrust in its recommendations, which were given without 
explanation. In addition, drivers tend to prefer systems that benefit them 
individually over systems that optimise the broader traffic situation (Risto and 
Martens, 2013).  
Regarding feedback systems, drivers tend to prefer clear, visual interfaces 
(Fors et al., 2015), and systems that communicate the rate of the required 
change (Jamson et al., 2015a). Studies about haptic pedals yielded mixed 
results, regarding their acceptance (Fors et al., 2015, Hibberd et al., 2015), 
efficiency and clarity (Jamson et al., 2015b, Päätalo et al., 2001). One study 
investigated a force feedback system assisting accelerations by 
communicating the ideal position with an abrupt increase in the force applied 
against the accelerator pedal. It showed that such a pedal system is both 
effective and easily understood (Jamson et al., 2015a). Drivers tend to prefer 
suggestive feedback over invasive interventions. One type of invasive 
system was tested by Nozaki et al. (2012). It controlled the fuel injection, 
changed the reaction of the gas pedal and stopped the engine when the 
vehicle was not moving. Their indirect system communicated real-time 
feedback with the purpose of changing the driver’s behaviour. Both EDSS 
significantly improved fuel consumption, while the participants reported that 
they would rather engage with and conform to suggestions. During the study 
the feedback system was superior, as the drivers invested active effort and 
improved their proficiency. It allowed them to practice by trial and error, so 
they became conscious and active drivers. EDSS that communicate with the 
driver instead of manipulating the vehicle encourage the driver to participate, 
expend more effort and ultimately improve their skills.  
Adapting to the driver’s eco-driving proficiency (Jamson et al., 2015b, Wada 
et al., 2011) or making it obvious where the driver is standing in relation to 
their goal (Stillwater and Kurani, 2013) can further improve fuel savings, 
acceptance of the technology and interest in eco-driving. Nouvelière et al. 
(2012) created eco-driving algorithms for a visual EDSS. The algorithms 
optimise speed and gear, while taking safety limits into account. A simulation 
clearly showed improvements in economical and safety terms. An EDSS 
prototype was then tested in an experiment with a Renault Clio Eco2 on a 
test track, with and without preceding vehicles. With the EDSS the drivers 
managed to improve safety and to increase fuel efficiency between 1.6% 
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and 12.9%, compared to driving with eco-driving instructions only. Kim and 
Kim (2012) as well as Jamson et al. (2015a) found that auditory feedback 
can aid a visual device even more in achieving a fuel-efficient driving style. 
Feedback systems have limitations. For instance, it is not always clear to 
drivers which actions are most effective in improving their eco-driving scores 
(Man et al., 2010). A miles per gallon measure alone can be misleading, 
because it does not take kinetic energy into account and therefore 
encourages suboptimal acceleration and deceleration (Stillwater, 2011). In 
addition, a feedback system can annoy and distract drivers, for instance with 
auditory signals or too much information (Fors et al., 2015, Jamson et al., 
2015b). Distraction may however lessen with practise (Rouzikhah et al., 
2013). Lee et al. (2011) demonstrate how drivers’ satisfaction with an in-car 
eco-drive system changes over time. At the beginning, the satisfaction is 
high due to high expectations, but soon users developed some frustration 
with the system’s constant suggestions. Later they get used to the way the 
system works and the satisfaction levels improve. Competitive gaming 
systems such as post-trip comparisons can be problematic, especially when 
rankings with other drivers are involved. By definition this approach allows a 
subgroup of drivers to ‘win’. Those who find themselves in the mid- and 
lower ranks could be discouraged from exerting further effort (Venables and 
Fairclough, 2009). 
In several studies it remained unclear which behavioural changes are due to 
the system’s communication and which are due to the driver’s eco-driving 
proficiency triggered by the system or experimental situation (Birrell et al., 
2014, Tarkiainen et al., 2014). A control condition in which participants are 
asked to eco-drive without any feedback has been effective in accounting for 
these unwanted effects (van der Voort et al., 2001).  
Tulusan et al. (2012) show that corporate drivers using an eco-drive 
application for mobile phones reduce their fuel consumption by 3.23%, even 
though they do not receive any tangible incentives. Generally, there is little 
agreement about the effectiveness of money savings as a motivator to drive 
fuel-efficiently. In a large-scale survey Man et al. (2010) found that 
information about money savings are the biggest motivator for drivers to 
change their behaviour, followed by information about fuel consumption and 
at least information about the impact on the environment. In contrast, with a 
qualitative study using feedback devices in hybrid cars Stillwater and Kurani 
(2013) suggest that these savings are not motivating actual behaviour 
changes. Participants in their study found cost related feedback simply 
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informative and a few were surprised how cheap a trip with a hybrid vehicle 
was in fact. Information about miles per gallons coupled with personalised 
goals had a much stronger effect on eco-driving. It seems that money is 
initially a high motivator and is mentioned in people’s intentions and plans 
(cf. Boriboonsomsin et al., 2010). However, when it comes to driving with 
feedback devices the goal to simply decrease fuel usage in order to achieve 
better scores and emit less greenhouse gases seem to be a stronger actual 
motivators for behavioural change. 
2.4 Summary and conclusions 
In summary, eco-driving is one means to behave in an environmentally 
friendly manner, and to contribute towards the mitigation of climate change, 
with a minimum of lifestyle changes and the potential for accruing 
considerable cost savings over time. In order to achieve substantial 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, the behaviour of a large proportion 
of the driving population needs to be changed. The behaviour change is 
neither a simple matter of providing education nor relying on monetary 
incentives. Neither does the prospect of behaving in an environmentally 
friendly way encourage people enough to practise eco-driving. On the other 
hand, feedback has been shown to be able to change behaviour, at least for 
the duration it is provided. These conflicting findings suggest that there is a 
need for more knowledge about drivers’ cognition. Mental models are a way 
to gain further insights into drivers’ knowledge and skills regarding eco-
driving and may shed more light into the reasons eco-driving is not 
practised, and into possible ways to overcome the barriers. 
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3 Mental models 
3.1 Introduction 
In a case study by Delicado (2012) a driving simulator was designed for 
teaching eco-driving. The underlying assumption was that drivers do not 
know how to eco-drive, which needs to be mended. The success of the 
educational simulator was limited. Firstly, it has been shown that the ‘right’ 
knowledge and attitudes do not result in the according action (Flynn et al., 
2009). In fact, there is evidence that motorists know more about reducing 
fuel consumption than they are given credit for (Delicado, 2012). The current 
research aspired to explore drivers’ actual understanding and practise of 
eco-driving by employing a mental models approach. It was designed to 
measure and later activate existing eco-driving mental models, without 
focussing on goals and motivations. By regarding eco-driving mental models 
in detail, the research extended beyond the stimulus-response paradigm, 
which views the human as a ‘black box’. Mental models are defined as 
representations of reality (Johnson-Laird, 1988), which are stored in people’s 
minds. They are retrieved in every-day life, as they are needed, to direct 
people’s perceptions and actions (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Mental 
models have been used in the fields of education (Anderson, 1982), logical 
reasoning and robotic (Johnson-Laird, 1988) as well as user-friendly design 
(Norman, 1983).  
The research reported here is not intended to supplement the mental model 
literature with new theory. Instead, mental model theory is used as a tool to 
study drivers’ cognition and behaviour. The purpose of this chapter is the 
provision of an overview of mental model research and a discussion of its 
suitability for studying eco-driving. Section 3.2.1 begins with its history, as 
philosophers began to form ideas of mental models in the 18th century. Then 
mental models are defined, with reference to different approaches, and 
scoped for the current research. Subsequently it is explained how mental 
models function, and then how they are constructed and refined. The 
background section concludes with an overview of how mental models have 
been utilised in research, education and communication, as well as in 
engineering. Section 3.5.4 concentrates on examples of how mental models 
have been researched in the driving domain to demonstrate that they can be 
a usable tool in understanding eco-driving. In order to create a complete 
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picture, the varied perspectives and approaches in the literature were 
reviewed to select the approaches that are suitable for the present thesis. 
People do not have physical mental models stored in their brains, and 
neither are the neurological mechanisms parts of this work. Hence, in this 
work the concept of mental models does not claim to be the true way the 
human brain works. Rather, mental models are understood as a construct 
that is useful for researching and understanding human behaviour and 
thoughts. 
 
3.2 What are mental models? 
3.2.1 History and philosophy  
Until the 18th century there had been a long-standing argument between two 
sides of philosophers about the way human beings gain knowledge. The 
rationalists on the one hand included notable names such as René 
Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza. They explained 
knowledge via deduction, which is the generation of conclusions based on 
premises. For them, reason is the sole source of knowledge. The empiricists 
on the other hand, including John Locke and David Hume, assumed that 
human beings experience reality unfiltered, as it is. They were thought to 
update their knowledge directly with the information available to them. At the 
end of the 18th century the philosopher Immanuel Kant combined these 
ideas in his major work ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (Kant and Erdmann, 1884), 
and introduced the concept of schemata (p. 177/142). According to Kant 
humans neither purely deduct their knowledge nor do they completely rely 
on reality (p.26/45). Instead, schemata serve as the link between stored 
concepts and reality (p. 185/147). They guide and filter perceptions. This 
means that people do not directly perceive the world around them. The idea 
that schemata are placed between reality and the conscious mind became 
the predecessor of the concept of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 
189f.). 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) further elaborated on the philosophy of human 
minds, showing how human beings need to create sample representations in 
their minds in order to understand the world. He exemplified his arguments 
by attempting to create an exact definition of the term ‘game’ (p. 31ff.) He 
began by asserting that games are competitive, but he soon found examples 
of non-competitive, playful games, such as a child bouncing a ball against a 
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wall. Then he stated that games are generally rule-bound, but then 
discovered that some games evolve around improvisation. Arriving at a 
universal definition was deemed impossible. Instead Wittgenstein argued 
that it is more natural for a person to think in examples of typical games. 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts about colour further clarify this idea (p. 28). For most 
people it is easy to imagine and even to agree with each other on a typical 
shade of red. However, setting firm boundaries defining the colour red is 
much more difficult and individual.  
Mental models, originating from philosophy, entered the field of psychology 
later with the psychologist Philip N. Johnson-Laird. Before the 19th century, 
psychology was part of philosophy and considered a domain of the church 
(Brett, 1921, Robinson, 1995). Especially in medieval times, psychology was 
closely linked to theology and was concerned with the soul. Research was 
based on philosophical reflections of individuals rather than empirical and 
quantitative research (Brett, 1921). In 1879 Wilhelm Wundt founded a 
laboratory for psychological research in Leipzig (Smith, 1982) and 
psychology was first considered an independent field of study suitable for 
both introspection and experimental research. With the latter, Watson (1963) 
argued, Brett provided a quantitative dimension to Kant’s schemata. 
Johnson-Laird based his notion of mental models strongly on Kant’s work 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 189f.), and, accordingly, defined them as internal 
representations of reality (1988). Since then, mental models have been 
applied in different fields of psychology such as psychiatry and 
psychoanalytics (e.g. Lombardi, 2003, Stern et al., 1998) and experimental 
psychology (e.g. Anderson et al., 2004, de Boer and Badke-Schaub, 2013, 
Georgeon et al., 2007).  
Mental models have been used to understand human cognition. In the field 
of artificial intelligence (AI) it was also attempted to replicate its processes. 
AI is defined as “the science and engineering of making intelligent machines” 
(McCarthy, 2007), and is a way to make mental models explicit in 
programming language. In the 1970s computer-simulated functions such as 
the understanding of language (Charniak, 1972, Simmons, 1972, Winograd, 
1972) were based on mental models. Today there is a renewed interest in 
AI, for example in computer vision, expert systems and classification in 
domains such as fraud detection (McCarthy, 2007). Mental models have 
also been studied from the perspective of users. Mental models represent 
their knowledge of a technology, system or process (Norman, 1983, 
Rasmussen, 1983), and the degree of learning (Boer and Goodrich, 2005).  
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It is important to distinguish mental models from other common 
psychological paradigms such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB, 
Ajzen, 1991) and theories derived from it. The TPB predicts behaviour, in 
particular the intention to perform this behaviour, with beliefs, attitudes and 
perceived control over it. Accordingly, behavioural change is initiated by 
changing the predicting factors. It is then expected that the change occurs at 
the next opportunity (Ajzen, 2002). In contrast, mental models allow a more 
subtle approach. For example, section 3.4.3 illustrates how behaviour can 
be altered by activating mental models with simple experimental instructions. 
The current mental model theory extends into diverse fields and is 
accompanied by a variety of understandings and definitions. The following 
section gives an overview of definitions, from history until today, and 
conceptualises the mental model approach used in this study. 
 
3.2.2 Definitions 
Kant, Wittgenstein and Johnson-Laird set the groundwork for mental model 
research. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) created the idea that the human mind 
incorporates a storage of sample representations of the world. Johnson-
Laird, the originator of the mental model theory as it is presently understood, 
based his notion of mental models strongly on Kant’s work (Johnson-Laird, 
1983, p. 189f.). Following up on his and on Wittgenstein’s ideas, he referred 
to a schema as “a single representative sample” (1983, p. 264) of a real 
entity. The idea that humans store representative schemas of the world, 
which guide their perceptions and actions, is central to the understanding in 
the current research.  
Human beings store mental models of many aspects of the world, including 
objects, situations and events, but also sequences of events and actions 
(Garnham, 1997, Johnson-Laird, 1983, Rumelhart, 1980). According to 
Merrill (2000) mental models are also referred to as ‘schema’, ‘frame’ 
(Minsky, 1974), ‘production’ (Anderson, 1982, Newell, 1973) and ‘script’ 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977). These terms do not always mean exactly the 
same, nor are they applied in the same domain, and many authors do not 
even agree on the definition of one single term.  
It is assumed that the representations that people create, store and 
communicate are first and foremost practical. Hence, mental models are 
stereotypical and not necessarily exact (Putnam, 1975). Johnson-Laird 
(1983, p. 264) clarified that mental models can be typical examples of 
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situations. Humans tend to apply well-known mental models to new, but 
similar situations (Moray, 1987). Mental models vary in their degree of 
correctness and abstraction. In fact, mental models are usually not very 
elaborate and often naïve (Johnson-Laird, 1988). For example, Norman 
(1983) found that many people carry naïve mental models of calculators, 
which result in the performance of unnecessary actions such as clearing the 
calculator’s memory several times. Even mature mental models do not 
necessary match reality closely. Instead, in line with Kant’s philosophy, 
mental models are understood as a compromise (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). Therefore they are not meant to fully 
represent reality, but to provide a link between assertions about the world 
and the world itself (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 437). Brunswik (1934) agreed 
on the assertion that humans do not perceive the world as it is. His 
understanding of mental models was less logical and mechanical, but more 
visual-spatial and descriptive. His examples employ landscape sceneries 
and cities. He stated that humans build their mental models based on 
probabilistic cues. For examples, a mental model of a city can include a 
probability for the city to have a football team in the national league 
(Brunswik, 1956). 
Johnson-Laird (1983) used mental models in the domain of logical problem 
solving. He defined a mental model as an internal representation that is 
consistent with the problem’s assertions. He provided an example, 
expressing such assertions as “All scientists are sceptics” and “There may 
be sceptics who are not scientists”. Johnson-Laird stated that persons and 
objects represented in the mental model should "occur in the real world with 
the same properties and the same relations holding between them" 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 441). Minsky (1974), who referred to mental 
models as frames, described them as remembered frameworks, which 
match reality to a certain degree. However, they may only be receptive to 
certain types of values and create their own default values, if necessary, for 
example based on similar experiences from the past. 
Dijk and Kintsch (1983) established the concept of situation models in the 
field of text and language comprehension. They viewed situation models as 
mental models of a specific situation, whereas mental models were 
considered more generic. In more abstract terms, Zwaan and Radvansky 
(1998) defined situation models as "integrated mental representations of a 
described state of affairs". A situation model is the representation of events, 
persons, actions and situations within a text. It extends beyond syntax, 
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semantics and single sentences. Like mental models, they are neither 
guaranteed to be successful nor unique and can potentially be disconfirmed 
at a later point in time. A situation model is based on both, the current text 
and existing knowledge (Graesser et al., 1994). The model is aligned with 
the reader's goal, and aims to be coherent in local text chunks as well as the 
global level of the text. However, as the reader is searching for meaning, 
they often use more or less naive theories about the story’s plot. They create 
inferences, which are conclusions resulting from several premises by the 
process of reasoning (Collins English Dictionary, 2015). Common inferences 
are related to superordinate goals of the characters, causal antecedents that 
state why certain actions, events and states are mentioned in the text and 
global thematic inferences that convey a major message of the text, for 
example.  
Mental models can also represent visual geometrical aspects of the world, 
such as a lake, including attributes such as its beauty, or its surrounding 
area, for example depicted as a 2-dimensional image (Brunswik, 1934) with 
objects positioned adjacent to each other (Johnson-Laird, 1988). Bower and 
Morrow (1990), referring to mental models of texts, asserted that a spatial 
mental model can contain characters and objects as well as their location in 
the scene as well as non-geometric aspects such as goals, actions and 
events, and is therefore more than a simple image. Hence, besides spatial 
relations such a mental model includes connections between elements of 
the text, the real and imaginary worlds, and existing knowledge such as 
expertise in related areas. 
Rumelhart (1980) elaborated on mental models of action sequences as he 
researched what humans understand while reading a text. Schank and 
Abelson (1977) introduced the concept of scripts, which are similar to mental 
models, but with a different structure of the memory (Garnham, 1997). This 
is to say, scripts are an episodic series of actions related to a situational 
context. Schank and Abelson (1977) described an example with a person 
walking into a restaurant, ordering, eating and paying. This is a simple, 
stereotyped sequence of actions. The following sequence, a person walking 
in the street, thinking about cabbage and then picking up a shoe horn, does 
not make sense to most people, because they do not have a suitable script 
stored in their memory. Such an example of an action sequence is displayed 
in Figure 1. Walking into a restaurant, ordering a meal, eating, paying and 
leaving is a typical action sequence. Each time this sequence is gone 
through in a person’s every-day life, the mental model is recognised, 
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retrieved and its variables are filled, for example with the location of the 
actual restaurant and the menu currently on display. In a narrative, for 
example, parts of such an action sequence can be automatically assumed. If 
such a story involves a couple walking into a restaurant and later leaving it, it 
may not be necessary to mention that they pay for their meals before 
leaving. Radvansky and Zacks (1997) distinguished between mental models 
representing static situations, also termed the state-of-affairs model, as well 
as mental models of dynamic, evolving situations, a course-of-event model. 
 
 
Figure 1: Time line with action sequence, adapted from Schank and 
Abelson (1977)1 
 
Besides understanding action sequences in texts, mental models of ‘doing’ 
actions have been represented by Takahashi and Kuroda (1996) as 
production rules with IF-THEN clauses. The IF-conditions represent the 
boundaries of the resulting behaviours. As an example, a driver of a car can 
have the rule ‘IF current gear = 5 and speed < 40 kmh THEN I change to 4th 
gear’. Driving at a higher speed in 5th gear, the boundary that marks a 
change to the 4th gear is 40 kmh. Such boundaries of mental models are 
further elaborated on in section 3.5.5. The ACT-R theory of John Anderson 
(2004) is based on mental models with a similar production concept also 
formulated with IF-THEN rules. He (1982) developed a framework for skill 
acquisition that includes 2 major stages in the development of a cognitive 
skill, a declarative and a procedural stage. In the declarative stage facts 
about the skill domain are interpreted on a conscious level and in the 
procedural stage the domain knowledge is automated and embodied in 
procedures for performing the skill. 
Rasmussen (1983) created a taxonomy of mental models, grouping them 
into a hierarchy of three levels, which are knowledge-, rule- and skill-based. 
The knowledge-based level is the most conscious level, where humans 
                                            
1 Copyright (© 1977) From Scripts, plans, goals and understanding: An 
inquiry into human knowledge structures by Schank and Abelson. 
Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, a division 
of Informa plc 
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reason and plan their actions according to their goals. On the rule-based 
level action sequences are carried out, similar to steps set out in a cooking 
book. These routines are based on explicit know-how and can be 
consciously controlled. Because humans are able to adjust their behaviour, 
mental models on the rule-based level are not equivalent to rules. Well-
learned, automated behaviour is attributed to the skill-based level, where 
individual actions cannot be consciously controlled. Figure 3 depicts 
Rasmussen’s hierarchy, and the mechanisms are further explained in 
section 3.3.1. 
 
 
Figure 2: Communication and Control with a Society of Mental Model 
Agents. SP = Sensor Perception, MM = Mental Model, BA = 
Behaviour Actuation © 1998 IEEE (Goodrich and Boer, 1998) 
 
Some scientists view mental models as social rather than individual 
constructs (Hutchins, 1995, Lynam et al., 2012, Pianelli et al., 2007). This 
concept is known as social representations, and was first described by 
Serge Moscovici (1961) and then extended by Jean-Claude Abric (1987). In 
contrast to mental models social representations encompass groups and 
communities and thus exist beyond the mind of an individual. Social 
representations serve two functions, providing a societal order and enabling 
communication and behaviour in groups. Looking into human behaviour in 
collaboration with each other and with artefacts in the environment Hutchins 
(1995) investigated internal representations in the field of navigation. He did 
not support the idea that humans have internal representations of a large 
part of the environment they are working with. Especially when humans 
intensively interact with it they simply do not need them, as is the case in 
navigation. However, experienced navigators make fewer errors than 
novices. A reason could be that experienced navigators have more 
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knowledge about processing and coordinating different representations. 
Because the focus of the research reported here is put on the understanding 
the minds of individuals, mental models are seen as individual. This view is 
underpinned by the individual nature of the driving task and the diversity of 
the participants in the experiments. 
Mental models are applied in the health sector, where it can be beneficial to 
identify discrepancies between expert and patient mental models. Vogt and 
Schaefer (2012) represented mental models of medication using complex 
diagrams. These grouped conditions into categories such as benefits, typical 
side effects and severe health risks. This method has the inherent 
assumption that expert mental models are the correct mental models and 
differences to the patients’ mental models signify knowledge gaps in the 
latter. This normative approach can be problematic, because the experts’ 
models, as seen in public health advice (Shai et al., 2008), can be incorrect 
and incomplete. 
In sum, there is a variety of definitions of mental models, and the most 
relevant of them are compiled into a workable definition for this research. 
Mental models are defined as representations of reality (Johnson-Laird, 
1988), which are stored in people’s long-term memory. These 
representations do not have to be correct, and can be stereotypical, simple 
and inexact. Michon and Rasmussen provided the bases for a hierarchy of 
mental models (Michon, 1985, Rasmussen, 1983), describing how mental 
models represent goals, strategies and knowledge on the highest levels, and 
make decisions on the tactical or rule-based level in order to activate 
behaviours. Mental models by Goodrich and Boer (2003), based on 
Rasmussen’s taxonomy, show how drivers activate and deactivate a skill. 
For this work it is not discussed whether and where mental models 
physically exist in the human brain. Instead, they are a concept, used to 
approach driver behaviour, and especially eco-driving in the studies in the 
current research. Mental models are different from psychological paradigms 
such as the stimulus-response mechanism, regarding humans as black box. 
Mental model theory can be linked to an economic view of human beings 
aiming at maximising their utility functions, or, as understood in SDT, to find 
an acceptable combination of positive and negative utilities. Some 
researchers state that mental models can be linked to emotions (Heijs, 
2006), such as anxiety acquired during frightening experiences, which can 
then further influence behaviour. However, in this work emotions are not 
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regarded. The focus is limited to the cognitive aspect of an individual’s 
knowledge and skills. 
 
3.3 Cognitive processes 
3.3.1 Operation and functions  
It is understood that mental models function in certain ways and a lot of 
literature refers to the ideas of Johnson-Laird (1983). In essence, it is 
assumed that humans possess a library of mental models. As people 
perceive information, a matching mental model is retrieved and fed with the 
variables of the current situation. If no matching mental model is found, a 
new one needs to be built. The creation of a new mental model is described 
further in section 3.4.1. If the new information is matching an existing mental 
model, the latter is retrieved from the memory and instantiated. An 
instantiation is defined as the creation of a concrete example of an abstract, 
general or universal entity (Collins English Dictionary, 2015). For example, 
when a dog is encountered, a mental model for ‘dog’ can be instantiated with 
some of the particular dog’s features, such as its bread, height and 
temperament. Some researchers assume that mental models are created, or 
in programming terms ‘compiled’, for any new situation (e.g. Greeno, 1989, 
Lynam et al., 2012, Smith and Semin, 2004). However, due to the limited 
processing capacity of the human mind, it is understood that mental models 
are sufficiently abstract to be re-used. Therefore the idea of compilations for 
any new situation is not adopted for the present thesis. Instead, it is 
assumed that the mental models are stored as readily compiled versions 
that are somewhat generic for the type of situation. When a matching 
situation is encountered, the relevant mental is retrieved and instantiated 
with the current situational variables before use (cf. Anderson et al., 2004, 
Johnson-Laird, 1988). 
An instantiated mental model then guides further perceptions, for instance, 
to gauge a dog’s conduct. It guides which features are evaluated and 
interpreted (Brunswik, 1956) and then determines actions accordingly 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977), e.g. whether to stroke the dog or not. These 
actions are typically oriented towards higher-level mental models, including 
goals, which are located on the knowledge-level in Rasmussen’s hierarchy 
(1983). The reasons behind these goals can be experiences from previous 
actions, their causes and restrictions in the physical environment. This 
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means that humans select their goals and subsequently adjust their actions 
according to these goals. Goals control actions in unfamiliar environments 
and provide some orientation in more familiar settings. In this way mental 
models help humans to cope with complexity, and some mental models can 
take the form of rules. Nevertheless, humans are expected to be able to 
override knowledge- and rule-based mental models. The more mental 
models are available to the human, the more efficient the coping with 
different situations will be, and, for example in the case of text 
comprehension, the better the understanding across different scenes and 
episodes (Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998). 
Kieras and Bovair (1984) have shown that people who have a more exact 
mental model of a control device perform better in its operation. Correct 
mental models also allow the transfer of one’s skills from one system to 
another (Gentner and Schumacher, 1986). Halasz and Moran (1983) tested 
two groups of people with tasks involving a calculator. One of these groups 
was taught the way the calculator works, its internal mechanics. Then both 
groups practised routine problems. Afterwards, the participants were asked 
to solve routine and complex problems. Both groups were able to solve the 
routine tasks equally well using skilled methods, corresponding to lower-
level mental models. The group that had learned the underlying model of the 
calculator was better able to solve novel problems. Interestingly, some 
members of the naïve group used a simple, but effective algorithm. They 
entered the commands into the calculator, as they appeared in the problem. 
However, the participants with the calculator’s mental model did not use this 
algorithm. They were able to benefit from the stack algorithm of the 
calculators, especially for the most complex problems. These results show 
that correct mental models can be useful in operating a device such as a 
calculator, but also that naïve users may develop effective strategies as well. 
Johnson-Laird (1988) stated that mental models are naïve and stereotypical 
in order to be employable for the working memory. Baddeley (1992) defined 
the working memory as a “system that temporarily stores information as part 
of the performance of complex cognitive tasks”. It stores the information from 
the long-term memory and perceived information that is needed to complete 
the current task. The problem is that its capacity is limited (Miller, 1956, 
Simon, 1969). Hence, it is unable to host overly complex mental models. As 
an example of a serviceable mental model, a spatial diagram of the 
Common Room in the Institute for Transport Studies (ITS) was drawn by the 
author from memory without having another look at this room, as displayed 
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in Figure 3. The room was used by the author on most workdays for several 
months. However, as the comparison to a photo shows, the drawing does 
not match reality well. Instead of the large table in the drawing there are two 
small tables in the room and details about the coffee corner as well as the 
recycle bins were hardly remembered. This mental model appeared to be 
sufficient for the author’s use of the room, and the omitted details were either 
unnecessary or very ingrained in her mental model. 
 
 
Figure 3: Mental Model of the ITS Common Room 
 
The exercise of drawing the ITS Common Room was conducted twice with a 
group of fellow postgraduate research students, 6 at the first and 5 at the 
second session, with a few weeks in-between. At the beginning of a session 
the participants were handed empty sheets of paper and pens. Then they 
were simply asked to draw the aforementioned room, on their own, within a 
few minutes. They were also instructed to avoid talking, to prevent the 
students from influencing each other. One participant brought his young son 
to the first session. During the exercise the boy asked which room was 
meant and subsequently exclaimed “It is the room with the books!”  
The resulting drawings provide varying degrees of detail. A simpler one was 
drawn from a bird’s eye view with labelled boxes, see Figure 4. A more 
complex drawing depicts the room from the point of view of a human who 
just stepped into the room, with a skilfully crafted interior, and appears to 
peer through a window at a tree. Two of the 6 images created during the first 
session include a charity book box on one of the tables, and 2 explicitly 
include a bookshelf at the wall. None of the drawings from the second 
session includes the charity book box, and only one clearly shows the 
bookshelf.  
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Figure 4: Two drawings of the ITS Common Room 
 
In sum, the exercises indicate that visual-spatial mental models of the same 
room can vary strongly across different people, particularly in their degree of 
detail, abstraction and correctness. The boy’s mention of ‘books’ appeared 
to have activated some detail within the room’s mental models, although 2 
students remembered a book box and 2 others a book shelf. 
The relationship between mental models and actual behaviour is not 
coherent in the literature. Bellet and Tattegrain-Veste (1999) conceptualised 
mental models as a framework of knowledge that is communicating with a 
different part of the brain that is actuating behaviour. Other theories view 
mental models as directly controlling behaviour including fine-tuned and 
automated actions (Anderson et al., 2004, Rasmussen, 1983). The 
assumption for the research presented here is in line with the latter. Mental 
models determine both the higher level and also the very detailed, 
automated, behaviours. Therefore mental models make all the behavioural 
decisions of human beings. In the driving domain a lot of the mental models 
research relies on the hierarchy of behaviours by Rasmussen (1983) and 
Michon (1985). Michon divided the driving task into the three hierarchical 
levels as depicted in Figure 5, which roughly correspond to the knowledge, 
rule and skill levels by Rasmussen. These are the strategic, tactical level 
and the operational level. The strategic level is dedicated to well-thought 
through actions and planning, the tactical level is concerned with the 
manoeuvring of the car and the operational level ensures its control.  Control 
tasks can then be performed while the driver has sufficient cognitive 
resources for thinking and planning the next actions on the strategic level, 
for example. These levels are not strictly divided. For instance, driving 
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beginners perform their actions on a higher level, with conscious cognitive 
effort, which results in a slower performance. 
 
 
Figure 5: Hierarchical model of the driving task (1985)  
 
Bellet et al. (2007) created a computational simulation of mental models. 
They are situated on the tactical level in their COSMODRIVE model, a 
cognitive simulation model of the driving task (Bellet and Tattegrain-Veste, 
1999). COSMODRIVE was developed to model the driver’s cognition and to 
explain why they behave in the way they do. Mental models are instantiated 
on the Current Representation BlackBoard, a temporary storage space. 
They then produce anticipations, coordinate the road exploration as well as 
information processing, arrange decisions and choose driving actions. Errors 
in them can cause errors in decision making and therefore possibly 
accidents. 
The hierarchy of mental models by Boer et al. (1998) illustrates how mental 
models are organised and how they interact with each other. Figure 6 
displays the three hierarchical levels, a strategic, a tactical and an 
operational level (cf. Michon, 1985). In this model, each level contains 
mental models and decision makers. According to Boer et al. (1998), the 
‘needs’ mental model provides evaluations of the current and potential 
routes and task sets according to the driver’s needs. The resulting strategy 
is the basis for the selection of tactical mental models, which then provide 
the ‘tactical decision maker’ with predictive information and assessments of 
situations and current tasks. The ‘tactical decision maker’ schedules tasks 
and allocates attentional resources to the operational level, which interacts 
with reality. In this model it is understood that mental models exist on the 
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lower, operational level. However, humans are not able to consciously 
access and influence behaviour on these levels. Car-following and lane-
changing are well-learned skills that are potentially the same in ‘normal’ and 
eco-driving, although the decision to activate and deactivate them might 
differ in these driving styles. Hence, in the present thesis the view that 
mental models exist on such a lower, operational, level is nor adopted. What 
can be attributed to this level, though, is the collection of perceptive 
information and its upward direction. The operational decision makers are 
the task handlers executing the chosen actions. 
 
 
Figure 6: Hierarchical Driver Model (Boer et al., 1998) 
 
The hierarchy was rearranged by Goodrich and Boer (1998) into a society of 
mental model agents and consists of three levels which are knowledge-
based, rule-based and skill-based, respectively. This hierarchy is based on 
the hierarchy of human performance as defined by Rasmussen (1983). The 
skills are actuated from and monitored on higher levels. Humans perceive on 
the skill level, and the information is then transferred to the rule and 
knowledge levels. There the mental models receive this information and 
allocate resources to the levels below them 
There has been a debate about mental models from a psychological point of 
view, particularly about the idea of a set of specified schemas in the 
memory. Some researchers view mental models as loose structures that are 
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compiled into usable models when the human being needs them (Lynam et 
al., 2012). Oaksford and Chater (1991), for example, have the standpoint 
that human memory functions with formal rules that are unconnected to 
representations such as mental models. According to them, mental models 
are limited in the face of complex knowledge, where they become 
unmanageable in the process of making sense of the world. However, the 
storage capacity of the working memory is limited (Miller, 1956, Simon, 
1969), in contrast to the almost endless capacity of the mid- or long-term 
memory (Simon, 1969). Hence, it is unlikely that humans are capable of 
developing new strategies every time they attempt to solve a problem. The 
mental model theory provides an explanation for the way humans can 
accomplish complex tasks. They use stored representations instead of 
creating new representations every time they face a challenge (Johnson-
Laird, 1983, Moray, 1987). The theory takes into account that the 
representations are stereotypical and simplified, because exact 
representations are difficult to attain, especially when initial mental models 
are built (Wittgenstein, 1953). People do not include every logical step and 
possibility into their reasoning and often revert to recognising patterns and 
using heuristics (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002).  
 
3.3.2 Types of mental models 
One of the reasons why mental models are understood in a variety of ways 
is the fact that they have been used in a number of domains. Because these 
domains require them to fulfil different purposes, the way mental models are 
seen and represented varies. This section exemplifies some of the major 
types of mental models, beginning with logical constructs for problem 
solving, continuing with linguistics and text comprehension as well as visual-
spatial images and ending with actions in people’s everyday behaviour. 
 
Logic, reasoning and problem solving 
Mental models have been used for studying human reasoning as people 
form conclusions and judgements using stored and perceived information 
(Garnham, 1997). Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1990) asserted that most 
people do not solve complex problems such as the knight and knaves 
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puzzle2 utilising elaborate and exact strategies. Due to their cognitive 
limitations they refrain from testing a long chain of hypotheses, for example. 
Instead, humans tend to find or invent simpler strategies and heuristics by 
approaching such problems with mental models, as described by Johnson-
Laird (1983). He described problem solving based on truth conditions, which 
state whether a set of statements is defined as true (Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
The set of statements is judged as true if at least one mental model that 
satisfies its truth conditions can be mapped into the real world while 
preserving the content of the mental model.  
People begin a deductive process by building an internal representation that 
is consistent with the problem’s assertions. Such a representation can look 
as follows: 
 p     q 
The letter ‘p’ stands for a statement such as “Person A is a knight” and q for 
another statement such as “Person B is a knave”. The model is then tested 
for potential conclusions. If none is found, the model is altered. In case a 
conclusion is found, the opposite is tested, with assertions such as “Person 
A is not a knight” and “Person B is not a knave”. These negations are 
represented below: 
¬p  ¬q 
If the counterexample arrives at a reasonable conclusion, too, the mental 
model needs to be altered or rejected. Otherwise, it is accepted.  
 
Linguistics, language processing and text comprehension 
Mental models have been extensively studied in the field of linguistics, 
particularly in semantics, the branch concerned with the meaning of words 
and sentences. One stream of thought, also called the true or realist 
perspective, is concerned with the search for the meanings that are as close 
to reality as possible (Putnam, 1975). In contrast, the psychologist 
perspective, inferring meaning from assertions only and therefore 
                                            
2 The knights and knaves puzzle has been studied by Rips. In the puzzle it is 
assumed that two sorts of people exist, knights and knaves. Knights 
always tell the truth and knaves always lie. A problem can be formulated 
as follows: A says ‘I am a knave and B is a knave.’ B says ‘A is a knave.’ 
Please classify A and B into knights or knaves. The solution is that A is a 
knave and B is a knight. Rips, L. J. 1989. The psychology of knights and 
knaves. Cognition, 31, 85-116. 
37 
 
independently of reality, is in line with logical reasoning as related to 
Johnson-Laird (1983). On a broader scale, mental models have been 
applied to text and discourse comprehension (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983), 
which is a field within linguistics and psychology. While texts have the main 
purpose to structure and convey information, discourse is defined as the use 
of language to perform an action (McGregor, 2009). The understanding of 
language and texts is one important stream in AI (McCarthy, 2007). Some 
early approaches of AI are based on basic representations and procedures, 
which are fed with new information and performed, respectively, as a text is 
understood (Charniak, 1972, Simmons, 1972, Winograd, 1972). 
 
Visual and spatial cognition 
Mental models have been concerned with visual geometrical aspects of the 
world. Brunswik has worked with perception and stated that humans do not 
perceive the world with its physical properties, but on probabilistic terms 
(Brunswik, 1934). In the 1950s Brunswik (1956) developed a lens model, 
which describes how reality is perceived via objective cues, which have 
uncertain relationships to the actual objects. One example is the lake scene 
in Figure 7 (Gifford, 1997), with several features in the front and in the back. 
People tend to perceive the objects that are important to them, and filter their 
perceptions according to their goals. If the goal is to judge the beauty of this 
scene, cues such as ‘colour of water’ form inferences such as ‘undisturbed’, 
‘polluted’ and ‘striking’. They therefore form a judgement of perceived rather 
than objective beauty. 
 
Figure 7: Lake scene with perceptual cues (Gifford, 1997) 
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This visual pattern of information processing can be applied in the field of 
pervasive technology, for example, as described by Heijs (2006). Through 
visual cues technology can make people conscious of their actions 
(Vallacher and Wegner, 1987), which then has the potential for enabling 
behaviour change. 
 
Everyday behaviour 
Mental models have been used to understand behaviour, for example the 
understanding of behavioural sequences in texts and learned action routines 
(Garnham, 1997, Rumelhart, 1980, Schank and Abelson, 1977). The scripts 
are stored in the memory and retrieved when they are recognised in 
perceived events. Of particular important for the current thesis are action 
sequences relevant for the performance by an individual, because these are 
the ones relevant for driving. For example, Georgeon et al. (2007) and 
Henning et al. (2008) modelled lane changes with their ABSTRACT method, 
further described in section 3.5.4.  
In everyday behaviour, there are a number of different approaches to the 
way mental models function. For the research reported here it is assumed 
that humans store a library of mental models, which are generic enough to 
be used for the same type of situation. For example a mental model for a 
lane change can be used on different motorways, provided the traffic 
conditions are somewhat similar. As the driver perceives information and 
recognises the situation and the need for a lane change, the matching 
mental model is retrieved and fed with the variables of the current situation.  
 
3.4 How do mental models come into being? 
3.4.1 The creation of mental models 
This section focusses on the way humans learn. There is a lot of agreement 
in the literature about the process of mental model building. Learning begins 
with the construction of a new mental model. Johnson-Laird (1988) wrote 
that as humans comprehend, they build mental models based on some of 
the information available to them and use default values to complete the 
models initially to create a coherent picture of the situation. Therefore, an 
initial mental model is potentially very naïve or even erroneous. With new 
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information it is validated, changed or replaced and gradually mature 
(Johnson-Laird, 1988). In this section the creation of initial mental models is 
described from the point of view of different approaches and disciplines. 
 
Text and discourse comprehension 
Graesser et al. (1994) stated that text and discourse comprehension is 
thought to be similar to the way people experience and make sense of their 
daily lives. In order for people to comprehend a text they need to build new, 
and also retrieve existing representations (Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998). 
The topic of text comprehension was addressed specifically by van Dijk and 
Kitsch (1983) with situation models. As people read a text they create a 
coherent macrostructure for the text and draw inferences. This way this 
macrostructure is influenced by their existing knowledge, beliefs and goals. 
Within this structure representations are built on various levels of complexity, 
referring to words, clauses and sentences.  
The idea that, as people learn and understand they construct mental models 
or situation models, was termed the constructionist approach (Graesser et 
al., 1994). This theory is in line with the principle of a search for meaning. A 
reader tries to make sense of the reasons why events, actions and states 
are mentioned in the text, often using more or less naive theories about 
these occurrences. Some inferences are made on-line, or during 
comprehension. In some cases these inferences are abandoned, for 
example if the text is judged 'inconsiderate', the reader lacks necessary 
background knowledge or the reader's goals do not require that kind of 
understanding, e.g. during proofreading. Off-line inferences are made during 
retrieval and are just as crucial for the sense-making process as on-line 
inferences.  
 
Visual-spatial comprehension 
The mental model approach has been utilised to research the way human 
beings create representations of visual geometrical aspects of the world. 
Bower and Morrow (1990) researched the understanding of stories using 
spatial mental models. When a person reads a text they are building 
multilevel representations of the information. Beginning with the surface 
structure, they extract an initial text base with the text's concepts, their 
relations and predicates, which are the main components of sentences apart 
from the subject (Collins English Dictionary, 2015). The mental model is then 
40 
 
further modified based on clues in the text. When important elements in a 
story change, the mental model needs to be updated, which can require time 
and effort to process. In an experiment using the building layout in Figure 8 
Morrow et al. (1987) found that readers of a story were able recall probes in 
the same room with the main character faster than probes in other rooms. 
This indicates that relevant mental models are activated, at least to a higher 
degree than less important mental models. 
 
 
Figure 8: Building layout from Morrow et al. (1987)3 
 
The concept of mental models is comparatively fathomable in the field of 
visual-spatial cognition in the real world, where humans literally create 
models of the way they understand a location. 
                                            
3 Reprinted from Accessibility and situation models in narrative 
comprehension, Daniel G Morrow, Steven L Greenspan, Gordon H 
Bower, Copyright 1987, with permission from Elsevier. 
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Theory building 
As humans learn about complex subjects such as mathematics and physics, 
they build mental models of them. These mental models are often abstract, 
naïve and contain flaws. Performance, especially when it comes to complex 
problem solving, often depends on appropriate mental models (Halasz and 
Moran, 1983).  
It has been established that infants are able to create mental models from 
the age of 3 months (Baillargeon, 1987). In school, as children learn about 
complex subjects, their mental models can be very simplified and faulty at 
first. For example, some children believe the Earth is shaped as a flat disc. 
As children learn, they synthesise their mental models with socially accepted 
versions, until their mental models are not in conflict with these versions 
anymore (Vosniadou and Brewer, 1992).  
 
Driving 
When people drive a car for the first time the associated action sequences 
are new. Drivers build their initial mental model of, for example, a gear 
change on a high level, e.g. on the knowledge level in Rasmussen’s 
hierarchy (Rasmussen, 1983), defined in section 3.2.2. The sequence 
consists of stepping on the clutch, putting the gear lever into the correct gear 
and then slowly releasing the clutch while gently pressing the accelerator 
pedal. As these actions are automatised with practise, the sequence is 
simply called ‘gear change’ and performed at once. Bellet et al. simulated 
the construction of driving mental models (Bellet et al., 2007, Bellet and 
Tattegrain-Veste, 1999). Similar to the understanding of mental models in 
other domains, these driving frames are constructed with perceptive 
information and knowledge from the long-term memory. However, in this 
definition they solely exist on the tactical level and incorporate the operative 
knowledge. 
 
3.4.2 Learning, refinement and automation 
Human beings learn by incorporating new situations into their knowledge 
(Minsky, 1974, Schank and Abelson, 1977). Learning begins with the 
creation of a mental model, and from there the mental models are improved. 
In case new information is in conflict with existing mental models, this new 
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information causes the change or replacement of an old one. Alternatively, it 
induces the construction of a new mental model, as described in the 
previous section. Hence, during learning mental models are continuously 
evaluated, updated or reconstructed utilising information that is incompatible 
with the current set of mental models. If possible, humans are capable of 
linking mental models to each other (Radvansky and Zacks, 1997). This 
could generate different viewpoints about a topic, for example. However, 
existing mental models influence how information is perceived and therefore 
further learning processes. Learning is time-consuming, limited by the 
information processing capacity of human beings (Miller, 1956, Simon, 1969) 
and can trigger emotional responses (Schön, 1983). For this reason humans 
naturally tend to avoid the process, for example by ignoring contradictory 
information.  
In the context of language and text comprehension, Rumelhart (1980), 
Garnham (1997), Schank and Abelson (1977) asserted that mental models 
are enhanced by listening and reading. Especially the combination of 
language and images can improve the construction of mental models. As a 
result, the better a person is able to construct a mental model the more they 
are able to understand an event (Halford, 1993, Wyer Jr and Radvansky, 
1999).  
Frequent maturations of mental models can result in richer mental models. 
On the other hand it is expected that human beings abstract or simplify their 
mental models (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002). This is one type of 
optimisation, and was described by Arnold and Mettau (2006) as the 
formation and shifts of mental models within the hierarchy (c.f. Rasmussen, 
1983). Rasmussen (1983) and Michon (1985) explained that as behaviours 
are trained, they are increasingly automated and move down in the 
hierarchy, towards control actions. In this process the mental models are 
made more efficient by removing unnecessary parts and making shortcuts. 
Distinct actions are thereby converted into procedures and connected to 
larger routines. In the ACT-R theory of Anderson (1982, Anderson et al., 
2004) knowledge compilation is the process by which the skill transits from 
the declarative stage to the procedural stage. It consists of the subprocesses 
of composition, which collapses sequences of productions into single 
productions, and proceduralisation, which embeds factual knowledge into 
productions. Once proceduralised, further learning processes occur to make 
the productions more selective in their range of applications. The ecological 
interface design (EID) method (Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989) postulates 
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that humans can learn with direct stimuli to the automated level, by 
bypassing the higher levels and the automatisation process (McIlroy and 
Stanton, 2014, McIlroy and Stanton, 2015, Milot et al., 2010). 
Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978) use the concept of mental models in their 
concept of single-loop and double-loop learning. In single-loop learning 
people adjust their actions and still maintain existing governing variables. In 
double-loop learning people bring their mental models into consciousness 
and change the governing variables. 
 
3.4.3 Enabling and activating mental models 
In section 3.3.1 it was described how mental models are matched with 
currently perceived information and then instantiated. However, this match is 
not the only factor in choosing which mental model is activated. The 
concepts of priming, nudging and prompting show how more or less subtle 
messages can influence this process. These concepts go beyond simple 
information, which enables people to make decisions based on their 
preferences and goals. In this way, simple information is able to change 
behaviour. Primes, nudges and prompts, however, have the purpose to 
change behaviour into a particular direction. 
 
Priming 
Priming was defined by Fiske and Taylor (1984) as "the fact that recently 
and frequently activated ideas come to mind more easily than ideas that 
have not been activated" (p.231). Later Fiske and Taylor (2013) refined their 
definition of priming, clarifying that priming improves the accessibility of 
categories, assuming a network-like memory structure.4  Hence, the effects 
of priming on the accessibility of constructs has traditionally been 
understood in the context of network-based theories of cognition. Roskos-
Ewoldsen et al. (2002) argued, however, that mental models provide a 
framework that allows to research priming on a larger scale. Following up on 
this idea, subtle primes can cause the activation of mental models and 
                                            
4 "the effects of prior context on the interpretation of new information, that is, 
the impact of a recently or frequently activated category on the 
processing of category-relevant information, typically interpreted in terms 
of category accessibility, within declarative (associative network) 
memory." p. 450, Fiske, S. T. & Taylor, S. E. 2013. Social cognition: 
From brains to culture, London, UK, Sage. 
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change subsequent judgements and behaviour (Brewer et al., 2003, Iyengar 
and Kinder, 1987). They especially enhance the accessibility of files stored 
in the long-term memory (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987).  
 
It has been found that the attitudes that are more accessible can influence 
the way a person defines a situation (Fazio, 1986, Fazio et al., 1994), and 
therefore the mental models of the current situation and resulting behaviour. 
Which mental model is accessed depends on its match with the situation, 
but it also depends on its accessibility (Radvansky and Zacks, 1997, Wyer Jr 
and Radvansky, 1999). This means that mental models can be primed, for 
example by media. Examples of long-term media priming include an 
increased coverage of certain topics or violent TV programmes (Josephson, 
1987). Another way is that priming can activate elements within a mental 
model is to increase the accessibility of particular information inside a mental 
model. This mechanism has been researched in the field of text 
comprehension, for example (Morrow et al., 1989, Morrow et al., 1987, 
Radvansky and Zacks, 1997).  
Mental models are a useful approach for studying priming in two ways. On 
the one hand mental models can incorporate the information delivered with 
the prime (Wyer Jr and Radvansky, 1999, Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998). On 
the other primes increase the accessibility of the targeted mental model, 
which increases the likelihood if its activation (Brewer et al., 2003, Iyengar 
and Kinder, 1987).  
A problem with priming is that it can effect contrasting behaviours (Herr, 
1986, Herr et al., 1983, Martin, 1986), e.g. if the connection is too obvious 
and the intentions demystified (Erb et al., 2002) or in the case of extreme 
primes (Herr, 1986, Herr, 1989). However, even if participants notice the 
primes, but the desired effect on their choices remains unknown to them, the 
primes can affect their subsequent behaviour (Mandel and Johnson, 2002). 
Hence, primes are ideally delivered in a subliminal manner. For example, 
Fiske and Taylor (1984) stressed that in priming studies the primed 
interpretation must not be consciously connected to the stimulus to prevent 
the participants from pleasing the experimenter. However, this is difficult to 
achieve in practise, because the prime has to be shown for a very short 
duration and be hidden behind irrelevant cues. The timing of the primes can 
have effects as well. They can work in the short- and long-term, but function 
especially well at the point when a stimulus is encoded (Srull and Wyer, 
1979, Srull and Wyer, 1980). Hence, primes tend to be more effective with 
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close proximity between the prime and the stimulus, particularly for more 
inaccessible constructs (Bargh et al., 1988). Frequency and recency effects 
potentially occur (Higgins, 1989). Frequently primed constructs are more 
stable in the long-term. For example, when charities send regular 
newsletters, the receivers could be more likely to consider them the next 
time they want to make a donation. Recently primed concepts tend to 
dominate in the short-term (Higgins et al., 1985). If a construct is primed 
sufficiently, it becomes chronic (Bargh et al., 1986) and is used even without 
the person's intention (Higgins et al., 1982) or control (Bargh and Pratto, 
1986). The reason is that primed concepts are often automated (Bargh, 
1984, Payne and Iannuzzi, 2012). In contrast, if people are aware of the 
activation, they may invoke more conscious and controlled thoughts and 
behaviours instead.  
In the second experiment in the current thesis, presented in chapter 5, the 
concept of primes was used, but not in a way that is as subtle and hidden as 
in some priming studies. Messages were created, which included the topic of 
eco-driving and were supposed to increase the presence of eco-driving in 
the receivers’ minds. For another experimental group advice messages were 
created, which do also adhere to the concept of primes, because such 
advice does not involve direct encouragements. Because of the manifold 
nature of the experimental interventions, findings from literature from the 
fields of more overt methods such as nudging and prompting were employed 
as well during the design of the study. In the following discussion it will 
become more apparent that the definitions of primes, nudges and prompts 
are congruent in some aspects, and that the differences are mostly apparent 
in the academic disciplines in which these concepts are used. 
 
Nudging 
Nudges are defined by Thaler and Sunstein as “any aspect of the choice 
architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To 
count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.” 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). A typical example of a nudge is a canteen 
positioning healthy foods at eye level and sugary treats below them. This 
example shows how nudges preserve people's liberty by steering them in a 
particular direction, while taking their human limitations into account (Amir et 
al., 2005, Camerer et al., 2003). Nudges preserve the option for people to 
choose their own way (Sunstein, 2014). The example of the canteen also 
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illustrates that nudges are primarily targeting behaviour in the short-term 
such as at the point of purchase. If the canteen reverses the positioning of 
the food items a week later, the sales of the sweets would most probably 
rise. 
 
In comparison to campaigns or enforced restrictions, for example, nudges 
are potentially very cost effective. They were used to improve people’s 
decisions regarding their pensions and health, for example. Reminders are 
one example of a nudge that is applicable for the research presented here, 
because they could overcome people’s inertia towards eco-driving and 
competing demands. Reminders would adhere to the main goal of nudges, 
which is the retention of the option to behave in any other way. Nudges are 
not entirely different from primes in the sense that both approaches allow the 
receivers to act freely, and may be more or less subtle. One issue with 
governmental interventions is that indirect nudges can be perceived as 
deceptive. Several voices (Fischer and Lotz, 2014, Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008) cautioned against subliminal messages. They suggested that nudges 
need to be delivered in a transparent manner instead.  
 
In practise, this concept is primarily utilised in policy making. The examples 
known to the author are all intended to benefit the citizens by nudging them 
to make smarter choices, for instance in financial or health matters. The 
reasoning behind nudges is traditionally based on economic models. It 
assumes that humans are first and foremost as utility maximisers, whose 
utility functions are naturally flawed (Fischer and Lotz, 2014). The downside 
is that nudges are primarily momentary and do not take unconscious 
cognitive processes into account (Payne and Iannuzzi, 2012). Nevertheless, 
nudges help making sense of the results in the studies presented in this 
thesis, not least because the way mental models work can partly be 
explained with utility functions, as is done in satisficing decision theory below 
and in section 3.5.5. 
 
 
Prompting 
Prompting is based on reminders that are meant to draw the recipient’s 
attention to a specific behaviour, whether it is desirable or not (Steg et al., 
2012). They do not need to be subtle and are therefore easier to implement 
in experiments compared to studies using subtle primes. Prompts are 
suitable for campaigns, particularly in the field of environmentally friendly 
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behaviours, where people can be asked to act in a more desirable way. 
They are usually formulated in a direct, imperative manner, for example in 
the form of a sign in a park asking visitors to drop their litter into the bins 
provided. Billboards along motorways prompting drivers to use their 
seatbelts or so adhere to the speed limit are further examples. Prompts have 
the advantage that they target conscious decision making and can therefore 
lead to automated behaviours being overruled (Steg et al., 2012). Prompting 
studies found that they tend to be most effective when delivered close to the 
desired behaviour (Balas et al., 2000) as well as in a simple and polite way 
(Geller et al., 1982). Hence, they can be implemented with experimental 
instructions in the research presented here, as discussed in chapter 5. In 
contrast to nudges, prompts are not closely related to economics and 
therefore utility functions, and can hitherto be interpreted in more flexible 
ways. 
 
Selection of mental models and Satisficing Decision Theory 
In Rasmussen’s hierarchy the selection and activation of mental models is 
conducted by higher-level mental models (Rasmussen, 1983). With the 
goals and strategies decided on the knowledge level, the rule-based mental 
models select which lower-level skills are activated. Hence, they decide 
which actions are consequently executed, and which of the skills receive 
attentional resources. Using perceptual input fed back from the skill level, 
the rule-based mental models then refine their decisions and control further 
actions (Boer et al., 1998). As an example, with perceptual information about 
traffic lights or the headway to a car in front, the mental model for 
longitudinal vehicle control on the rule-based level makes the instant 
decision, if cruising is acceptable or if a braking action needs to be initiated. 
It is possible for humans to consciously influence the rule-based mental 
models and skills by shifting them upwards in the hierarchy. This process, as 
explained in section 3.4.2, is connected with an increased effort. Distraction, 
on the other hand, occupies attentional resources and can interrupt such 
efforts, and cause the more automated behaviours to be activated, which is 
further explained in the following section. Figure 9 illustrated the interaction 
between knowledge-, rule- and skills with examples from the driving domain 
(Goodrich and Boer, 1998). 
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Figure 9: Communication and Control with a Society of Mental Models, 
based on Rasmussen (1983) and adapted from © 1998 IEEE 
Goodrich and Boer (1998) 
 
The required attention of the skills is calculated using Model Predictive 
Control (Richalet, 1993). MPC is a system model designed to handle 
uncertain situations in constrained environments. According to the 
Satisficing Decision Theory (SDT) (Goodrich et al., 1998b) the choice of an 
action by the rule based-models is based on MPC. In SDT an action is 
chosen when it is good enough. ‘Good enough’ means that the sum of the 
benefits is higher than the sum of the costs for a given option. On this level 
making an optimal choice may be impossible or require too many resources, 
and therefore too much effort. Philosophically speaking, this is done to 
minimise error rather than seeking the absolute truth. Once decided, the 
eventual action is executed on the skill-based level. SDT assumes that 
humans usually do not make optimal decisions, but use a simpler heuristic 
instead. They search through the alternatives, here mental models, available 
to them and settle for the first one that meets a certain set of criteria, or is 
within a boundary. SDT is not based on the concept that humans maximise 
a single utility, as is the case in many economic theories. Instead, in 
epistemic utility theory it is assumed that humans compare two independent 
utilities, the benefits and costs (Levi, 1983). SDT also explains how drivers 
prefer a satisficing solution over investing further effort to find a better 
alternative. Particularly in the face of distraction, it can be expected that 
drivers abandon possibly secondary goals such as eco-driving and 
concentrate on maintaining solely safe driving behaviours. 
 
3.4.4 The deactivation of mental models and regression 
When an appropriate mental model is activated it can occur that, under 
certain conditions, a person reverts to more familiar and well-learned mental 
models (Rasmussen, 1979). Rasmussen stated that especially 
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subconscious actions are vulnerable to interference by more automated 
mental models, and even more so when the actions are very similar. Weick 
(1990) described the return to more familiar and automated mental models 
with the term regression. Regression can have several causes. For example, 
it can occur due to mind-wandering during lengthy tasks (Rasmussen, 
1979). A lack of transfer of a new mental model into the current situation can 
result in the use of a more familiar mental model (Perkins and Salomon, 
1992).It has been shown that drivers who are very familiar with a route are 
more likely to miss new cues in the environment such as a new speed limit 
or changed priorities at junctions (Martens, 2011, Martens and Fox, 2007, 
van Elslande and Faucher-Alberton, 1997). Stress can cause regression as 
well (Davis, 1958). Stress is believed to have played a major role in the 
events leading to a KLM airplane colliding with a Pan Am machine on 
Tenerife in 1977. As the situation became increasingly critical, the KLM pilot, 
the Pan Am crew as well as the air traffic controllers all appear to have 
reverted to more familiar routines (Weick, 1990).  
In chapter 5 in the current thesis the topic of regression is discussed in the 
context of eco-driving. The question is whether it is possible to get a driver to 
revert to more familiar mental models by subjecting them to a workload task. 
Driver distraction is defined as “the diversion of attention away from activities 
critical for safe driving toward a competing activity” (Lee et al., 2009) and 
can therefore, with the means of a task, increase the drivers’ workload. In 
the case of the current study, distraction has the aim to divert the driver’s 
attention away from driving after eco-driving mental models were activated. 
This experiment was performed to find out whether, in the face a workload 
task, potentially more familiar ‘normal’ or safe driving mental models take 
precedence.  
 
Distraction tasks and their impact 
Distraction tasks have been used in driving studies and have shown to 
cause a variety of behavioural measures to change. Visual, auditory and 
cognitive tasks can affect speed (Funkhouser and Chrysler, 2007, Hatfield 
and Chamberlain, 2005, Salvucci et al., 2007, White et al., 2006), headway 
(Haigney et al., 2000, Kircher et al., 2004, White et al., 2006) and lateral 
variation (Engström et al., 2005, Haigney et al., 2000, Hatfield and 
Chamberlain, 2005, Kircher et al., 2004). In these studies, though, non-
visual did not worsen performance in all cases. It can be agreed, however, 
that non-visual tasks increase reaction time (Hatfield and Chamberlain, 
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2005, Horberry et al., 2006, Kircher et al., 2004, Laberge et al., 2004). 
Adding a manual task to a visual task has a much stronger effect on driver 
performance that a visual or non-visual task alone. These types of 
distraction tasks have the highest impact on driving performance, on speed 
(Chiang et al., 2001, Engström et al., 2005, Tsimhoni et al., 2004, White et 
al., 2006), headway (White et al., 2006), particularly risky headways 
(Engström et al., 2005, Manser et al., 2004), lateral variance (Chiang et al., 
2001, Engström et al., 2005, Kircher et al., 2004, Tsimhoni et al., 2004) and 
reaction times (Chisholm et al., 2007, Rouzikhah et al., 2013, White et al., 
2006). Some of these effects are possibly related to the increase of the 
duration and number of glances towards an employed device during task 
completion (Chiang et al., 2001, Chisholm et al., 2007, Dingus et al., 1989, 
Tijerina et al., 1998). In a study by Young et al. (2012) a combined visual-
manual task resulted in a reduction in words in think-aloud protocols, for a 
description and discussion of the method see section 4.3.2. Although the 
quality of the protocols was the same as in the control condition, the content 
was more geared towards control tasks, away from the vehicle’s 
surroundings. The behavioural measures are relevant in the second study 
presented in this thesis, when drivers were subjected to a workload task 
while following a lead vehicle. In section 5.9.4 the effects on ‘normal’ and 
eco-driving were discussed. 
 
3.5 The use of mental models in research and practise 
3.5.1 Applications in communication and education 
Mental models have been utilised to assess people’s knowledge about 
health-related issues (e.g. Morgan et al., 2002, Vogt and Schaefer, 2012). 
When producing communications for patients it is often difficult to elicit what 
they already know and where the most potent knowledge gaps are. One 
approach using mental models involves the creation of expert mental models 
and their comparison with the mental models of the patients. This enables to 
better target communication and education material.  
Vogt and Schaefer (2012) attempted to determine how well consumers 
understood contraceptive medication with respect to its risks and benefits by 
eliciting the patients’ as well as experts’ mental models. Morgan et al. (2002) 
conducted a similar approach to analyse a variety of risks to people’s health, 
safety and the environment. de Bruin et al. (2007) used interviews and 
questionnaires to gain insights into mental models of risky sexual behaviour 
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from adolescents, and based recommendations on uncertain and incorrect 
statements. 
These approaches have been successful in the health education field. 
Mental models allow learning about humans, which can inform the design of 
targeted communication and education material. However, they can have 
limitations, as even expert mental models may not be correct and complete 
(Shai et al., 2008).  
 
3.5.2 Applications in engineering and design 
Mental models have been applied successfully in human machine 
interaction. In requirement engineering it is important to acquire sufficient 
knowledge about the domain the technology will be applied to. Mental 
models can give valuable insights into the way users perform tasks and 
where they need support. In addition, it is crucial that users have functioning 
mental models of the technology and technology itself needs to be able to 
provide the information that helps building them. In some cases, these 
mental models do not need to be correct. For example, the folder icon in 
Microsoft Windows conveys a mental model of a folder structure, as is 
common in a typical office, although a computer does not store information 
in this manner. However, such an understanding is practical in this case and 
does not impair the use of the system. 
Whitten and Tygar (1999) showed that incorrect mental models of 
technology can lead to errors. They strongly suggest that technology 
communicates its way of functioning in a clear and simple way to users. A 
study with a software user interface providing such clues found that these 
lead to increased acceptance (Hasan and Ahmed, 2007). Ogden (2001) 
described an approach to improve user interaction using ecological interface 
design (Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989) based on mental models. Instead of 
providing a user interface communicating information about the actual 
physical level, the display can show a higher, functional and abstract level. 
This is meant to reduce the cognitive load on the user while allowing 
understanding of the underlying relations. 
Crandall et al. (2006) have worked with cognitive task analysis (CTA) 
methods. They showed how the elicitation of cognitive requirements can 
improve system design. For example, CTA can help improve training 
material by providing insights into the existing knowledge of trainees as well 
as their needs. In a project involving a re-design of training material for 
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firefighters it was found that they need to be made aware of the signs 
implying an imminent building collapse, instead of simply being told to 'be 
careful'. In this way CTA can lead to substantial improvements in decision 
making. Interviews and workshops are effective means to gather relevant 
information from professionals or drivers, as conducted by McIlroy and 
Stanton (2014). In addition, observations in the natural context of technology 
utilisation can provide necessary insights to identify asymmetries between 
the intended and interpreted mental model (Jelsma, 2006). Ideally users and 
technology have a common ground in order to foster effective collaboration 
(Feltovich et al., 2007). 
Boer and Goodrich (2005) introduced a way to measure human 
understanding of their interaction with technology. When children or adults 
find themselves in a new context their perceptions and behavioural patterns 
are still very volatile. With practise and experience the behaviour becomes 
increasingly predictable. The authors defined this behavioural predictability 
as entropy, which can be observed with more systematic, consistent and 
predictable actions. In this way they provided a measure for human 
performance in areas such as driving or other technology interactions, or the 
effects of high workload or sleep apnoea. 
 
3.5.3 Mental models and driving 
Mental models are a suitable concept to understand the behaviour and 
thoughts of humans in a diverse range of contexts, and driving is one of 
them. Going back to the major pillars of psychology, as described in the 
history section 3.2.1, both introspection as well as behavioural data collected 
in experiments are expected to be relevant for the driving domain. Although 
this section introducing relevant concepts to the driving domain heavily relies 
on mathematical and behavioural approaches, qualitative and introspective 
research is crucial. Researchers need to be aware that drivers are able to 
verbalise a lot of relevant information when asked. Hence, adding qualitative 
and introspective methods to studies can sometimes replace expensive data 
collection in projects involving simulator experiments or FOTs, for example 
(Cotter and Mogilka, 2007).  
There have been a number of different ways drivers’ mental models have 
been elicited. Behavioural methods have involved complex machine learning 
algorithms (e.g. Henning et al., 2008, Junell and Tumer, 2013), and 
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qualitative methods have included interviews and focus groups (e.g. Birrell et 
al., 2011, Harvey et al., 2013, Hof et al., 2012).  
 
3.5.4 Examples of mental model research in the driving domain 
In this section two examples of elaborate theories involving mental models in 
the driving domain are introduced in order to provide an overview of the 
current relevant research. These examples constitute COSMODRIVE, a 
detailed model of driver cognition and behaviour, and the ABSTRACT 
method and tool for modelling distinct manoeuvres such as a lane change. 
 
COSMODRIVE 
COSMODRIVE was developed in order to simulate the drivers’ cognition and 
to explain the reasons behind their behaviour (Bellet et al., 2007, Bellet and 
Tattegrain-Veste, 1999). In this approach a computational simulation of 
mental models was created. An experiment was conducted, showing videos 
of driving sequences that were abruptly stopped. The participants were 
asked to find differences on a modified version of the last picture shown. 
With the answers it was possible to visualise the mental representations of 
experienced as well as novice drivers. The emphasis of this experiment was 
on the anticipation of possible future events, which was better performed by 
experienced drivers. 
 
The ABSTRACT Method and Tool  
ABSTRACT is both a software and a method designed by Georgeon et al. 
(2007) to use a variety of sensory data to model drivers’ behaviour and 
cognition. The researchers modelled mental models using data recorded 
with an instrumented car, tracking the movements of the car and the 
behaviour of the driver, e.g. eye movement and steering angle. These data 
were then enriched with inputs from an experimenter and interviews in which 
situations were assessed by the driver. The data were then validated and 
manipulated with the ABSTRACT software. With the software the researcher 
allocated numerical and textual properties to events, and then produce 
traces and ontologies. In this way lane changes were modelled on a high 
abstraction level and then tested with the original data. It was shown that for 
example a decision for a dangerous lane change can be recognised one 
second before the lane change is started. In a later study Henning et al. 
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(2008) modelled lane changes with a larger number of participants, trying to 
distinguish between lane changes that are well-planned and lane changes 
that are delayed due to a sudden obstacle. ABSTRACT is an example of 
using experimental data as the basis for modelling. It was developed 
primarily for ergonomists and designers of in-car technology. A downside is 
that the creation of models depends strongly on the individual using the 
software and method, but the models can later be tested and falsified. Wynn 
et al. (2008) conducted a study using models created with ABSTRACT to 
measure the occurrence of lane changes with different acceleration patterns. 
Although their study did not present significant results, the research is an 
important step towards the automated recognition of driver behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 10: Mental model schema of a lane change in ABSTRACT 
(Georgeon et al., 2007)5 
 
McCall et al. (2004) equipped a car with a number of devices to collect data 
about the driver's behaviour and the context. These devices included a GPS 
sensor, cameras capturing the driver and the surroundings and several 
systems to record the car's operation. Two researchers were placed in the 
car to prompt the driver for explanations and to record behaviour as well as 
other happenings related to the driving situation. Questionnaires and video-
aided interview sessions a few days after the drives rounded up the data. 
For the analysis the data were represented in two ways, in a contextual view 
with different camera views synchronised with a map with GPS information 
and in a timeline view with several behavioural and context-based lanes, 
similar to the ABSTRACT method (Georgeon et al., 2007). The results show 
                                            
5 Copyright (© 2007) From Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Conference on Cognitive Modeling : 6th ICCM 2004, integrating models : 
July 30-August 1, 2004, Carnegie Mellon University, University of 
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA. Reproduced by permission 
of Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, a division of Informa plc 
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that combining ethnographic with engineering-focussed data allowed the 
identification of three different lane change configurations. 
The advantages of these methods modelling mental models with large 
amounts of behavioural data, interviews and questionnaires are detailed 
insights into driver behaviour, which can be used to identify knowledge and 
skills of drivers. Support systems would then potentially be able to detect 
hazardous behaviours, for example, or personality traits (Stachl and 
Buehner, 2015). However, so far these methods have not been able to 
produce reliable results and the error rates may be too high for the design of 
warning systems. 
 
3.5.5 A multiple mental model framework 
The multiple mental model framework by Goodrich and Boer (1998) is based 
on Rasmussen’s knowledge-, rule- and skill-based taxonomy. The 
hierarchical structure is defined in section 3.2.2 and communication and 
control between mental models within this hierarchy are described in 3.3.1. 
The framework has been applied in a several studies aiming at the 
identification of natural driver behaviour. A set of experiments was 
conducted to inform the design of an acceptable and intuitive adaptive cruise 
control (ACC) system (Goodrich and Boer, 2003). An ACC takes over the 
car-following task by keeping a safe distance to the car in front and adjusting 
the speed slightly. Because the system is unable to perform strong braking 
actions, the human driver needs to take over control when active braking is 
required. Goodrich and Boer (2003) argue that this moment, when the switch 
from car-following to active braking occurs, needs to be as natural and 
human-like as possible in order for the driver to understand the take-over 
situation and to accept the system. In order to establish a boundary between 
car-following and active braking they subjected drivers to relevant situations 
and measured their reactions. 
Goodrich and Boer (1998) measured boundaries of the mental models for 
car-following and active braking on the skill level. These boundaries 
represent those circumstances in which a currently activated skill ceases to 
be satisficing, and needs to be deactivated as well as replaced by another 
skill. In this example the rule-based mental model for longitudinal vehicle 
control is making the decisions regarding the skills. For their experiment the 
participants were asked to follow a preceding vehicle and therefore to 
execute the skill of car-following by regulating the time headway with 
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manipulations of the gas pedal. The participants were presented with a 
number of cut-in events, in which another vehicle changed lanes, so it got 
into front of the host vehicle as displayed in Figure 11. If the participants 
changed their behaviour by stepping on the brake, it was assumed that car 
following now got ‘not satisficing’. In this case the skill ‘brake to avoid 
collision’ was engaged instead.  
 
 
Figure 11: Cut-in event 
 
This modelling exercise was applied in the first study in the present thesis. In 
order to analyse the mental model boundaries, critical decision points for the 
drivers were identified and counted as a case for either a braking (BRK) or a 
nominal (NOM) condition (cf. Goodrich et al., 1998a). These two points are 
considered the transition points, at which the switch from one skill to another 
occurs. In this case, distinct transitions can be identified, because a BRK 
condition is defined as an application of on the brake, whereas in the NOM 
condition the brake is not pressed. After each cut-in event the driver may 
consider the time headway and inverted time to collision not satisficing and 
step on the brake. In this case, the critical point for a BRK case is the 
initiation of the braking action. The end of the braking action is defined as a 
NOM case. Goodrich and Boer (1998) acknowledged that it may be 
possible, though, that the triggers for a transition from NOM to BRK and for 
the transition back from BRK to NOM are slightly different. However, for the 
sake of feasibility, such a distinction was not performed in the present 
research. 
In the case of no braking response after a cut-in event, it is assumed that the 
driver considers the combination of time headway and inverted time to 
collision satisficing. In this case there are two critical points as well. The first 
NOM is marked by the beginning of the cut-in event, just when the 
antagonist begins to move towards the middle lane. Because of the 
fluctuating speed of the preceding vehicle, the second analysis point for a 
NOM cases is defined as the minimum time to collision in the ten seconds 
following the beginning of the event. 
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The theoretical basis for this modelling exercise is SDT (Goodrich et al., 
1996, Goodrich et al., 1998b), explained in section 3.4.3. Goodrich et al. 
(1998b) created the concept of accuracy. It represents the value of the 
support of declaring a set of propositions as true (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1988). 
In the driving context 𝜇𝐴 is a utility representing benefits for the driver, such 
as safety and travel speed. The second concept, rejectability 𝜇𝑅, 
corresponds to the value of the rejection of a set of propositions (cf. 
Johnson-Laird, 1988). It is an anti-utility, or cost for the driver, such as 
accident risk and delays. In the case of the studied scenario, the inverted 
time to collision (𝑇𝐶
−1) is more beneficial to the driver the smaller it is. Hence, 
a small value for  𝑇𝐶
−1 results in a high utility. Because utility always 
increases with decreasing values for 𝑇𝐶
−1, assuming that other things stay 
the same (ceteris paribus), the accurate states are strictly monotonic. By 
comparison, a smaller value for time headway (𝑇ℎ) is associated with an 
increased crash risk and therefore considered a cost or anti-utility. Hence, it 
is assumed that, ceteris paribus, an increase in 𝑇ℎ always results in a utility 
increase. Therefore, the rejectable states are strictly monotonic as well. 
These monotonicity assumptions are simplified for the sake of the feasibility 
of the modelling exercise presented here, and not always correct in real-life 
driving. For example, a large headway could tempt others to perform 
dangerous overtaking manoeuvres. It is also important to mention that 
limiting the assumptions about a driver’s perceptual space to 𝑇ℎ and 𝑇𝐶
−1 is 
another strong simplification. Although these measures have been 
empirically verified (Kiefer et al., 2003, Lee, 1976), it is expected that they 
change when the drivers’ goals change, for example. For instance, during 
eco-driving drivers could attempt to keep their speed constant and therefore 
compromise on safety margins and accept closer distances to the car in 
front. Goals could also be based on achieving high speeds in order to arrive 
quicker at the destination. 
The utilities are quantifiable as probabilities (Levi, 1983). Due to the 
monotonicity one can compute the accurate analysis points as a cumulative 
distribution function (cf. Goodrich and Boer, 1998). The function marks the 
probability of the binary variable ‘surviving’ over a continuous variable. For 
the NOM cases the function tells the probability 𝜇𝐴 of a driver not braking 
depending on 𝑇𝐶
−1. In comparison, for the BRK cases the function tells the 
probability 𝜇𝑅 of a driver braking at a given 𝑇ℎ, as explained below. The 
following equation tells the probability 𝜇𝐴  of a driver not braking at a given 
inverted time to collision. 
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𝜇𝐴(𝑇𝐶
−1 =  𝜏) = 1 −  𝐹𝑇𝐶−1
(𝜏|𝑁𝑂𝑀) = 1 −  
𝑁(𝑇𝐶
−1 ≤  𝜏|𝑁𝑂𝑀)
𝑁(𝑇𝐶
−1 ≤  ∞|𝑁𝑂𝑀)
 
A logistic regression with an accuracy function of the following form was 
performed for both the safe and the fuel-efficient run (cf. Goodrich and Boer, 
1998)6:  
𝜇𝐴 =
1
1 + 𝑒(−𝑎𝜏+𝑏) 
 
Because the monotonicity is valid for the rejectable states as well, a 
cumulative distribution function of the following form was computed (cf. 
Goodrich and Boer, 1998):  
𝜇𝑅(𝑇ℎ =  𝜏) = 1 −  𝐹𝑇ℎ(𝜏|𝐵𝑅𝐾) = 1 −  
𝑁(𝑇ℎ ≤  𝜏|𝐵𝑅𝐾)
𝑁(𝑇ℎ ≤  ∞|𝐵𝑅𝐾)
 
The function tells the probability µ of a driver not braking at a given 𝑇ℎ. A 
logistic regression with a rejectability function of the following form was 
performed for both the safe and the fuel-efficient run (cf. Goodrich and Boer, 
1998):  
𝜇𝑅 =
1
1 +  𝑒(−𝑎𝜏+𝑏) 
 
With the accuracy and rejectability functions the mental model boundary in 
the perceptual space of time headway and inverted time to collision was 
computed. The nominal analysis points, where ‘time headway regulation’ 
was satisficing, are indicated with a circle. The analysis points in case of 
braking are drawn as crosses. Figure 12 depicts these analysis points as 
well as the boundary line dividing them as well as possible. 
 
                                            
6 The equation is presented in a different form in the cited paper. 
Nevertheless, the correctness of the form shown here was verified with 
the author. 
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Figure 12: Scatter plot with mental model boundaries in the perceptual 
space of time headway and inverted time to collision © 1998 IEEE 
(Goodrich and Boer, 1998) 
 
For nominal behaviour the accuracy function is larger than or equal to the 
rejectability function, because the benefits outweigh the costs (cf. Goodrich 
and Boer, 1998): 
𝑆𝑏 = {𝜃𝑅𝐵 ∶  𝜋𝐴(𝑇𝐶
−1) ≥ 𝑏𝜇𝑅(𝑇ℎ)} 
For braking behaviour the opposite equation applies, as the rejectability 
function is larger than the accuracy function (cf. Goodrich and Boer, 1998): 
𝑆𝑏
𝐶 = {𝜃𝑅𝐵 ∶  𝜋𝐴(𝑇𝐶
−1) < 𝑏𝜇𝑅(𝑇ℎ)} 
Combining the accuracy and rejectability functions, the following expression 
represents the line where behaviour is switched from nominal to braking (cf. 
Goodrich and Boer, 1998): 
𝜋𝐴(𝑇𝐶
−1) = 𝑏𝜇𝑅(𝑇ℎ) 
The coefficient b determines the boundaries’ locations related to time 
headway (𝑇ℎ) and inverted time to collision (𝑇𝐶
−1). The classification is 
performed with a minimax algorithm, which minimises the maximum 
outcome of the following three functions (cf. Goodrich et al., 1998a). 
𝐽1represents the total share of incorrectly classified analysis points, while 𝐽2 
stands for the share of incorrectly classified NOM and 𝐽3 for the incorrectly 
classified BRK points. 
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𝐽1(b) =
N [(NOM ∩ 𝑆𝑏
𝐶) ∪ (BRK ∩ 𝑆𝑏)]
N[NOM ∪ BRK]
 
𝐽2(b) =
N [NOM ∩ 𝑆𝑏
𝐶]
N[NOM]
 
𝐽3(b) =
N [BRK ∩ 𝑆𝑏]
N[BRK]
 
The boundaries between car following and emergency braking could then be 
described in terms of 𝑇ℎ and 𝑇𝐶
−1.  
The multiple mental model framework by Goodrich and Boer (1998) is a way 
to measure decisions on the rule-based level in the mental model hierarchy 
(c.f. Rasmussen, 1983). However, this method only measures a small part of 
lower level mental models. The question arises whether it can be used to 
categorise driving styles. In the study described in this section it has been 
assumed, that mental model boundaries are general. It may be possible that 
they change, for example when drivers decide to drive very safely or fuel-
efficiently. However, it is important to acknowledge the instantaneous nature 
of the multiple mental model framework. The concept itself does not account 
for behaviour change, but it is able to measure behaviour in different 
moments, which can then be compared in order to explore existing eco-
driving mental models as in study 1. 
 
3.5.6 Mental models of eco-driving 
For the present thesis the theory of mental models provided the framework 
for studying eco-driving. Because mental models allow the investigation of 
drivers’ cognition, ranging from conscious knowledge and strategies to 
automated behaviour, they are a means to investigate eco-driving in a high 
degree of detail. 
To date, mental models have been researched by observing behaviour in 
experiments (e.g. Goodrich and Boer, 2003, Henning et al., 2008), but also 
by using questioning techniques and interviews (e.g. Bellet et al., 2007, 
Morgan et al., 2002). Both sets of methods were applied in the studies in the 
present thesis. Past research suggests that drivers possess eco-driving 
mental models. In experiments by Waters and Laker (1980) and van der 
Voort et al. (2001), as summarised in section 2.3.4, drivers were asked to 
eco-drive, without further explanations. The resulting behavioural changes 
indicate that these participants possess the necessary knowledge and skills 
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they need to considerably reduce their fuel consumption. In the present 
thesis these findings were supplied with more detailed insights about the 
mental models responsible for eco-driving. The research gaps are explored 
in the relevant study chapters in the sections 4.2.3 and 5.2.3.  
Some applications of mental model research in the general driving domain 
are potentially suitable for studying eco-driving. For example, the current 
thesis includes the modelling and comparison of mental model boundaries 
on the skill level (Goodrich and Boer, 2003, Rasmussen, 1983). Specifically 
the mental models for car-following, which is understood as time headway 
regulation, and active braking are of interest. This theoretical framework for 
mental model boundaries is explained in detail in the previous section 3.5.5. 
When the distance to the vehicle in front is within certain limits, car-following 
is satisficing, which means appropriate for the situation. Here the mental 
model for time headway regulation is activated. When certain thresholds are 
crossed, say the distance is becoming too short, car-following ceases to be 
satisficing and the corresponding mental model is deactivated. Instead, the 
driver is switching to active braking by stepping on the brake pedal in order 
to avoid a collision. In order to simplify the analysis, the switch from car-
following to active braking as well as the switch back to car-following are 
examined at the same time. These boundaries can help explaining how 
drivers make decisions about safety margins during longitudinal vehicle 
control on the rule level. This method has not been used to compare intra-
individual differences between boundaries varying with driving styles and 
goals, for example. Hence, in the first study in the present thesis, see 
section 4.4.7 for the results, it was investigated, if the boundary between car-
following and active braking changes when people eco-drive. 
 
3.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter provided an overview of mental model theory and research, 
beginning with their historical and philosophical foundations and concluding 
with applied concepts in driver behaviour research. The purpose of this 
chapter was the definition of the concept of mental models and to provide an 
overview of its varied uses. It is not within the scope of the present thesis to 
arrive at definite conclusions about mental models, nor to mirror neurological 
processes in the human brain. Instead, mental models are viewed as a 
construct, enabling the exploration and understanding of human cognition, in 
this thesis particularly during driving. 
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The broad range of views and approaches discussed in this chapter were 
narrowed down to a set of main points that will form the basis of the present 
thesis. The major theoretical underpinning for the definition of mental models 
is drawn from works by Johnson-Laird. According to him, mental models are 
defined as representations of reality (Johnson-Laird, 1988), which are stored 
in people’s minds. These representations are stereotypical; they neither 
have to be correct, very elaborate nor exactly defined. Rasmussen provided 
a hierarchy of mental models (Rasmussen, 1983), organising them into 
knowledge-, rule- and skill-based levels. These levels allow studying 
people’s conscious thoughts, as well as ingrained, automated behaviours. 
Goodrich and Boer (2003) then brought this hierarchy into the driving 
domain, showing how drivers make decisions to switch from one skill to 
another. 
Mental models enable the investigation of drivers’ cognition in a way that 
other psychological paradigms do not allow to the same degree. For 
example, common approaches for the study of eco-driving are based on the 
theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), which are usually conducted with 
closed questions in questionnaires (e.g. Cristea et al., 2012, Schießl et al., 
2010), and attempt to predict behaviour without considering the mechanisms 
leading to decision making (Stillwater and Kurani, 2013). Other approaches 
are based on economic assumptions, basically that humans are constantly 
optimising utility functions. Satisficing decision theory (Goodrich et al., 
1998b) is based on two contrasting utility functions, but takes lower-level 
mental models as well as human limitations in decision making into account.  
The existing literature that links mental models and driving is predominantly 
focussed on mathematical approaches and measurements of behaviour. 
Indeed, the major part of the work presented in the following chapters is 
based on quantitative measures. However, several qualitative elements 
were added in order to further explore drivers’ thoughts, knowledge and 
decisions. The associated methods include interviews, think-aloud protocols 
and open questions in questionnaires. 
In the present thesis people’s driving behaviour was measured as they were 
asked to perform different driving styles. These measurements enabled 
making inferences on their automated behaviour as well as on their 
strategies they select to reduce fuel consumption. In addition, qualitative 
techniques were used to gather insights into the parts of eco-driving mental 
models that drivers are able to verbalise. 
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4 Study 1: Investigating drivers’ approaches to reducing 
fuel consumption: An experimental study on mental 
models of eco-driving 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In 2012 road transport accounted for 19% of the total carbon dioxide 
emissions in the EU (European Environment Agency, 2014). One promising 
means to reduce these emissions is eco-driving, which is a set of behaviours 
that drivers can implement to save fuel (Mensing et al., 2014). An overview 
of eco-driving behaviours that can be practised in a given passenger car on 
a given route is provided in section 2.2.2. It has been found that eco-driving 
is able to facilitate a decrease in fuel consumption and therefore carbon 
dioxide emissions of conventional internal combustion engines by 5 to 10% 
(Barkenbus, 2010). 
Behavioural change is challenging, though, due to educational and 
motivational hindrances, which are discussed in section 2.3.2. However, fuel 
savings have been attained with in-vehicle technology providing continuous 
real-time feedback on parameters such as pedal pressure, gear or miles per 
gallon (e.g. Hibberd et al., 2013, Kim and Kim, 2012, Nouvelière et al., 2012, 
van der Voort et al., 2001). The underlying question of this study is the 
degree to which drivers need close guidance by complex support systems. 
Drivers may already have some understanding of eco-driving and therefore 
need guidance in a different form than currently assumed (Stillwater and 
Kurani, 2013). Using mental model research, this study was able to explore 
drivers’ knowledge and skills of eco-driving and to highlight their information 
requirements. 
 
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Rationale and objectives 
Eco-driving campaigns have traditionally been assuming a knowledge gap 
that needs to be filled (Delicado, 2012), and many support systems have 
been designed to closely guide drivers, fine-tuning their proficiency (e.g. 
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Wada et al., 2011). However, there has been evidence that drivers have 
some idea of eco-driving, indicated by behavioural changes when they are 
asked to drive fuel-efficiently (Birrell et al., 2010, van der Voort et al., 2001, 
Waters and Laker, 1980).  
In this research eco-driving mental models were investigated in a driving 
simulator experiment supplemented with think aloud protocols and open 
interviews. The research presented here aimed to identify a set of mental 
models regular drivers have of eco-driving on different cognitive levels (cf. 
Rasmussen, 1983) by measuring changes in their behaviour and thoughts 
after being asked to drive in an eco-friendly manner. The measures were 
contrasted to their usual (Baseline) driving, but also safe driving behaviour. 
The Safe condition was added to contrast eco-driving with safe driving and 
identify conflicts between these driving styles. The Safe drive also enabled 
distinguishing the specific effects of eco-driving instructions from the simple 
introduction of any type of experimental instruction beyond ‘drive normally’. 
The rationale is that instructions can possibly increase attentional resources 
and improve performance, as drivers deliberately control their behaviour 
(Trick and Enns, 2009). This study specifically examined longitudinal driving 
behaviour. Behavioural measures included acceleration, speed choice, 
coasting and braking behaviours. Decelerating measures consisted of the 
use of the brake pedal and coasting. Coasting was described by Beusen et 
al. (2009) as smooth deceleration by releasing the accelerator pedal while 
not pressing the brake pedal. Cruising is free-flow driving, with no car in 
front, whereas car-following was defined by Vogel (2002) as maintaining a 
headway to a car in front of a maximum of 6 seconds. 
 
Study objectives: 
 The investigation of the existence of mental models of eco-driving on 
different cognitive levels with a driving simulator experiment 
 The measurement of changes in behaviours and focus when drivers 
are asked to drive fuel-efficiently 
 The identification of eco-driving strategies and their comparison with 
baseline behaviours 
 
4.2.2 The measurement of drivers’ mental models 
In order to explore mental models of eco-driving a range of methods were 
combined in this study. One part of the data collection was based on 
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behavioural data measured with the controlled environment of a driving 
simulator. It provided the ability to compare human behaviour safely across 
different experimental conditions. This level of control was crucial, as the 
conditions differed only in a small part of the instructions given to the 
participants. The simulator recorded data of the drivers’ actual behaviour, 
consciously or unconsciously controlled, and its consequences within the 
driving environment. These data allowed the exploration of the behavioural 
elements of mental models, especially the automated lower-level skills (cf. 
Rasmussen, 1983).  
The behavioural measures were supplemented with verbal protocols and 
brief open interviews recorded during and after the experimental drives. 
Verbal data can provide information about the drivers’ strategies, decisions 
and foci in the moment or, reflected, after driving. These data were 
important, as they revealed insights into what drivers consider eco-driving 
and where they mention safety-relevant issues and their conflicts with eco-
driving. In some instances discrepancies between the participants’ words 
and actions could be found as well. A discussion of these research methods 
is provided in section 4.3.2. Each of these types of data allowed the 
investigation of different aspects of the driving task. 
 
4.2.3 Unique contribution and justification for approach 
This research is unique, as there has been no other study found that 
specifically investigated whether drivers apply different behaviours and have 
different thoughts when they are asked to eco-drive compared to being 
asked to drive normally and safely. In several studies participants have been 
asked to eco-drive without further support, which resulted in behavioural 
changes and fuel savings. Birrell et al. (2010) focussed on the use of the 
accelerator pedal, in order to improve its use with haptic feedback. van der 
Voort et al. (2001) found that the reduction in fuel consumption was mostly 
due to altered gear changes. In order to test whether fuel reductions are 
possible without time losses, they instructed the participants to keep their trip 
time constant, which resulted in no significant effects for mean speed. In 
contrast, Waters and Laker (1980) found that drivers lowered their speed 
during eco-driving, and, by also using lower gears, managed to save fuel. 
These behavioural changes indicate that drivers possess mental models of 
eco-driving, and warrant an in-depth exploration, using quantitative as well 
as qualitative methods. In addition, it needed to be assured that the 
behavioural changes did not solely result from an exertion of more effort into 
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‘normal’ driving. In order to be able to associate such behavioural changes 
with the use of eco-driving knowledge and skills, an experimental condition 
focussing on ‘safe’ driving was added. This intervention provided the means 
to compare two potentially unusual driving styles with each other and 
‘normal’ driving.  
The research presented here used a combination of behavioural data, think 
aloud protocols and interviews. It was therefore able to identify mental 
models of eco-driving on several cognitive levels, ranging from knowledge 
and strategies to tactics in specific situations to automated behaviour. These 
insights could clarify in which areas where drivers already possess sufficient 
and effective knowledge and skills. Discrepancies between the ability to eco-
drive and its actual practise could show where training and education for 
drivers is unnecessary, and thus where efforts should focus on an activation 
of eco-driving mental models instead. The current research may also identify 
gaps in the drivers’ proficiency and misconceptions, which then indicate in 
which aspects drivers need information, education and assistance. For 
example, drivers’ reluctance to eco-drive could be rooted in incorrect ideas 
about its implications for travel time (Eriksson et al., 2013). It was also 
studied whether some drivers prioritise fuel efficiency over safety during 
some of the experimental scenarios, and therefore increase their crash-risk 
in these instances. Such insights were able to help identifying situations 
where drivers can benefit from active safety systems that monitor following 
distances or remind drivers of safety. 
Goodrich et al. (1998a) performed experiments in which participants drove 
an instrumented vehicle on a test track. The study was able to show that it is 
possible to model boundaries between mental models on the skill-level, see 
section 3.5.5. This method was later used to inform the design of an 
adaptive cruise control system with a model of natural human behaviour 
(Goodrich and Boer, 2003). This method has not been used to compare 
differences between boundaries in different experimental conditions, for 
example. In this study it was investigated, if the boundary between car-
following and active braking changes when people eco-drive. 
In section 3.6 it was concluded that the study of mental models is an 
established means to gain detailed insights into people’s knowledge and 
skills. Mental models investigate human cognition beyond the stimulus-
response paradigm and help leverage cognitive processes that people are 
not able to access themselves. The results could shed light into the question 
whether drivers have mental models of eco-driving and what their content 
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could look like. They were able to increase the understanding of the 
cognition of drivers utilising behavioural and verbal data. However, the 
scope of this research is limited. Although a large amount of information 
about eco-driving mental models could be collected, the resulting picture is 
neither complete nor conclusive. In addition, the design implications for 
EDSS are preliminary. Therefore the results of this study need to be 
extended and validated in future research. 
 
4.3 Methodology and research environment 
4.3.1 The University of Leeds Desktop Driving Simulator 
This research consisted of an experiment using a desktop driving simulator, 
see Figure 13. According to the AIDE project (Rimini-Döring et al., 2005) this 
simulator can be classified as a type A, or low-level, system, which is usually 
equipped with a plasma screen and game-like controls. This simulator was 
ideal for the purposes of the current study, which required the collection of 
behavioural data to establish the existence and details about the content of 
eco-driving mental models. A driving simulator provides a highly controlled 
environment, in which variables such as weather and traffic flow can be held 
constant, thus each driver is faced with the same conditions (Boyle and Lee, 
2010). The operational controls include a screen and steering wheel placed 
on a desk and a set of pedals for on the floor. This setup was sufficient to 
allow the participants to perform longitudinal vehicle control. The software 
has been continuously developed by the driving simulator team in the 
University of Leeds. The vehicle’s behaviour is determined by an engine 
model from a 2002 Jaguar X-type and braking data from a Ford Mondeo, 
assuming a normally aspirated 2l, V6 petrol engine. The vehicle’s reactions 
are based on its engine speed, accelerator position and the resulting engine 
torque output. The fuel consumption data was generated by the microscopic 
Passenger car and Heavy-duty Emission Model PHEM (Rexeis et al., 2005). 
For modelling realistic effects of driving behaviour on fuel consumption a 
more typically sized vehicle was assumed, a Ford Mondeo Ghia with a 16V, 
Euro 5 petrol engine.  The low-cost, flexible and rapid setup of the desktop 
simulator was beneficial particularly for this study. Every participant was 
subjected to four experimental conditions, each of these comprising an 
urban and a motorway section. This means that a session with a participant 
involved eight road layouts, which had to be loaded separately, and could be 
performed in this simulator by the experimenter. 
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Other possible research methods relevant for driver behaviour include 
studies in the real world. Naturalistic driving studies, for example, involve 
precise measurements and observations of vehicles driving in the real world 
without any experimental interventions. These studies are usually conducted 
over a long timeframe. For instance, the 100-car study in the United States 
(Dingus et al., 2006, Guo et al., 2010) included 100 vehicles, which were 
observed for 1 year. A more controlled, quasi-experimental method involving 
gathering driving data from real road conditions are field operational tests 
(FOT). FOT is defined as “A study undertaken to evaluate a function, or 
functions, under normal operating conditions in road traffic environments 
typically encountered by the participants using study design so as to identify 
real world effect and benefits” (FESTA, 2014). The Trafisafe project 
(Tarkiainen et al., 2013, Tarkiainen et al., 2014), for example, involved the 
fitting of driver support systems into 75 vehicles driven by young male 
drivers and their parents in Finland. Within a time period of about 10 months 
changes in the novice drivers’ behaviour were measured and compared to a 
control group of 22 drivers without support system. In contrast to a driving 
simulator experiment, studies on real roads allow a more natural and richer 
data collection and their results are more generalisable for real-life settings. 
However, they are very costly and time-consuming. Extensive data collection 
is often necessary to gather a sufficient number of situations relevant for the 
aims of the research. Especially this study needed a controlled environment 
due to the nature of the experimental conditions, differing only by the 
instructions to the drivers. The real-world setting would not have been able 
to provide the stability between experimental drives and across the 
participants.  
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Figure 13: The University of Leeds Desktop Driving Simulator 
 
For this research a comprehensive road layout needed to be built with the 
team at the University of Leeds Driving Simulator. The design of the road 
layout was based on an urban and rural as well as a motorway part. Urban 
and rural road elements contained one lane in each direction. These 
sections were suitable for junctions with traffic lights. Interactions with other 
vehicles were modelled on the motorway section with preceding vehicles 
driving and cutting in front of the participant. Several scenarios were 
designed to challenge the participants by creating a conflict between eco- 
and safe driving. These scenarios involved traffic lights that changed from 
green to amber when the participant’s vehicle was in close proximity as well 
as vehicles cutting in the front of the participant on the motorway. These 
events were triggered with specified thresholds for TTC with the stopping 
line at the junction and the preceding vehicle in the adjacent lane, 
respectively. 
 
4.3.2 Think aloud protocols and open interviews 
In order to gain more detailed insights into the content of drivers’ mental 
models, qualitative methods needed to be added to this study. These 
methods were intended to complement the behavioural data measured with 
the driving simulator. Think aloud protocols were one of these, because they 
allow the capture of people’s momentary thoughts. For these protocols 
participants are instructed to speak out loud whatever is going through their 
minds while they perform a task. The participants are neither asked to 
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explain nor focus on anything (Ericsson and Simon, 1980, van Someren et 
al., 1994). The resulting reports recorded during an experiment are 
understood to be verbalised excerpts from the working memory. This 
memory hosts mental models that are currently activated, which is explained 
in more detail in the sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.3. Hence, think aloud protocols 
represent parts of the mental models that the participants have retrieved 
from their long-term memory and instantiated with current information for the 
actual task. 
 
The method is intended to gather themes that include higher-level goals and 
strategies as participants adhere to the experimenter’s instructions as well 
as their means to pursue them. With reference to the hierarchy of 
Rasmussen (1983), as introduced in section 3.3.1, this signifies that think 
aloud protocols measure mental models on the knowledge- and rule-levels. 
They are not expected to capture automated skills, because people are 
usually unable to verbalise them. Nevertheless, this method can aid people 
in verbalising thoughts they would normally not consciously access. As an 
indication for this, Ericsson and Simon (1980) inferred from their experience 
that people do not usually listen to their spoken thoughts when they think 
aloud. In contrast to conversational speech, they make grammatical errors 
and leave them uncorrected. In addition to the content of the mental models, 
the protocols provide information about the drivers’ perceptions and 
momentary foci. The uptake of sensory information in turn is guided by the 
currently activated mental models.  
van Someren et al. (1994) provided instructions for experimenters planning 
to utilise think aloud protocols. It is crucial to ask participants solely to speak 
loudly while thinking. The reason why they are neither asked to explain nor 
to focus on certain themes is that conscious reflections can alter the 
participants’ thoughts (Ericsson and Simon, 1980). Instead, the participants 
need to be able to fully concentrate on their task. It is therefore sufficient to 
say ‘Tell me what is going through your mind.’ with the occasional hint ‘Keep 
talking.’ (van Someren et al., 1994). At times participants think and talk 
about other topics unrelated to the driving task. This is generally 
unproblematic, and indicates that the current behaviour is automated. Once 
the task is difficult enough, the speaking usually returns to it.  
Think aloud protocols deliver only a part of the currently instantiated mental 
models, because they are inherently incomplete (Ericsson and Fox, 2011, 
Ericsson and Simon, 1980). They are not able to fully capture inchoate and 
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incomplete thoughts (Ericsson and Simon, 1980), because these thoughts 
are usually not uttered. Synchronisation problems occur when it takes more 
time to say a thought out loud than to actually think it. In addition, many 
thoughts in the working memory are non-verbal. Typical indications for 
problems with think aloud protocols are complaints by participants and 
interruptions. If people are skilled enough in a task that it appears trivial, they 
are often unable to verbalise their thoughts. They could also feel obliged to 
bring lower-level mental models into consciousness, which can affect and 
especially slow down behaviour (Ford et al., 2005). Therefore tasks suitable 
for think aloud protocols need to be somewhat difficult for the participant. 
Hence, think aloud protocols are typically used for problem solving tasks 
(van Someren et al., 1994), but they could be adapted to the driving task in 
this study, because it involved instructions that were expected to be unusual 
for the driver.  
For many people this type of speaking becomes natural after a few minutes 
and does not interfere significantly with the task itself. However, some 
scientists describe think aloud protocols as introspective and suspect that 
they affect the participants' thoughts and actions and therefore behavioural 
measures (Hutchins, 1995, Schooler, 2011). Fox et al. (2011) conducted a 
systematic review of 94 studies using think aloud protocols and found that 
the effect of think aloud protocols on the accuracy of the completed tasks 
was not significant. However this was valid only for those studies in which 
the experimenters were adhering to the recommendations given by Ericsson 
and Simon (1980), which are in line with those by van Someren et al. (1994). 
The experimenters needed to instruct their participants to speak out loud 
whatever went through their minds. Additional instructions for the 
participants, such as asking them to describe or to explain their thoughts, or 
to focus on a specific theme resulted in altered performance. However, even 
with carefully formulated instructions, it has been found that think aloud 
protocols can affect the speed of problem solving tasks (Fox et al., 2011). 
Hence, there could be effects on reaction times during driving, but such 
effects should be similar in each experimental condition. In addition, there 
are people who are not deemed suitable participants for think aloud 
protocols, for example people who have a different first language. Therefore 
the participants in this study needed to be sufficiently fluent in the English 
language. 
 
Another qualitative method added to this study was the conduction of 
interviews with the participants after the experimental drives. Retrospection 
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can allow information to be accessed from the long-term memory, which is 
more detailed than think aloud protocols. This way the researcher was able 
to identify reasons for ‘why’ drivers were performing certain actions, which 
think aloud protocols are not able to. However, retrospection is affected by 
the unreliability of memories. Memories are often reported in a more 
structured manner compared to the thoughts during a task. Furthermore 
people often interpret their memory and try to conform to expectations. 
Therefore, retrospection might lead to the ignorance of relevant information, 
especially unsuccessful steps towards solving a problem. Yet, retrospective 
interviews have been shown to be useful in gathering information about 
people’s mental models (Morgan et al., 2002). It was decided to pose open 
questions such as “What did you do?” and “What did you think?” These 
questions refer to people’s awareness of their actions and to their thoughts 
during these actions. As humans can regard behaviours on different 
cognitive levels (cf. Vallacher and Wegner, 1987), their answers are 
expected to cover a large variety of facets.  
Another possible method to gather verbalisations is introspection, which 
involves the interruption of a task at several points and asking participants to 
report on it. This method is able to leverage people’s working memory. 
However, similar to retrospection, participants are often interpreting their 
thoughts. Due to the interruption they are disturbed in their task or given the 
opportunity to plan further actions, which would affect their behaviour. 
Hence, this type of introspection was not applied in the current study. 
 
4.3.3 Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted with the desktop driving simulator described 
in section 4.3.1. The version used in this research is equipped with a 
Logitech G27 Racing Wheel for steering. Placed on the floor were 
accelerator, brake and clutch pedals, but the clutch was not in use for this 
experiment. A sound system with a speaker mimicked the sound of the 
vehicle’s engine and other road noise. The simulator collected data at 60 Hz, 
which included data inferred from the driver’s inputs, such as steering wheel 
angle, brake pedal pressure and accelerator pedal angle, data describing 
the movement and position of the vehicle in the form of speed, acceleration 
and deceleration. Data related to other vehicles on the simulated roads 
included TTC and time headway to preceding vehicles. Specific time 
stamps, for example when the participant vehicle passed specified locations 
or when events were triggered, were recorded separately. A Sony voice 
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recorder was placed next to the simulator to record all verbalisations. A 
picture puzzle forming the words ‘Institute for Transport Studies’ was 
arranged on a separate table. 
 
4.3.4 Design  
A three-way (4x2x2) mixed design was employed, with Instruction as a 
within-subjects factor with 4 levels. Each level corresponded to an 
experimental drive with different instructions (‘Baseline 1’, Safe’, ‘Eco’, and 
‘Baseline 2’), Table 1.  The Baseline conditions were always conducted as 
the first and the last drive of the experiment. For these drives the participants 
were asked to drive ‘normally’, as they would every day, so these drives 
could provide data to measure people’s usual driving behaviour as well as to 
evaluate practice or boredom effects by comparing Baseline 1 with Baseline 
2. For the ‘Safe’ and ‘Eco’ drives the participants were asked to drive safely 
or fuel-efficiently, respectively. No further explanations, for example what 
‘fuel-efficient’ means, were provided with the instructions. One between-
subjects factor Intervention (2 levels) refers to the sequence in which the 
second and third drives were completed. These were counterbalanced to 
account for order effects and the participants were randomly assigned to a 
Group. The second between-subjects level is Gender (2 levels). 
 
Table 1: The order of instructions 
Simulator 
drive 
Group 1 Group 2 
1 “Drive normally.” (Baseline 1) “Drive normally.” (Baseline1) 
2 “Drive safely.” (Safe) “Drive fuel-efficiently.” (Eco) 
3 “Drive fuel-efficiently.” (Eco) “Drive safely.” (Safe) 
4 “Drive normally.” (Baseline 2) “Drive normally.” (Baseline2) 
 
4.3.5 Driving scenarios 
A varied test layout was created with an urban and a motorway section with 
ambient traffic. The urban section consisted of a road with one lane in each 
direction, no traffic in the participant’s lane and several junctions. The posted 
speed limit was 40 mph (64 km/h). The motorway section comprised three 
lanes in each direction. The surrounding traffic was driving at or below the 
74 
 
speed limits for UK motorways (UK Government, 2015b). Because the 
middle and right lanes are reserved for overtaking (UK Government, 2015a), 
the traffic in the right lane drove 70 mph (113 km/h), 65 mph (105 km/h) in 
the middle lane and 60 mph (97 km/h) in the left lane. Five scenarios were 
developed, as listed in Table 2. Most scenarios provided an opportunity for 
the drivers to practise eco-driving. These included the acceleration scenario 
to test whether the participants accelerate more smooth during eco-driving. 
The long-range braking and the two-junction scenarios allowed measuring 
whether the participants approached the junctions with a lower speed during 
eco-driving.  A cruising scenario with free-flow driving was added to test 
whether speed choice changed during safe and eco-driving and how 
smoothly the cruising speed was maintained. The expected eco-driving 
behaviours are hypothesised in section 4.3.7. Two scenarios were designed 
to challenge eco-driving behaviours with safety-critical situations. These 
scenarios tested whether the participants prioritised safety or took risks in 
order to maintain a constant speed. One of them was a short-notice braking 
scenario with a junction requiring sudden and strong braking when the traffic 
lights switch to red. The other scenario took place on a motorway and 
involved vehicles cutting in front of the participant at different values for TTC, 
some of which required immediate reactions as well. Unlike the scenarios 
described above, the safety-critical scenarios were not solely defined by 
their location on the road such as the acceleration scenario which began at a 
junction and ended about 350 meters after it. The reason is that the safety-
critical scenarios involved critical events, which necessitated taking the 
host’s speed into account in order to avoid that, for example, low speeds 
would not result in larger margins allowing much more reaction time. Hence, 
the beginning of the relevant data collection was triggered by the participant 
vehicle’s TTC with either the stopping line at a junction or with a car in an 
adjacent lane on the motorway. 
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Table 2: Driving scenarios 
Road layout Scenario description 
Acceleration 
 
 
The acceleration scenario necessitated 
that the participant was stationary at a 
red traffic light that then switched to 
green. They then accelerated to the 
speed limit.  
Data capture commenced when the 
traffic light turned green and ended 
approximately 350m later. 
 
Braking  
 
 
The traffic lights were timed in two 
different ways. In the long-range 
braking scenario, the traffic lights were 
red from the point where the 
participant was 350m before them, 
whilst in the short-notice braking 
scenario turned red when the driver’s 
the time to collision (TTC) with them 
was 3.5 seconds. The scenarios ended 
when the traffic lights turned green and 
therefore required drivers to bring the 
vehicle to a stop at a red traffic light. 
Two-junction scenario 
 
 
The two-junction scenario began when 
the traffic lights at one junction turned 
green and in the same time the traffic 
lights of another junction, 252m further 
down the road, turned red and 
remained red until the participant 
stopped there. 
Cruising 
 
 
The cruising scenario consisted of 
road sections with slight curves, 250m 
long. This scenario occurred several 
times in each urban section and had 
the secondary purpose to create space 
between the scenarios involving 
junctions.  
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Road layout Scenario description 
Cruising involved free flow driving with 
no traffic lights present.  
Motorway 
 
On the motorway the participants were 
required to drive into the middle lane 
and follow a lead vehicle. This 
motorway section included ten events 
whereby adjacent vehicles cut into the 
participants’ lane ahead of them.   
 
 
Every drive included a combination of scenarios. Four sets of an urban and 
a motorway road layout were created. One of them is illustrated in Figure 14 
and Figure 15. In each urban road layout the scenarios were positioned in a 
different sequence to avoid the participants getting familiar with the traffic 
light timings. The acceleration and braking scenarios occurred twice in each 
drive, and both instances were relevant for the analysis. For example, when 
the measure for average acceleration in the acceleration scenario was 
calculated, the average value from both occurrences within a drive was 
used. Accordingly, the measure for maximum acceleration was the largest 
accelerator pedal angle of both acceleration scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 14: Example of an urban section with acceleration, braking and 
cruising scenarios 
 
 
Figure 15: Motorway section with car-following and cut-in scenarios 
 
The urban road layouts were allocated to the experimental drives using the 
Latin square method to control for order effects. Figure 16 depicts this 
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allocation. The first line in the table shows that participant ‘1’ performed the 
first experimental drive with road layout ‘1’, the second experimental drive 
with road layout ‘2’ and so on. Participant ‘2’ had road layout ‘4’ assigned for 
the first experimental drive, then road layout ‘1’ for the second drive, 
counting the road layouts from here. This allocation ensured that the urban 
road layouts were evenly distributed among the drives and participants. 
 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of urban road layouts using Latin squares 
 
4.3.6 Dependent variables 
The data recorded in this study included objective, behavioural measures as 
well as subjective verbalisations. The speed measures, as well as the x- and 
y-positions of the vehicle on the road, were used to model the fuel 
consumption. Objective measures were recorded for entire road layouts, 
except for the start and end sections, as well as for the distinct scenarios 
taking place within each drive, which are relevant for each of the longitudinal 
measures of interest. Measures related to the drivers’ inputs were extracted. 
These included mean and maximum values for the accelerator pedal angle 
and brake pedal pressure. For scenarios involving braking, the points, where 
the foot was put on or taken off the brake pedal, were relevant as well. Mean 
and standard deviation values were calculated for speed, acceleration and 
deceleration. In addition, measures that relate the position of the participant 
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vehicle to junctions and other vehicles were included in the analyses. These 
measures consisted of distance, time headway and TTC. 
All verbalisations needed to be brought into a form that enabled quantitative 
analysis. Therefore the recordings of the think aloud protocols and 
interviews were transcribed and then further processed in NVivo. To date no 
existing theoretical framework suitable for coding the transcriptions of this 
study has been identified. Therefore it was decided to use a bottom-up 
approach. The first-level coding was performed with Initial Coding (Charmaz, 
2006). The text was divided into small, but meaningful chunks, which were 
then assigned to suitable categories (nodes). These nodes were created and 
refined during this process. This way the whole of the transcriptions was 
coded into nodes of a fine granularity. For the second-level coding these 
nodes were summarised with Subcoding (Miles and Huberman, 1994) into 
higher-level categories, resulting in a tree-shaped structure. Simultaneous 
Coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was applied by allowing the assignment 
of multiple nodes to the same statements. This was necessary, because 
several statements were relevant for different categories. 
 
4.3.7 Hypotheses 
Hypotheses for the quantitative analysis of driving behaviour 
The primary hypothesis tested in this study was based on earlier findings 
that drivers behave differently once they are asked to eco-drive (Birrell et al., 
2010, van der Voort et al., 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980). This effect could 
be observed in different ways, depending on the eco-driving strategy that the 
drivers selected. Some drivers aim to accelerate swiftly to efficient speeds 
(cf. Mensing et al., 2013), which are then kept as constant as possible by the 
avoidance of unnecessary acceleration and braking (Andrieu and Pierre, 
2012, Delhomme et al., 2013). Other drivers decide to accelerate as 
smoothly as possible (cf. Birrell et al., 2010, Johansson et al., 1999) and 
drive at lower cruising speeds (Harvey et al., 2013). For safe driving, too, it 
was expected that the participants would lower their speed limit or at least 
adhere more strictly to the speed limits (Cristea et al., 2012). In addition it 
was tested whether drivers attempted to smoothen their pedal actions during 
eco-driving. Such an effect could be shown with maximum values for pedal 
pressure and angle (af Wåhlberg, 2007, Birrell et al., 2014, Birrell et al., 
2010, Ericsson, 2001) as well as the variability of positive and negative 
acceleration. A low variation of acceleration and deceleration implies fewer 
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pedal corrections and therefore better eco-driving performance (cf. Hibberd 
et al., 2015). Time losses during eco-driving were expected, although they 
have been shown to be smaller than drivers typically estimate (Eriksson and 
Svenson, 2012). 
The safety-critical scenarios were designed to present conflicts between 
safe and eco-driving (cf. Young et al., 2011). During the safe drive it was 
expected that the drivers would maintain high safety margins (Lee, 1976, 
Summala, 2005). In contrast, during eco-driving the participants were 
hypothesised to prioritise a constant speed at the expense of safety margins. 
They could apply more engine braking and postpone the use of the brake 
pedal, applying it at lower speeds and at shorter distances to a junction or 
hazard. This behaviour could result in the need to push the brakes hard to 
stop or to re-establish an acceptable car-following distance.  
In an experiment by Graving et al. (2010) females increased their fuel 
efficiency when they were asked to, while males only changed their 
behaviour when provided with a continuous feedback system. Therefore 
Gender was added as a between-subjects variable to this study. In addition, 
it was tested whether the sequence of the experimental drives affected 
driving performance. Driving performance could change with the amount of 
driving due to practise and fatigue effects. In addition, it could matter if the 
participants were learning about the eco-driving focus of the study before or 
after the Safe drive. 
 
Hypotheses for the analysis of mental model boundaries 
For the current thesis an experiment by Goodrich and Boer (1998) was 
replicated. These researchers measured boundaries of the mental models 
for car-following and active braking. These boundaries represent those 
circumstances in which an activated skill is not considered satisficing 
anymore. Participants in their experiment were asked to follow a preceding 
vehicle and therefore execute the skill of ‘time headway regulation’ by 
pressing and releasing the gas pedal. The participants were presented with 
a number of cut-in events, in which another vehicle changed lanes, so it got 
into front of the host vehicle. If the participants changed their behaviour by 
stepping on the brake, it was assumed that the car following behaviour now 
got ‘not satisficing’, thus not good enough anymore. In this case the skill 
‘brake to avoid collision’ was engaged instead. The method to model mental 
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model boundaries by Goodrich and Boer (1998) is described in detail in 
section 3.5.5. 
The principle hypothesis was that drivers accept lower safety margins during 
eco-driving compared to safe driving. This method was used with the data 
recorded during car-following in the motorway section, because this scenario 
was able to provide several similar situations, determined by varying 
distances to the momentary front vehicle, in which drivers had to make 
decisions. These situations provided a variety of data points, which enabled 
fitting equations to the data that predict the drivers’ behaviour depending on 
the safety margins. In this example it was examined whether drivers pressed 
the brake pedal or not, and the measures for the safety margins, time 
headway (𝑇ℎ) and inverted time to collision (𝑇𝐶
−1), were recorded at critical 
points. Hence, it was expected that, for eco-driving, the mental model 
boundaries moved towards higher values for 𝑇𝐶
−1 and lower values for 𝑇ℎ, as 
drivers would consider closer car-following conditions satisficing, compared 
to safe driving.  
 
Hypotheses for interviews and think aloud protocols 
The verbal protocols should contain the strategies and tactics the drivers use 
to drive fuel-efficiently and safely. Hence, it was expected that the drivers 
talk about maintaining a constant speed during eco-driving, the means to 
achieve this and conflicts between eco- and safe driving. Both driving styles 
promote anticipation (Haworth and Symmons, 2001). However, it was 
expected that eco-driving results in an increased awareness of one’s own 
behaviour, as the actions may not be as familiar as the Baseline and Safe 
driving behaviours (cf. Rasmussen, 1983). 
 
Summary of main hypotheses 
 When drivers are instructed to ‘drive fuel-efficiently’ they are expected 
to lower speeds as well as the variation of speed, acceleration and 
deceleration 
 Drivers are expected to maintain a constant speed, also in safety-
critical situations, and therefore apply the brake less strongly and 
closer to the junction, traffic sign or hazard, and lower the mean and 
variation of deceleration as well as do not lower their speed as much 
as in ‘normal’ driving  
 Mental model boundaries shift towards smaller safety margins 
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 Interviews and think aloud protocols include constant speed, means 
to achieve this and conflicts with safety 
 Focus and awareness increase towards the drivers’ behaviour 
 
4.3.8 Participants 
Participants were recruited utilising the simulator database, printed adverts 
placed in different locations in the University of Leeds as well as snowball 
sampling. The group consisted of 16 drivers, between 26 and 43 years old, 8 
of them male and 8 of them female. Their demographic information is listed 
in Table 3. Every participant drove at least 5000 miles per year (mean 
annual mileage was 8750 miles), and held a full EU license for at least two 
years (mean driving experience was 13.3 years). Eight of the 16 drivers had 
previous experience with a driving simulator, but none of them had driven 
the desktop simulator used in this study before. As a gesture of appreciation 
all participants were entered into a prize draw. 
 
Table 3: Participant demographic information 
 Male Female 
 
Age 
(years) 
Annual 
mileage 
(miles) 
Driving 
experience 
(years) 
Age 
(years) 
Annual 
mileage 
(miles) 
Driving 
experience 
(years) 
Mean 37.0 9000 16.0 30.6 8500 10.7 
Sd. 5.5 2390 6.0 4.0 2000 4.6 
Max. 43 14000 23 37 10000 20 
Min. 26 6000 8 26 5000 5 
 
 
4.3.9 Procedure 
During recruitment the participants were told that the study was about 
‘driving styles’, without mentioning the eco-driving focus, to prevent the 
participants preparing for the study. At the beginning of a session the 
participants were briefed and asked to sign a consent form. They were then 
given a puzzle with pictures representing letters. To practise the think aloud 
protocol, the participants were instructed as described by Ericsson and 
Simon (1980) and van Someren et al. (1994). Accordingly, they were asked 
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to speak their thoughts out loud, while performing the simple, logical task of 
combining the letters to the words ‘Institute for Transport Studies’. The 
participants were not asked to focus on anything, just to verbalise whatever 
would go through their minds. If a participant was silent for several moments, 
they were reminded to keep talking. Further instructions and prompts were 
kept to a minimum to prevent any influence on the think aloud protocols. 
Subsequently, the participants performed a test drive to become familiar with 
the desktop driving simulator and with speaking during driving. The 
participants were told that the simulated car is equipped with a conventional 
petrol engine. For the experimental drives, each participant was asked to 
drive through an urban and a motorway section four times, according to the 
assigned Group. Hence, they were told to ‘Drive normally’, ‘Drive safely’ and 
‘Drive fuel-efficiently’, without being given further explanations about the 
meaning of these driving styles. The participants were also asked to imagine 
that they are on the way to a meeting to avoid that they drive excessively 
slowly. Each drive lasted around 20 minutes. After each drive open 
interviews were conducted with questions such as “What did you do?” and 
“What did you think?” After all drives were completed, a debriefing took 
place, where the purpose of the study was explained and the participants 
had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
4.3.10 Analysis 
The raw behavioural data collected by the driving simulator was processed 
in Matlab to extract the dependent variables, for the whole drives and 
separately for each scenario. Because the start and end sections had been 
implemented on roads where drivers would usually not stop, they were 
excluded from the analysis. The start section of the urban drive was about 
500m long. The end section included a speed limit increase and a rural road 
stretch of about 900m. Data from the motorway section was used from 100 
seconds after the drive began, until the end of the last cut-in scenario. The 
fuel consumption, as modelled with PHEM (Rexeis et al., 2005), was 
analysed in relation to the entire road layouts as well as separately for the 
cruising scenario.  
In order to account for practise, fatigue and boredom effects, the Baseline 1 
and the Baseline 2 drives were compared across all objective performance 
measures with paired-samples, two-tailed t-tests. The statistical comparison 
of the behavioural and verbal data of the Baseline 1 and Baseline 2 drives 
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resulted in significant differences in 4 measures7, Table 4. The variation of 
deceleration increased from Baseline 1 to Baseline 2, which could be due to 
the drivers anticipating the traffic light turning to red after being exposed to it 
three times beforehand. The decrease in mean acceleration in the short-
notice braking scenario as well in the standard deviation of speed in the cut-
in scenario could also be explained with a learning effect, and therefore 
milder reactions to the events over time. In sum, these differences did not 
suggest a consistent change in behaviours relevant for eco-driving between 
Baseline 1 and Baseline 2. Therefore it was assumed that there were no 
significant differences between these conditions and the Baseline 2 drive 
was chosen for the following analysis. ‘Baseline 2’ was referred to as 
‘Baseline’ from now on. Results could have been affected by this decision, 
particularly with regards to the strong deceleration in the long-range braking 
scenario in Baseline 2, which could present a clearer contrast to the Eco 
condition. 
 
Table 4: Significant comparisons between Baseline 1 and Baseline 2 
Variable Scenario Baseline 1 Baseline 2 p r 
Sd. of deceleration 
(m/s2) 
Long-range 
braking 
0.58 1.01 .022 .550 
Mean deceleration 
(m/s2) 
Short-notice 
braking 
-1.75 -1.49 .016 .575 
Sd. of speed (m/s) Cut-in 2.68 2.08 .025 .542 
Mean headway at 
braking termination (s) 
Cut-in 0.65 0.48 .024 .560 
 
Subsequently, a mixed methods ANOVA with Bonferroni corrected post hoc 
pairwise comparisons was performed, with the within-subjects factor 
Instruction and the between-subjects factors Group and Gender. For 
violations of the sphericity assumption, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was applied, because it is the most conservative method (Greenhouse and 
Geisser, 1959). When assumptions of parametric testing were violated, non-
                                            
7 Differences were found in the standard deviation (sd.) of deceleration in the 
long-range braking scenario [t(15) = -2.55, p = .022], the mean 
deceleration in the short-notice braking scenario [t(15) = -2.72, p = .016], 
as well as the sd. of speed [t(15) = 2.50, p = .025] and the mean 
headway of braking termination [t(14) = 2.53, p = .024] in the cut-in 
scenario. 
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parametric methods were used. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was applied 
for within-subjects factors and the p-value was corrected for multiple 
comparisons. The Mann-Whitney U-test was performed on between-subjects 
factors. Statistical significance was accepted at p < 0.05. 
Mental model boundaries as described in section 3.5.5 were modelled using 
data from the motorway sections. These sections included ten cut-in events 
per drive and therefore provided data for several comparable situations that 
required the drivers to make decisions. Following the method of Goodrich et 
al. (1998a), these critical decision points were identified in the data. After 
each cut-in event on the motorway, there were two possible outcomes. One 
of these outcomes was that the driver considered the resulting combination 
of 𝑇ℎ and 𝑇𝐶
−1 not satisficing and stepped on the brake (BRK). In this case, 
the critical decision points were the moment the participant began to depress 
the brake pedal as well as the moment the brake pedal was released. The 
second possible outcome was the case that the driver did not press the 
brake pedal, so either kept the accelerator pedal depressed or coasted. This 
behaviour was defined as nominal driving (NOM). In this case it was 
assumed that the driver considered the combination of 𝑇ℎ and 𝑇𝐶
−1 
satisficing. Two analysis points, which mark examples of acceptable states, 
were defined for the NOM states as well. The first one was defined as the 
beginning of the cut-in event, just when the vehicle performing the cut-in 
manoeuvre began to move from the right or the left towards the middle lane. 
Because of the fluctuating speed of the preceding vehicle, the second 
analysis point for nominal cases was defined as the minimum TTC in the ten 
seconds window following the onset of the cut-in event. It was assumed that 
after this time window the participant did not react to the event anymore and 
regularly followed the lead car instead. 
For the first steps of the analysis the observed NOM and BRK points were 
regarded separately. Each set of points was shaped into a cumulative 
distribution function, giving each point a cumulative probability for not 
braking µ, and this probability ranged from 0 to 1. The independent variables 
were 𝑇ℎ for BRK cases and 𝑇𝐶
−1 for the NOM cases, represented in the 
accuracy (𝜇𝐴) and rejectability (𝜇𝑅) functions below with the term 𝜏. 
 
𝜇𝐴 =
1
1 + 𝑒(−𝑎𝜏+𝑏) 
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𝜇𝑅 =
1
1 +  𝑒(−𝑎𝜏+𝑏) 
 
 
The computation of these functions was performed using a least squares fit. 
The coefficients a and b resulting from the fit were then utilised for a 
classification of all NOM and BRK measurement points, leading to a 
boundary function. These coefficients were compared with a t-test. The 
boundary functions of the Eco, Safe and Baseline drives were then visually 
compared and discussed. 
The verbal recordings the think aloud protocols and interviews were 
transcribed and processed with NVivo using a bottom-up approach. The 
first-level coding was performed personally by the author with Initial Coding 
(Charmaz, 2006). For Initial Coding the text was divided into small, but 
meaningful chunks, which were then assigned to categories (nodes). In 
order to clarify which statement belonged into which node, definitions and 
qualifying questions were added to the descriptions of the nodes. The 
content of the nodes were read regularly to ensure consistency, and 
statements were recoded if needed. One challenge was that several 
statements of the drivers included more than one aspect of driving. Hence, it 
was necessary to apply Simultaneous Coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
by allowing the assignment of multiple nodes to the same statements. About 
20 to 30% of the transcripts needed to be coded in multiple nodes. At the 
end of the first-level coding the entirety of the transcriptions was coded into 
nodes of a fine granularity. For the second-level coding these nodes were 
summarised using Subcoding (Miles and Huberman, 1994) into higher-level 
categories.  
During detailed coding and subsequent categorisation five relevant 
categories were established. The category FUEL EFFICIENCY AND ECO 
DRIVING contains statements about eco-driving. The vast majority of these 
statements were uttered in the Eco condition, and only sporadically in other 
conditions, for example in order to draw a comparison (“I’m just doing 
a bit of driving and […] focus less on the speed”). 
Therefore a statistical comparison of the presence of statements in this 
category among the conditions was neither feasible nor meaningful. During 
the drives and the interviews afterwards people talked about their eco-
driving strategies and evaluated their actions accordingly. It can be assumed 
that the drivers mentioned eco-driving when they activated eco-driving 
mental models. In order to closer examine the category, mentioned eco-
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driving strategies and techniques were counted and regarded in detail. Here 
the think aloud protocols and interviews provided clues about the explicit 
eco-driving know-how on the knowledge- and rule-based levels of 
Rasmussen’s mental model hierarchy (Rasmussen, 1983).  
The higher-level categories ACTION, SAFETY AND VIGILANCE and 
SURROUNDINGS were created during the coding process. The ACTION 
category includes every statement related to what the participant was doing, 
either at the moment (“brake a bit”) or as a strategy for the drive (“I do 
really need to stick to the speed limit”). It comprises 
information about controlling the simulator (“Just getting used to the 
controls”) as well as actions in the simulated world (“I’m gonna 
accelerate to join the motorway”). These types of actions are 
things the participants decided or considered to do, and they are therefore 
relevant for the driving styles researched in the current study. In addition to 
actual actions, the category includes decisions against actions (“I’m not 
going to go faster“). A large proportion of this category is about speed 
maintenance, car following and the selection of speed including increasing 
and decreasing it. The node SAFETY AND VIGILANCE includes statements 
about the driving environment as well as the driver’s focus (“So I keep my 
eye on them”), anticipation and validation, the location and position of the 
participant vehicle (“Driving behind the car in front”) as well as 
expressions of surprise. The SURROUNDINGS category is a subcategory of 
SAFETY AND VIGILANCE and includes any features in the environment 
that the drivers mention, for example other road users (“He’s just 
moving along”), the traffic lights, the road, road and landscape features as 
well as events (“Yellow to red”). 
These categories facilitated the analysis of the verbalisations during driving, 
thus of the think aloud protocols. For each experimental condition it was 
determined how many words in a participant’s transcriptions were coded in a 
category, as a percentage of the total number of their words within that drive. 
One participant remained silent during the Baseline 2 drive and was 
therefore excluded from the analysis of the verbal protocols. These 
percentages were subjected to ANOVAs as described for the behavioural 
measures above. In addition, the post-test interviews were used to gain 
further insights into the strategies the drivers used for eco-driving. Regularly 
mentioned practises were identified in an eco-driving category and counted. 
The number of participants who mentioned a particular technique to eco-
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drive was subjected to a simple non-statistical comparison and the findings 
of the interviews were compared to actual behaviours and discussed.  
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Fuel consumption and travel time effects 
The total driving time and fuel consumption were calculated separately for 
the urban and motorway sections. Figure 17 shows a median split of the 
participants by their fuel consumption in urban areas in the Baseline drive. 
One can see that both sides of the median, those using a high amount of 
fuel and those using less fuel during ‘normal’ driving manage to reduce their 
fuel consumption down to a similar average. In fact, every single participant 
achieved a reduction in fuel consumption in the urban section. A main effect 
[F(2,24) = 10.89, p < .001, η2 = .476] of Instruction was found; the difference 
was on average 7.7%, and 6.3% compared to the Safe condition. During the 
Safe drive the participants used 1.7% less fuel than during the Baseline 
drive. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons prove these differences to be 
significant. An examination of the cruising scenario in isolation resulted in a 
strong reduction of the fuel consumption for the Eco compared to the 
Baseline drive, with 12.6%. The main effect was significant [F(2,24) = 4.01, p 
= .029, η2 = .255], although post-hoc comparisons did not reveal a significant 
difference. For the motorway driving less fuel was consumed during the Eco 
condition compared to the Baseline condition [F(2,24) = 8.99, p = .001, η2 = 
.428]. However the reduction in fuel consumption was less (2.8%). There 
was a main effect of Group, with the Group performing the Safe before the 
Eco drive consuming more fuel in every motorway drive than the Group 
having the Eco drive first [F(1,12) = 5.22, p = .041, η2 = .303]. There were 
neither Gender nor interaction effects. 
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Figure 17: Fuel consumption for participants split by the median fuel 
consumption in the Baseline drive 
 
The travel times were analysed. The urban sections took 48 seconds longer 
during the Eco drive compared to the Baseline drive, which lasted 7 minutes 
and 48 seconds [F(1.4,16.7) = 7.84, p = .008, η2 = .395]. In the cruising 
scenario the Eco drive resulted in a longer time compared to Baseline (15 
seconds) and Safe (11 seconds) drives [F(2,24) = 8.55, p = .002, η2 = .416], 
see Figure 18 and Table 5. There were no effects for between-subjects 
variables and no interaction effects. In the motorway section the Eco drive 
lasted on average 50 seconds longer than the Safe drive [Z = -2.482, p = 
.039, r = -1.433]. Because the length of the motorway section depended on 
the completion of the cut-in events, this result was regarded with caution and 
did not inform the major conclusions of the present study.  
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Figure 18: Fuel consumption and total time for the urban section of the 
experimental drives 
 
Table 5: Overall results for the urban, motorway and cruising sections 
Variable Safe Eco Baseline 
Post-hoc 
tests 
p ηp2/r 
Fuel consumption 
urban (g/s) 
0.59 0.56 0.60 Eco <  
all other 
<.00
1 
.476 
Fuel consumption 
cruising scenario 
(g/s) 
0.70 0.64 0.73 none .029 .255 
Fuel consumption 
motorway (g/s) 
0.67 0.66 0.68 Eco < 
Baseline 
.001 .428 
Time urban 
(min:sec) 
8:00 8:30 7:48 Eco > 
Baseline 
.008 .395 
Time cruising 
scenario (min:sec) 
3:05 3:16 3:01 
Eco >  
all other 
.002 .416 
Time motorway 
(min:sec) 
6:14 7:04 6:31 
Eco > 
Safe 
.039, 
.765 
-1.43, 
n/a 
 
 
4.4.2 Acceleration scenario 
Main effects were found for all three measures of accelerator pedal angle. 
Fifteen of 16 drivers were accelerating with a lower standard deviation in the 
Eco condition compared to the Baseline drive and the effect was significant 
90 
 
[F(2,24) = 8.98, p = .001, η2 = .428]. On average they achieved 25% and 
28% less variation compared to the Safe and the Baseline drives, 
respectively. Accordingly, in the speed profiles in Figure 19 it can be seen 
that the speed increased gradually during eco-driving. In addition, the speed 
increase was less steep at the beginning and the resulting cruising speed 
was slightly lower, too. The spread in the middle 50% for the Safe and the 
Eco drives suggests a relatively high individual variation with the lower 
quartile of the participants accelerating extremely mildly. The statistics 
support that the participants accelerated less harshly on average [F(2,24) = 
10.25, p = .001, η2 = .461] with 0.34 m/s2 compared to the Baseline and with 
0.3 m/s2 compared to the Safe drive. It is possible that the lower speed at 
the end of the scenario affects the previous findings. However, it was 
established that the drivers accelerated with less tendency to “put their foot 
down” [F(2,24) = 7.10, p = .004, η2 = .372], compared to the other drives, as 
the maximum accelerator pedal angle was 20° lower than during the 
Baseline drive. In order to further explore the acceleration behaviour, the 
time spent with the accelerator pedal angle pressed at an angle of at least 
30°, which is about a third of pedal range, was examined. It was found that 
during the Baseline drive the participants pressed the pedal past that point  
on average more than 7 times longer than in the Eco drive [Z = 3.180, p = 
.003, r = .795], and more than 5 times longer than in the Safe drive [Z = 
2.824, p = .015, r = .706]. In order to control for cruising speed, an ANCOVA 
was conducted with mean acceleration. The mean cruising speed from the 
Eco condition was chosen as covariate, because it is the most relevant 
speed variable regarding effects from the eco-driving instructions. The 
inclusion of the speed negated a main affect (p = .483). Hence, differences 
in acceleration are indeed related to the cruising speed during eco-driving. 
There were significant effects neither for Gender nor for Group, and no 
interaction effects. 
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Figure 19: Speed profile of the acceleration scenario  
 
Table 6: Results for the acceleration scenario 
Variable Safe Eco Baseline 
Post-hoc 
tests 
p ηp2/r 
Mean acceleration 
(m/s2) 
1.03 0.73 1.07 
Eco <  
all other 
.001 .461 
Time with 
accelerator pedal 
angle above 30° (s) 
2.31 0.46 3.43 
Eco < all 
other 
.015, 
.003 
.706, 
.795 
Max. accelerator 
pedal angle (°) 
44 27 47 
Eco <  
all other 
.004 .372 
Sd. of acceleration 
(m/s2) 
0.93 0.70 0.97 
Eco <  
all other 
.001 .428 
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4.4.3 Braking scenario 
In the long-range braking scenario, where drivers had extended preview of 
the red traffic light, the speed profiles in Figure 20 suggest that the 
participants began to decelerate earlier and in a less steep manner during 
the Eco drive compared to the Baseline drive. During the former, all 
participants reduced their mean deceleration and a main effect of Instruction 
was found [F(1.3,15.3) = 14.30, p = .001, η2 = .543]; post-hoc testing 
revealed that with -0.56 m/s2 it was significantly lower in the eco-drive 
condition compared to the others (Safe: -0.68 m/s2, Baseline: -.072 m/s2), 
Table 7. Similar results were found for variation in deceleration with drivers 
instructed to drive fuel-efficiently braking more smoothly (0.76 m/s2) than 
when instructed to drive normally (1.01 m/s2) and safely (0.95 m/s2) [F(2,24) 
= 16.30, p < .001, η2 = .576].  No significant effects were found for measures 
relating to activation of the brake pedal (mean speed and time to contact 
with the stopping line at braking initiation and maximum brake pressure).  
 
 
Figure 20: Speed profile of the long-range braking scenario 
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Table 7: Results for the long-range braking scenario 
Variable Safe Eco Baseline 
Post-hoc 
tests 
p ηp2/r 
Mean deceleration 
(m/s2) 
-0.68 -0.56 -0.72 
Eco <  
all other 
.001 .543 
Sd. of deceleration 
(m/s2) 
0.95 0.76 1.01 
Eco < 
Safe 
<.001 .576 
Mean speed at 
braking initiation 
(m/s) (mph in 
brackets) 
10.28 
(23.0) 
8.74 
(19.6) 
9.95 
(22.3) 
none .084 n/a 
Time to contact with 
stopping line at 
braking initiation (s) 
6.61 7.38 6.11 none .227 n/a 
Max. brake 
pressure (N) 
136 108 150 none 
.150, 
.072 
n/a, 
n/a 
 
There was no statistically significant two-way interaction, but a three-way 
interaction between Instruction, Group and Gender for the standard 
deviation of deceleration [F(2, 24) = 8.27, p = .002, ηp2 = .408]. This means 
that there was an interaction effect between Group and Instruction that was 
only significant for males, as shown in Figure 21. The males in the Group 
instructed to eco-drive before driving safely had a much more smooth 
deceleration in the Safe drive compared to those performing the Safe drive 
before the Eco drive. 
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Figure 21: Interaction effects for the sd. of deceleration for males only 
 
In the short-notice braking scenario the traffic lights switched to red at a time 
to contact of the participant vehicle with the stopping line of 3.5 seconds. 
During the Eco drive one participant drove through both occurrences of this 
scenario without stopping. An ANOVA with the deceleration parameters of 
the other 15 participants indicated neither a difference in mean deceleration 
nor in maximum brake pressure. However, the average maximum brake 
pedal pressure for eco-driving was 10 N lower compared to the Baseline and 
6 N lower compared to the Safe condition (159 N). These results are 
summarised in Table 8. For the Baseline drive it was found, that with an 
average of 195 N females pushed the brake pedal harder than males, by 
136 N (U = 55.5, p = .030, r = 0.645). No effects were found for Group nor 
for interactions. 
 
Table 8: Results for the short-notice braking scenario 
Variable Safe Eco Baseline 
Post-hoc 
tests 
p ηp2/r 
Mean deceleration 
(m/s2) 
-1.49 -1.51 -1.49 none .997 n/a 
Max. brake 
pressure (N) 
159 153 163 none 
1.038, 
.417 
n/a, 
n/a 
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4.4.4 Two-junction scenario 
The two-junction scenario occurred once in every second drive to reduce the 
likelihood of the participants recognising it and adjusting their behaviour 
accordingly. Therefore every participant was faced with this scenario in 
either Baseline 1 or the Baseline 2 as well as in either the Safe or the Eco 
drive. In this case, both Baseline drives were combined into one ‘Baseline’ 
condition, and then compared with the Eco drive using a paired-samples t-
test. Because each participant experienced the two-junction scenario in 
either the Safe or the Eco drive, these drives were analysed with an 
independent-samples t-test. For each test, p-values were Bonferroni-
corrected. 
Figure 22 depicts the speed profiles for this scenario. The drives appear to 
differ considerably at the beginning of the scenario when the participants 
were increasing their speed. Indeed, during the Eco drive the mean 
acceleration was about 30% lower on average than in the Baseline condition 
and this difference prove to be significant (t(7) = -3.90, p = .006, r = 0.827). 
This difference in acceleration is reflected in the maximum accelerator pedal 
angle, which was on average 37% lower during the Eco drive compared to 
the Baseline drive (t(7) = -6.80, p < .001, r = .932). In fact, all of the 8 
participants faced with the two-junction scenario during their Eco drive 
achieved a lower maximum accelerator pedal angle than in their Baseline 
drive. There were no significant effects for the maximum speed the 
participants achieved between the junctions. Instead, the speed profiles 
indicate a wide spread between the participants, illustrated by the lower and 
higher quartiles of the Safe and Eco drives towards the second junction. 
However, there was a tendency; and the maximum speed was about 19 % 
lower on average for the Eco drive compared to the Baseline drive.  
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Figure 22: Speed profile of the two-junction scenario 
 
It was analysed whether the participants released the accelerator pedal at 
different speeds during the experimental drives. A significant effect was 
found for the Eco drive, in which participants terminated the acceleration on 
average at lower speeds compared to the Baseline condition (t(14) = 3.254, 
p = .042, r = .776). These results are listed in Table 9. There were no 
significant effects for between-subjects variables, nor could any interaction 
effects be identified. 
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Table 9: Results for the two-junction scenario 
Variable Safe Eco Baseline Post-hoc  p ηp
2/r 
Mean acceleration 
(m/s2) 
.93 .82 1.17 
Eco < 
Baseline 
.449, 
.006 
n/a, 
.827 
Max. accelerator 
pedal angle (°) 
27 22 35 
Eco < 
Baseline 
<.00
1 
.932 
Max. speed (m/s) 
(mph in brackets) 
13.4 
(30) 
11.6 
(26) 
14.4 
(32) 
none 
.279, 
.051 
n/a, 
n/a 
Speed at first 
termination of 
acceleration (m/s) 
(mph in brackets) 
10.8 
(24) 
10.6 
(24) 
13.6 
(30) 
Eco < 
Baseline 
.931, 
.042 
n/a, 
.776 
 
 
4.4.5 Cruising scenario 
The results for the cruising scenario are summarised in Table 10. Fifteen of 
all 16 participants lowered their mean speed in the Eco drive compared to 
the Baseline drive. There was indeed a significant main effect of Instruction 
on this measure [F(2,24) = 20.7, p < .001, η2 = .633]. Post-hoc analysis 
indicated that for the Eco drive the mean speed was significantly slower than 
for all other conditions, about 5% lower than Safe and 7% lower than 
Baseline driving. There was no main effect of Instruction on the standard 
deviation of speed, so the speed was not kept more constant during eco-
driving. However, there was a main effect on the standard deviation of 
acceleration [F(2,24) = 15.2, p < .001, η2 = .505]. Post-hoc comparisons 
revealed that with 0.28 m/s2 the acceleration was more smooth during eco-
driving than in the other drives (Safe: 0.36 m/s2, Baseline: 0.41 m/s2). There 
were no effects for Gender. 
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Table 10: Results for the cruising scenario 
Variable Safe Eco Baseline Post-hoc p ηp
2/r 
Mean speed (m/s) 
(mph in brackets) 
17.5 
(39) 
16.6 
(37) 
17.9 
(40) 
Eco <  
all other 
<.001 .633 
Sd. of speed (m/s) 
(mph in brackets) 
1.40 
(3.13) 
1.54 
(3.44) 
1.36 
(3.04) 
none 
.402, 
.189 
n/a, 
n/a 
Sd. of acceleration 
(m/s2) 
0.36 0.28 0.41 
Eco <  
all other 
<.001 .505 
 
There was a significant interaction effect for the variation of acceleration 
between Group and Instruction [F(2, 24) = 3.54, p = .045, ηp2 = .228]. Figure 
23 indicates that those who performed the Safe drive before the Eco drive 
subsequently had a 33% higher variation in their acceleration in the Baseline 
drive.  
 
 
Figure 23: Interaction effect between Group and Instruction in the 
cruising scenario 
 
4.4.6 Motorway scenario 
Figure 24 shows the distribution of mean time headways, split into bins with 
the length of 1 second, in the Safe, Eco and Baseline conditions.  It can be 
seen that there is a greater range of headways in the Eco condition, and a 
main effect of Instruction was found [Eco/Safe: Z = -2.637, p = .024, r = -
1.522; Eco/Baseline: Z = -3.154, p = .006, r = -1.821]. The mean headway 
99 
 
was on average 1 second longer than in the Safe and 1.15 seconds longer 
than in the Baseline condition, Table 11. In addition, the standard deviation 
of time headway was significantly larger during the Eco drive compared to 
the Safe and Baseline drives [Eco/Safe: Z = -2.534, p = .033, r = -1.463; 
Eco/Baseline: Z = -3.258, p = .003, r = -1.881]. However, by limiting the 
analysed data to headways with a maximum of 6 seconds, which is an 
approximation for car-following using findings by Vogel (2002), the effect 
diminished. Nevertheless, Figure 25 depicts the distribution of mean time 
headways smaller than 2 seconds. Within 2 seconds, assuming a speed of 
65 mph, which is the average speed of the ambient traffic in the middle lane, 
one would travel about 58 metres. In case of an event, it can take at least 1 
second until an initial accelerator pedal release and at least another second 
until the brake pedal is depressed (McGehee et al., 2000), these time ranges 
indicate safety-critical differences between the drives. It supports the finding 
that the headways tended to be largest during the Eco condition, and the 
tendency that headways were slightly larger for Safe than for Baseline 
driving. Tests with standard deviation values show that accelerations were 
smoothest in the Eco condition [F(2,24) = 10.73, p < .001, η2 = .472], and 
decelerations were more smooth in the Eco than in the Safe condition [Z = -
2.430, p = .045, r = -1.403]. For the Group performing the Eco before the 
Safe drive, the variation of deceleration was significantly lower during the 
Baseline drive compared to the other Group (U = 7.00, p = .021, r = -0.657). 
During the Eco drive the decelerations the variations was significantly lower 
for males compared to females with a difference of 43 % (U = 55.0, p = .045, 
r = 0.604).  
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Figure 24: Distribution of the mean time headway for the car-following 
scenario  
 
 
Figure 25: Distribution of small mean time headway measures for the 
car-following scenario 
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Table 11: Results for the car-following scenario 
Variable Safe Eco Baseline 
Post-
hoc 
tests 
p ηp2/r 
Sd. of speed (m/s) 
(mph in brackets) 
1.29 
(2.89) 
1.22 
(2.73) 
1.30 
(2.91) 
none 
1.314, 
.363 
n/a, 
n/a 
Mean headway (s) 1.37 2.37 1.22 
Eco >  
all other 
.024, 
.006 
-1.522, 
-1.821 
Sd. of headway (s) 0.67 1.89 0.73 
Eco >  
all other 
.033, 
.003 
-1.463, 
-1.881 
Sd. of acceleration 
(m/s2) 
0.31 0.25 0.35 
Eco < 
Baseline 
< .001 .472 
Sd. of deceleration 
(m/s2) 
.22 .15 .21 
Eco < 
Safe 
.045, 
.078 
-1.403, 
n/a 
 
Several interaction effects could be identified, and these are depicted in 
Figure 26. Instruction had a stronger effect on mean time headway of the 
Group having the Safe drive first; it was about 2.4 times as long during the 
Eco drive compared to the Baseline drive [Z = -2.521, p = .036, r = -0.630]. 
In contrast, the other Group had a 2.1 times higher variation of time 
headway in the Eco drive [Z = -2.521, p = .036, r = -0.630]. Instruction also 
had a stronger effect on males, whose mean time headway during the Eco 
drive was 60% longer than during the Baseline drive [Z = -2.521, p = .036, r 
= -0.630], and whose variation of time headway was about 2.3 larger in the 
Eco drive as well [Z = -2.521, p = .036, r = -0.630]. 
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Figure 26: Interaction effects for the mean and standard deviation of 
time headway in the car-following scenario 
 
Analysing cut-in events on the motorway, as shown in Table 12, it was found 
that the standard deviation of speed was significantly lower, by about 33%, 
during the Eco compared to the Baseline condition [Z = -2.999, p = .009, r = 
-1.731]. Hence, the participants kept their speed more constant during eco-
driving. One possible explanation could be a longer time headway, which 
was about 0.26 seconds longer during the Eco drive [Z = -2.844, p = .012, r 
= -1.642]. With an examination of the data with a maximum headway of 6 
seconds (cf. Vogel, 2002) the effect of the speed variation barely remained 
[F(1.342, 16.102) = 4.532, p = .040, ηp2 = .274]. In order to examine safety-
critical behaviours, the braking actions were further examined, specifically 
the speed and headway when braking actions were initiated and terminated. 
These tests revealed that the mean time headway, when braking was 
terminated, was significantly lower for the Eco drive, about 0.12 seconds, 
compared to the Safe [Z = -2.497, p = .039, r = -1.442]  and 0.18 seconds 
lower than the Baseline drives [Z = -2.803, p = .015, r = -1.618]. It was 
higher for the Group performing the Safe before the Eco drive (U = 4.00, p = 
.012, r = -0.551). In addition, in every drive males terminated their braking 
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actions at higher speeds compared to females (F(1) = 8.12, p = .029, ηp2 = 
.575).  
 
Table 12: Results for the cut-in scenario 
Variable Safe Eco Baseline 
Post-hoc 
tests 
p ηp2/r 
Sd. of speed (m/s) 1.74 1.40 2.08 
Eco < 
Baseline 
.078, 
.009 
-1.283 
-1.731 
Mean headway (s) 0.89 1.06 0.82 
Eco > 
Baseline 
.132, 
.012 
n/a, 
-1.642 
Mean speed at 
braking initiation 
(m/s) 
(mph in brackets) 
29.5 
(66) 
29.1 
(65) 
29.6 
(66) 
none .473 n/a 
Mean speed at 
braking termination 
(m/s) 
(mph in brackets) 
26.6 
(59) 
25.4 
(57) 
25.9 
(58) 
none .701 n/a 
Mean headway at 
braking initiation (s) 
0.93 1.71 0.79 none 
2.634, 
1.938 
n/a, 
n/a 
Mean headway at 
braking termination 
(s) 
0.54 0.36 0.48 
Eco <  
all other 
.039, 
.015 
-1.442 
-1.618 
 
Several interaction effects could be found. The Group that drove the Safe 
drive before the Eco drive had a 40% lower variation of speed in the Eco 
compared to the Safe drive [Z = -2.521, p = .036, r = -0.630], illustrated in 
Figure 27.  
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Figure 27: Group*Instruction interaction effect in the cut-in scenario 
 
Females were significantly influenced by Instruction, as their mean time 
headway was 34% higher in the Eco than in the Baseline drive [Z = -2.521, p 
= .036, r = -0.630], but not males, as shown in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28: Gender*Instruction interaction effect in the cut-in scenario 
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4.4.7 Mental model boundaries 
A fit of an accuracy function was performed to attain classification functions 
for the Safe, Eco and Baseline drives (cf. Goodrich and Boer, 1998). The 
concept is explained in detail in section 3.5.5. In brief, accuracy 𝜇𝐴 is a utility 
and therefore measures benefits for the driver, such as safety and travel 
speed. In satisficing decision theory, accuracy represents satisficing states 
(Goodrich et al., 1998b). In this example accurate, or satisficing, states 
signify that the driver perceives the current distance to a car in front as high 
enough, so a braking action is not necessary. In epistemic utility theory 
(Levi, 1983) utility is represented as probability. Hence, the accuracy 
function determines the probability 𝜇𝐴, ranging from 0 to 1, of a driver not 
braking depending on 𝑇𝐶
−1. Goodrich and Boer (1998) brought their collected 
data into a cumulative distribution function and then found that a function of 
the following form could be fitted to them:  
 
𝜇𝐴 =
1
1 + 𝑒(−𝑎𝜏+𝑏) 
 
 
The NOM cases for the accuracy function are displayed in Table 13. The 
probability of the driver not braking decreases as 𝑇𝐶
−1 increases. Expressed 
differently, the probability of the driver braking increases with an increasing 
value for 𝑇𝐶
−1, or with a smaller TTC. Accordingly, the slopes of the functions 
in Table 13 are negative. On the left side of the function 𝑇𝐶
−1 is considered 
small enough (TTC is large enough), so the driver does not brake. As one 
moves towards the right, the probability for not braking decreases with a 
higher 𝑇𝐶
−1. This probability is smaller for the Eco drive compared to the Safe 
drive, indicating that during eco-driving the drivers were more likely to brake 
at a given 𝑇𝐶
−1. The differences were significant between the Baseline and 
the Eco drive for both the a and b coefficients [a: t(183) = 7.56, p = .003, r = 
.488, b: t(183) = 3.92, p = .003, r = .278].  
Rejectability 𝜇𝑅 is a disutility representing costs for the driver, such as crash 
risk, but it can also stand for delays, for example. In satisficing decision 
theory rejectability represents non-satisficing states (Goodrich et al., 1998b). 
In this study rejectable, or non-satisficing, states mean that the driver 
perceives the current distance to a car in front as too low, and therefore 
decides to step on the brake pedal. In accordance with utility, disutility is 
represented as probability (Levi, 1983). Hence, the rejectability function 
determines the probability 𝜇𝑅, ranging from 0 to 1, of a driver not braking 
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depending on 𝑇ℎ. To begin with, the BRK points were shaped into a 
cumulative distribution function. Subsequently, a least squares fit with a 
rejectability function of the following form was performed for the Safe, Eco 
and Baseline drives (cf. Goodrich and Boer, 1998):  
 
𝜇𝑅 =
1
1 +  𝑒(−𝑎𝜏+𝑏) 
 
 
The BRK cases are displayed in the two lower rows in Table 13. Similar to 
the accuracy functions, the tendency suggested by the coefficients for a can 
be interpreted for the rejectability functions as well. With a negative a, the 
probability of the driver braking decreases as 𝑇ℎ increases. This effect is 
much less pronounced for the Eco drive compared to the Safe drive. This 
means that the participants tended to brake at large headways in the Eco 
condition. This behaviour can indicate more anticipation during eco-driving, 
with the goal to retain larger headways in order to avoid stronger braking 
later on. For the a and b coefficients the differences are significant between 
the Baseline and the Eco drive [a: t(184) = 17.3, p = .003, r = .786, b: t(184) 
= 10.9, p = .003, r = .628], as well as between the Safe and the Eco drive [a: 
t(178) = 14.1, p = .003, r = .726, b: t(178) = 8.92, p = .003, r = .556]. 
 
Table 13: Coefficients for regression functions 
Coefficients Safe Eco Baseline Sign. diff. t p r 
a accuracy -11.85 -10.16 -15.12 
Eco < all 
others 
2.56, 
7.56 
.03, 
.003 
.189, 
.488 
b accuracy 0.93 0.84 0.59 
Eco < 
Baseline 
1.35, 
3.92 
.06, 
.003 
n/a, 
.278 
a rejectability -3.99 -1.17 -5.75 
Eco < all 
others 
14.1, 
17.3 
.003, 
.003 
.726, 
.786 
b rejectability -3.10 -1.49 -3.69 
Eco < all 
others 
8.92, 
10.9 
.003, 
.003 
.556, 
.628 
 
Because the BRK cases include situations with very large headways, the 
analysis was repeated for data with a maximum headway of 6 seconds, 
which corresponds to the car-following definition by Vogel (2002). The 
resulting coefficients are listed in Table 14. The differences for the accuracy 
function are significant between the Baseline and the Eco drive for both the 
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a and b coefficients [a: t(184) = 7.18, p = .003, r = .468, b: t(184) = 3.75, p = 
.003, r = .266]. With regards to the rejectability function the differences are 
significant between the Baseline and the Eco drive [a: t(184) = 10.5, p = 
.003, r = .611, b: t(184) = 10.8, p = .003, r = .622], as well as between the 
Safe and the Eco drives [a: t(178) = 4.61, p = .003, r = .326, b: t(178) = 7.71, 
p = .003, r = .501]. 
 
Table 14: Coefficients for regression functions with a maximum 
headway of 6 seconds 
 
Coefficients Safe Eco Baseline Sign. diff. t p r 
a accuracy -11.85 -10.16 -14.90 
Eco < 
Baseline 
2.56, 
7.18 
.06, 
.003 
n/a, 
.468 
b accuracy 0.93 0.84 0.60 
Eco < 
Baseline 
1.34, 
3.75 
.6, 
.003 
n/a, 
.266 
a rejectability -4.77 -3.45 -6.77 
Eco < all 
others 
4.61, 
10.5 
.003, 
.003 
.326, 
.611 
b rejectability -3.42 -2.12 -4.09 
Eco < all 
others 
7.72, 
10.8 
.003, 
.003 
.501, 
.622 
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Figure 29: Fitted rejectability and accuracy functions 
 
With the accuracy and rejectability functions the mental model boundaries in 
the perceptual space of 𝑇ℎ and 𝑇𝐶
−1 could be computed. For illustration 
purposes the scatterplots of NOM and BRK states are illustrated in Figure 
30. The nominal analysis points, where ‘time headway regulation’ was 
satisficing, are indicated with a circle. The analysis points in case of braking 
are drawn as crosses. 
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Figure 30: Scatterplots of the experimental drives 
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In order to make sense of the scatterplots, a boundary dividing the NOM and 
BRK cases for each experimental condition was fitted. The following function 
represents this line, telling where behaviour was switched from nominal car-
following to active braking (cf. Goodrich and Boer, 1998): 
𝜋𝐴(𝑇𝐶
−1) = 𝑏𝜇𝑅(𝑇ℎ) 
The coefficient b determines the boundaries’ locations related to 𝑇𝐶
−1 and 𝑇ℎ. 
The classification was performed by minimising the maximum outcome of 
three misclassification equations (cf. Goodrich et al., 1998a). 𝐽1represents 
the share of all incorrectly classified analysis points, while 𝐽2 stands for the 
incorrectly classified NOM and 𝐽3 for the incorrectly classified BRK points: 
 
𝐽1(b) =
N [(NOM ∩ 𝑆𝑏
𝐶) ∪ (BRK ∩ 𝑆𝑏)]
N[NOM ∪ BRK]
 
𝐽2(b) =
N [NOM ∩ 𝑆𝑏
𝐶]
N[NOM]
 
𝐽3(b) =
N [BRK ∩ 𝑆𝑏]
N[BRK]
 
 
The optimal coefficient b is 0.50 for the Safe condition, 0.49 for the Eco 
condition and 0.59 for the Baseline drive. The resulting boundary functions 
for the drives are drawn in Figure 31. The area below a boundary represents 
the combinations for 𝑇𝐶
−1 and 𝑇ℎ in which car-following is satisficing and the 
driver does not step on the brake pedal. If these measures change, for 
instance in the event of a close cut-in, and cross the boundary, the situation 
ceases to be satisficing and the driver is likely to brake actively. The grey 
area in this figure is not defined, because there the time to collision is larger 
than the  𝑇ℎ . This means that for low values for 𝑇ℎ the boundary between 
acceptable and unacceptable states is only marginally higher for the Eco 
drive compared to the Safe. This indicates that there is not a large difference 
in the drivers’ braking behaviour during car-following. This finding is partly in 
line with the statistical comparison of the cut-in scenario in section 4.4.6, 
where some behavioural differences lessened or diminished when the 
analysis was limited to data with a time headway of 6 seconds.  
For larger 𝑇ℎ the slope of the boundary function is a lot less steep for the Eco 
drive compared to the other drives. This can mean that 𝑇ℎ had less influence 
on braking behaviour during eco-driving. However, the result can also stem 
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from the large values for 𝑇ℎ in the Eco condition, which provided the 
measurement points for this modelling exercise.  
 
 
Figure 31: Boundaries for each experimental condition 
 
When 𝑇ℎ is limited to 6 seconds the boundaries are closer together, Figure 
32. After modelling boundaries for the filtered data b is 0.49 for the Safe 
condition, 0.47 for the Eco condition and 0.58 for the Baseline drive. 
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Figure 32: Boundaries for each experimental condition with headways 
of max. 6 seconds 
 
4.4.8 Verbal recordings 
It prove to be relatively easy to code the transcripts for the first participant. 
However, it was a challenge to make the resulting coding scheme suitable 
for subsequent participants, as each person was expressing themselves in 
different ways. Hence, during this process the nodes were created and 
refined, and regular re-coding had to be performed in order to create 
categories and subcategories to which the statements could be linked 
distinctly. This process resulted in a tree-shaped structure, as depicted in 
Table 15. Statements were generally coded into the lowest available node. 
For example, when a participant talked about slowing down, the words were 
assigned to the third-level node ‘Slowing down’, but when a brake was 
mentioned, or coasting, the other relevant nodes on the same level were 
used, but not exclusively. All these examples were then automatically also 
coded in the second-level node ‘Speed decrease.’ 
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Table 15: Hierarchy of coded nodes 
Name Ref. Description 
1 Action 1414 
What is the driver doing? (“I’ll go 
ahead and slow down”) 
    1.1 Controlling the 
simulator 
391 
Related to the simulator and experimental 
situation (“And again I’d be doing 
a mirror check”) 
    1.2 Latitudinal behaviour 61 
(“Gonna move into the middle 
lane now”) 
    1.3 Speed decrease 506 
Anything related to a decrease in one’s 
speed (“Slowing”) 
        1.3.1 Braking  178 
Step on the brake (“And then I brake 
slowly”) 
        1.3.2 Coasting 93 
Foot off the accelerator (“Getting off 
the gas”) 
        1.3.3 Slowing down 348 
The driver slows down (“Okay I’ve 
just slowed”) 
        1.3.4 Stopping and 
waiting 
113 
The driver is stopping/coming to a halt or 
considering it (“I’m gonna stop at 
these”) 
    1.4 Speed increase 312 
Anything related to an increase in speed 
(“and up until forty”) 
        1.4.1 Acceleration 231 
From lower speed to higher speed (“Now 
I need to speed up”) 
        1.4.2 Start driving 104 From standing (“Okay off again”) 
    1.5 Speed maintenance 799 
Includes adjustments to other cars and 
the selection of a new cruising speed 
(“keep my foot on the gas”) 
        1.5.1 Adjustment to 
vehicle in other lane 
22 (“I shouldn’t undertake”) 
        1.5.2 Car following 375 
Adjust speed to a vehicle in front (“Just 
catching up gradually”) 
        1.5.3 Continue driving 76 
Not stopping (although sometimes not 
clear) (“Just carry on straight”) 
        1.5.4 Selection of speed 427 
“Here I drive forty” “a bit less 
than seventy” excludes creeping up to 
traffic lights 
        1.5.5 Speed regulation 
or cruising 
203 
Maintaining cruising speed (“Still 
doing a reasonable speed”) 
2 Other 214 
Seemingly unrelated to the driving task 
(“Get to the meeting”) 
    2.1 Comparison to real life 80 
“When I drive home to … 
sometimes” 
    2.2 Memories 2 
Incidents and critical situations in the past 
(“That’s the problem I had last 
week with my car”) 
    2.3 Unrelated 133 
Thoughts about food, family, friends, work 
etc. (“Friday fish and chips day”) 
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Name Ref. Description 
3 Safety and vigilance 1944 
Situation awareness, visibility and control 
(“And don’t really want to hit 
anyone”) 
    3.1 Anticipation 321 
What could happen (“Or anything 
else that people might do”) 
    3.2 Avoidance 239 
The driver is preventing something from 
happening (“Make sure no one is 
behind me or beside”) 
    3.3 Surroundings 1539 
What is around the driver? (“And other 
cars”) 
        3.3.1 Event 447 
What is happening now in the 
environment or what happened (“Just 
swerved right in”) 
        3.3.2 Landscape and 
        simulator specific 
        features 
228 
Comments on simulated environment, 
(“random shops on the side”) 
        3.3.3 Road and road 
features 
429 
Observations about the road incl. 
junctions, curves (“Okay so there’s 
the slip road”) 
        3.3.5 Road users 880 
Other cars, people (potentially) using the 
road (“Oh red car”) 
        3.3.6 Traffic lights 438 
Traffic lights are mentioned (“And we 
come up to some lights again”) 
    3.4 Expectations and 
    Instructions to others 
100 
Telling other road users what to do (“Come 
on!”) 
    3.5 Focus 448 
Looks, focus, incl. ‘mirrors’ (“Have to 
look out for other cars”) 
    3.6 Judgement of own 
    behaviour and situation 
298 
Negative assessment (opposite of 
validation) (“Oh going fast”) 
    3.7 Location and position 952 
Drivers locate themselves (“Okay I’m 
in the centre lane”) 
        3.7.1 Position related to 
road features and 
place 
434 
The driver’s position relative to traffic 
lights, lines, junctions or road (“Just so 
I am waiting at the line”) 
        3.7.2 Position related to 
road users 
576 
E.g. headway to vehicle in front or 
adjacent lane, “Somebody changing 
into my lane” 
    3.8 Panic, shocks and 
    surprises 
139 
Unexpected situations (“Oh gosh isn’t 
it”) 
    3.9 Validation 421 
Driver is validating current situation 
(“Okay”) 
4 Strategic decisions 331 
Higher level goals (“I’m trying to 
keep my speed fairly constant”) 
    4.1 Fuel efficiency or eco 
    driving 
154 
Fuel efficiency or eco driving are 
mentioned talked about (“This time no 
hard acceleration”) 
    4.2 Strategy 240 
Something the driver does with a goal in 
mind or an explanation of behaviour 
(“Trying to anticipate well 
ahead”) 
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Name Ref. Description 
    4.3 Safety 121 
Safety is mentioned (“I’m quite 
careful”) 
 
The category FUEL EFFICIENCY AND ECO DRIVING contains statements 
about eco-driving. It can be assumed that the drivers mentioned eco-driving 
when they activated eco-driving mental models. A statistical analysis was 
conducted with the remaining three categories, ACTION, SAFETY AND 
VIGILANCE and SURROUNDINGS. These categories are illustrated in 
Figure 33 and listed in Table 16. Due to the Simultaneous Coding approach, 
the sum of the percentages exceeds 100%. The order of instructions did not 
have significant effects on the percentage of the categories in each drive. 
Each participant contributed to the category FUEL EFFICIENCY AND ECO 
DRIVING during the Eco drive and therefore had some idea of eco-driving. 
The answers were compared with behavioural measures that approximate 
the stated actions, from the Eco and the second Baseline condition. Most 
mentioned the goal of keeping a constant speed. Fourteen of 16 participants 
said that they tried to avoid large speed fluctuations at traffic lights, and 
indeed every single participant decreased their mean negative acceleration 
in the long-range braking scenario during eco-driving. Eleven wanted to do 
so when other cars were cutting in front of them on the motorway, but only of 
them 8 lowered the speed variation when car-following. Ten said specifically 
that they try to closely control their speed by keeping their foot steady on the 
throttle. Only one of them did not accelerate more smooth when cruising in 
the Eco condition. Most participants declared that they wanted to avoid 
stepping on the brake, 13 at junctions in the urban part, with 10 of them 
managing to decelerate with less variation in this scenario. Fourteen wanted 
to avoid strong decelerations on the motorway (“Touching the brakes 
as little as possible”), and 11 of them achieved this. In order to 
leave room for a steady speed, eight participants mentioned, and 
maintained, a longer headway during the motorway part in the Eco drive (“I 
was leaving more space”). Speed choice was another frequently 
mentioned topic. Thirteen drivers wanted to keep a lower speed, but only 3 
of them said it during the urban part, where the speed limit was 40 mph 
(“Tried not to go as fast so I kept it down towards 
thirty”). For these 3, and indeed altogether 15, participants a lower 
cruising speed was reported. Nine drivers said that they wanted to drive 
more slowly than the speed limit of 70 mph on the motorway, and 7 of them 
drove more slowly during car-following. One participant explained that he 
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had not planned to drive more slowly during the Eco drive, but his mild 
acceleration unintentionally resulted in a lower speed. Indeed, thirteen 
drivers mentioned slower acceleration in the urban section (“I shouldn’t 
be using too much gas”), with 12 of them lowering their mean 
acceleration in the acceleration scenario. Nine wanted to curb their 
acceleration on the motorway, and 7 of them managed this around the cut-in 
events.  
For the percentage of the think aloud protocols coded in ACTION it was 
found that for the Eco drive the percentage of verbalisations was 35.1% and  
significantly higher than for the Safe condition with 27.5% [F(1.3,14.5) = 
4.52, p = .043, η2 = .291]. A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that for 
the Eco drive the percentage of verbalisations coded in SAFETY AND 
VIGILANCE was at 47.2% significantly lower than for the Safe condition, in 
which it was 60.4% [F(2,22) = 4.71, p = .020, η2 = .300]. To investigate the 
shares of the SURROUNDINGS category within the think aloud protocols a 
repeated measures ANOVA clarified that for the Eco drive the percentage of 
verbalisations coded in SURROUNDINGS, at 32.2%, was significantly lower 
than for the other conditions (Safe: 42.2%, Baseline: 40.8%) [F(2,22) = 5.08, 
p = .015, η2 = .316]. None of these ANOVAs revealed a significant effect for 
Gender or for Group. Nor were any interaction effects found. 
 
 
Figure 33: Percentages of coded categories 
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Table 16: Results for the verbal categories 
Variable Safe Eco Baseline 
Post-hoc 
tests 
p ηp2/r 
Action (%) 27.5 35.1 25.0 
Eco > 
Safe 
.043 .291 
Safety and 
vigilance (%) 
60.4 47.2 55.9 
Safe > 
Eco 
.020 .300 
Surroundings (%) 42.2 32.2 40.8 
Safe > 
Eco 
.015 .316 
 
In order to further examine goals, subgoals and the means to achieve them, 
a means-end analysis (Newell and Simon, 1961) was conducted. 
Statements about eco-driving were regarded further by dividing them into 
pairs of needs and actions, Table 17. As an example, the first participant in 
the table mentioned being ‘fuel-efficient’ as a need and stated as resulting 
actions the avoidance of braking and accelerating (“I don’t wanna be 
braking and accelerating”). The behavioural data show that the 
increased coasting in both braking scenarios, and started braking at a lower 
speed during eco-driving compared to the other conditions. She then in turn 
expressed the avoidance of braking as a goal (“if I do happen to 
need […] the brake then that would just need […] some more 
petrol”) and said that she addressed this need by moderating her speed 
(“I’m just not gonna drive that quickly”). Indeed, in the Eco 
drive she drove with the lowest speed compared to the other conditions. The 
majority of statements about eco-driving was related to the goal of a 
constant speed, potentially achieved with the avoidance of braking and 
subsequent acceleration. The participant who crossed the junction in the 
short-notice braking scenario reasoned with a constant speed (“That was 
again to maintain fuel efficiency; that was so that I 
keep a constant speed”), which is consistent with his behavioural data. 
The other participants avoided braking with safer measures such as using 
coasting when slowing down, and also by choosing a lower speed, 
anticipation and larger headways. Some participants have incorrect ideas 
about eco-driving. Participant 3, for example, mentioned that coasting “is 
free petrol” and that he saved fuel as he “kept it down towards thirty“. His 
mean speed in the cruising scenario was about 33 mph, the lowest of all 
participants. In sum, this means-end analysis divided up eco-driving into 
goals and sub-goals, highlighting behaviours on different levels of mental 
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models. It gave additional insights into the content of mental models, which 
was consistent with the measured behaviours, except for maintaining a 
constant speed in the cruising scenario. 
 
Table 17: Need-action pairs in the FUEL EFFICIENCY node 
Participant Need Action 
Participant 1, 
Female, 27 years old 
So fuel-efficient… … which basically to 
me  
Means I don’t wanna 
be braking and 
accelerating  
Like not a lot 
So I’ll just drive 
as I normally do 
… 
So I just coast 
Participant 1, 
Female, 27 years old 
Cause if I do happen 
to need (?) the 
brake 
Then that would just 
need (?) some more 
petrol 
I’m just not gonna 
drive that quickly 
right now 
Participant 1, 
Female, 27 years old 
Which is even better 
in fuel-efficiency 
go through the light 
Participant 1, 
Female, 27 years old 
… because that’s 
more fuel-efficient 
than speeding up and 
slowing down 
constantly 
And and as I reach 
speed 
Then I just keep it 
constant… 
Participant 2, Male, 
39 years old 
If you want fuel 
efficiency… 
… you want to sort 
of avoid fast 
acceleration or 
heavy braking 
 
 
Participant 2, Male, 
39 years old 
… so I can slow down 
and avoid stopping 
if I can 
But what I’m gonna 
try and do is 
perhaps anticipate 
the lights a little 
more… 
Participant 2, Male, 
39 years old 
… in the hope ? not 
stopping completely 
Just to keep that 
bit of momentum 
going is 
It’s actually good 
for your fuel 
efficiency I 
understand and also 
it does mean you get 
away at the lights 
I’m like gradually 
decreasing my speed 
as I approach… 
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Participant Need Action 
quicker as well when 
they do change 
Participant 3, Male, 
37 years old 
… I have been 
reading somewhere 
that this is free 
petrol 
Coasting… 
Participant 3, Male, 
37 years old 
to drive fuel-
efficiently… 
… I did not 
accelerate as hard; 
I did coast a bit 
more often; didn’t 
go as fast or tried 
not to go as fast; 
So I kept it down 
towards thirty; 
watched the revs 
rather than the 
accelerator, more 
than the speeder 
Participant 3, Male, 
37 years old 
Cause if I want to 
say save petrol 
And just go tootle 
along… 
… I go in the inside 
lane 
 
Participant 3, Male, 
37 years old 
Then economy So I need to drive a 
bit slower 
Participant 4, Male, 
39 years old 
… rather than 
stopping as much as 
possible in order to 
get back up to speed 
I need to expends 
more fuel 
I kind of kept the a 
constant speed as 
much as I could… 
 
Participant 4, Male, 
39 years old 
So that cars that 
were going to pull 
out from the left 
I wouldn’t have to 
brake 
In the motorway run 
I was leaving more 
space 
Participant 4, Male, 
39 years old 
… that was again to 
maintain fuel 
efficiency; that was 
so that I keep a 
constant speed  
I went through 
lights that were on 
amber… 
Participant 5, Male, 
40 years old 
Got a full tank but 
it has to last me 
for three months… 
… so drive easy 
 
 
Participant 5, Male, 
40 years old 
I say fifty six is 
about an economical 
speed… 
… so I try for that 
 
 
Conflicts between safety and fuel-efficiency were regarded separately, as 
listed in Table 18. Avoiding braking was a recurrent topic. One participant 
solved this conflict with a lower speed (“driving slightly under the 
speed limit”) in order to maintain a longer margin to the car in front, and 
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drove about 37 mph on average in the cruising scenario. Another driver 
decided to increase his risk by crossing a junction despite an amber traffic 
light. Most statements, however, signify that, when in critical situations, most 
participants decided for the safe option, which is in line with the behaviour in 
the short-notice braking and cut-in scenarios. 
 
Table 18: Conflicts between Safety and Fuel Efficiency 
Participant Need/Conflict Action 
Participant 1, Female, 
27 years old 
Oh I don’t wanna 
brake 
I don’t wanna 
accelerate very 
often 
But it is not about 
me so much (?)   
As what other 
vehicles do 
So I think what I 
try  
Is driving slightly 
under the speed 
limit 
It probably gives me 
more reaction time 
 
Participant 2, Male, 
39 years old 
So I’m just letting 
it coast down 
Just take my foot 
off the gas 
I’m having to brake 
a bit here 
And yeah I’m 
probably  
I’m going to have to 
stop altogether 
Participant 4, Male, 
39 years old 
That was again to 
maintain fuel 
efficiency 
That was so that I 
keep a constant 
speed  
For the suburban run 
there was moments 
Where I would 
I went through 
lights that were on 
amber 
Participant 5, Male, 
40 years old 
On the motorway I 
will usually sixty 
to seventy 
My car seems to 
like between sixty 
to seventy 
Probably I’d have 
to have to brake a 
lot 
Well I thought I 
had to brake a lot 
What I probably 
would have done was 
actually 
To say that I go a 
little bit faster 
and go to the 
outside lane 
So I didn’t have to 
brake all the time 
Participant 6, Male, 
40 years old 
But I do feel I’m a 
little bit too far 
behind him 
But any more than 
what I’m doing 
would be over the 
speed limit 
Get up the speed 
slightly to get 
behind him  
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4.4.9 Summary of main results 
 When drivers are instructed to ‘drive fuel-efficiently’ they changed their 
behaviour 
 Behaviour changes involved acceleration, speed choice and 
smoothness of actions 
 A constant speed was not prioritised over safety in most situations 
 Mental model boundaries did not shift towards smaller safety margins 
 Interviews and think aloud protocols included constant speed, means to 
achieve this and conflicts with safety 
 Focus and awareness increased towards the drivers’ behaviour, 
particularly in comparison to ‘safe’ driving 
 
4.5 Discussion 
This research aimed to investigate the existence and the content of mental 
models that regular drivers employ during eco-driving on different cognitive 
levels. For this purpose a driving simulator experiment with a varied road 
layout comprising urban and motorway sections was designed and enriched 
with think aloud protocols and open interviews. The study used simple 
driving task instructions to investigate changes in the participants’ behaviour 
as well as focus in three conditions. Sixteen drivers were asked to ‘Drive 
normally’, ‘Drive safely’ or ‘Drive fuel-efficiently’. Behavioural measures and 
verbalisations were compared and analysed. The emphasis of this study 
was on eco-driving relevant indicators such as accelerating, braking, 
coasting and car-following. This study identified eco-driving mental models 
and was able to derive design recommendations for driver support systems. 
 
4.5.1 The existence of eco-driving mental models 
The results support that each participant in this study has a set of eco-
driving mental models. Their existence became evident, first of all, as these 
drivers changed their behaviour when they were asked to eco-drive, 
resulting in a reduction of fuel consumption in the urban section of the road 
layout for each participant. Additional consistent behaviour changes included 
a reduced mean acceleration when approaching a red traffic light. For all 8 
drivers faced with the scenario, a reduction occurred in the maximum 
accelerator pedal angle when setting off from a junction while another 
junction with red traffic lights was visible. In addition, fifteen of all 16 drivers 
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chose a lower cruising speed. These patterns, as well as the results of 
statistical tests are consistent with previous studies (Birrell et al., 2010, van 
der Voort et al., 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980). This behaviour was not just 
different from the normal drives, but also from what they did when asked to 
drive safely. In fact, for no measure, instructing the participants to drive 
safely resulted in significant differences to the normal condition. Hence, the 
behaviour change in the Eco drives cannot solely be explained by an 
allocation of additional attentional resources to the driving task. Furthermore, 
the results from modelling mental model boundaries and the analysis of the 
think aloud protocols and interviews indicate that the participants activated 
eco-driving mental models. However, the mental models vary in their content 
and effectiveness. For instance, the reduction in fuel consumption was not 
significant in the cruising scenario and was relatively low in the motorway 
sections (only changed by 2.8%). 
Differences in behaviours between the Eco and the other conditions indicate 
an existence of eco-driving mental models. The direction of the behaviour as 
well as statements in the drivers’ verbalisations could provide insights into 
their content, as well as some incongruity on several levels. For example, 
the speed during cruising and car-following was not kept more constant in 
the Eco condition, although 10 participants mentioned a steady speed as 
part of their strategy and lower variations in speed can indeed affect fuel 
savings positively (cited in Haworth and Symmons, 2001, Nairn and Partners 
et al., 1994). Drivers can have problems consciously influencing the lower-
level mental models, such as the usually highly automated control of the 
accelerator pedal (Goodrich and Boer, 2003, Rasmussen, 1983). The only 
exception was the cut-in scenario on the motorway, where the participants 
managed to keep their speed more constant during the Eco drives compared 
to the Baseline condition. The steadiness of the speed can be partly 
explained with longer headways in the Eco condition. Some of these effects 
lessened when headways with a maximum of 6 seconds were regarded. 
This indicates that drivers tend to facilitate eco-driving with larger headways 
and prioritise safety when the safety margins are shorter. However, in the 
cut-in scenario drivers tended to terminate their braking actions at lower time 
headways during eco-driving compared to the other conditions. This implies 
that they braked, but with less effect and accepted lower safety margins 
during eco-driving in order to retain a steadier speed.  
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4.5.2 Driving parameters 
The mean cruising speed during eco-driving was slower than during normal 
and safe driving, although only 3 participants specifically mentioned a lower 
speed during the urban section. In the literature it has been argued that 
slower driving is considered safe (Elvik et al., 2004, Nilsson, 2004, Taylor et 
al., 2000, Taylor et al., 2002). However, a review of studies about factors 
predicting accident risk concluded that a definite link is not yet established 
(Wang et al., 2013). For example, Baruya (1998) as well as Taylor et al. 
(Taylor et al., 2000), for rural roads, found an inverse relationship between 
speed and accident risk. Possible explanations include the quality of the 
road as well as caution while driving at higher speeds. Hence, it might not 
necessarily be safer to drive more slowly during eco-driving. This argument 
is supported by the fact that the average speed during ‘safe’ driving was 
1mph below the speed limit, and therefore expected to be sufficiently safe. 
The time needed to complete the urban part of the Eco drive was 9% longer 
than the Baseline drive, and this difference was significant. In an experiment 
by Birrell and Young (2011) drivers were reducing their speeds as well, 
although the tested system did not encourage them to do so. It has been 
shown that drivers tend to associate eco-driving with slow driving (Harvey et 
al., 2013, van der Voort et al., 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980). In fact, 
efficient speeds range from 37 mph (60km/h) to 50mph (80 km/h) (Samaras 
and Ntziachristos, 1998), which would allow staying at around an urban 
speed limit of 40 mph (64 km/h) and suggest driving below the motorway 
speed limit of 70 mph (113 km/h). The speed reduction in the cruising 
scenario of the urban section implies that drivers overestimate the speed 
reduction needed for fuel savings, in line with findings by Eriksson and 
Svenson (2012), which can discourage them from eco-driving. Hence, the 
speed choice on roads with speed limits below 40 to 50 mph is an aspect in 
mental models of eco-driving that can benefit from corrections. In several 
experiments where participants used in-vehicle, eco-driving feedback 
devices, time losses were either low or not present at all (Birrell et al., 2014, 
Birrell and Young, 2011, Birrell et al., 2010, van der Voort et al., 2001). 
However, it has been found that asking people to eco-drive may cause an 
increased workload which could have contributed to the reduction in speed 
(Haigney et al., 2000).  
The mean acceleration in the acceleration scenario was lowered during eco-
driving and 13 participants said they would do so. Lower cruising speeds 
confound this behaviour change slightly. From a closer examination of the 
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accelerator pedal use it was found, though, that the participants spent a 
small fraction of the time with the pedal pressed more than a third of its 
range, compared to the Baseline drive. Furthermore, the maximum 
accelerator pedal angle decreased substantially. These actions, supported 
by intentional statements, indicate that many drivers have low acceleration 
rates in the higher, more conscious levels of their eco-driving mental models. 
The effectiveness is, however, only partly supported by research. In some 
studies it has indeed been found that lower acceleration rates can result in 
fuel reductions (Ericsson, 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980), but other studies 
suggest a swift, but not aggressive acceleration up to an efficient speed 
(Mensing et al., 2014, Mensing et al., 2013). With regards to behaviours 
associated with lower levels of driving mental models, it was found that the 
acceleration was less erratic for the Eco drive than for the other drives. 
When a second junction with a red light was in sight the participants tended 
to terminate their accelerations at lower speeds, possibly anticipating these 
traffic lights to switch to green before arriving at the junction. In the braking 
scenario the mean deceleration decreased significantly during the Eco 
drives and the participants attempted to avoid stopping at the traffic lights. 
Anticipation in order to limit speed fluctuations at junctions is an effective 
way to save fuel (Johansson et al., 2003) and therefore suggests an 
effective part of eco-driving mental models. The lack of behavioural changes 
at the short-notice braking scenario suggests that in this critical situation 
most participants prioritised safety, which indicates that their eco-driving 
mental models do not lead them to compromise on safety margins. This 
could either mean that eco-driving mental models include safe driving 
behaviours, or that safe driving mental models take precedence in critical 
situations. The avoidance of large changes in speed could increase driving 
safety, as the Power Model (Nilsson, 2004) postulates. This relationship 
between speed variance and accident risk is supported by an analysis of US 
road data by Lave (1985), for example. However, Davis (2002) argued that 
Lave was aggregating data on a large scale, which does not allow 
conclusions for individual risk. A more recent analysis of road data, using the 
Power Model, found that effects of speed changes depend on the traffic 
environment (Cameron and Elvik, 2010). In addition, the risk appears to 
increase with the initial speed, with stronger effects at higher initial speeds 
(Elvik, 2013). In sum, it cannot clearly be established whether the lower 
speed changes during eco-driving are increasing driving safety. 
Nevertheless, at speeds of 40 mph, such effects would be relatively small.  
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The prioritisation of safety in safety-critical scenarios was not unified. The 
fact that one participant compromised on safety by crossing a junction with 
amber traffic lights in order to maintain a steady speed during the Eco 
condition indicates individual differences in eco-driving mental models and 
possibly riskier behaviour in some people. 
There were a few differences for Gender related to braking actions, as 
females tended to brake stronger in the short-notice braking scenario and on 
the motorway. For some measures related to time headway to the car in 
front females displayed stronger differences between the Eco and Baseline 
drives. Interaction effects between Group and Instruction display a similar 
pattern. For measures related to smooth acceleration and deceleration as 
well as headway it appeared that the Group doing the Safe before the Eco 
and then the Baseline drive performed relatively strong behaviour changes, 
especially between the Eco and the Baseline drive. These differences could 
indicate negative spill-over effects, or boredom effects, and one can assume 
that eco-driving mental models were deactivated for the last drive. In 
contrast, a few positive spill-over effects were appearing for the Safe drive if 
the Eco drive took was placed before it. These Gender and interaction 
effects, however, are not as consistent as the eco-driving behaviours found 
above, and not backed up by earlier findings in the literature. In addition, the 
strong variability between participants suggests that there might not be a 
consistent pattern, and that such effects could have occurred due to the 
plethora of measures and tests performed in this study. 
 
4.5.3 Boundaries of eco-driving mental models 
Instead of assuming a situation-specific full activation and deactivation of 
eco-driving mental models, the handling of lower-level skills during driving 
was considered. Therefore, boundaries between the mental models for car-
following and active braking were calibrated. It was tested whether the 
boundaries shifted across the experimental conditions in this study. For this 
exercise it was possible to use the cut-in events on the motorway section to 
extract a sufficient number of cases with either acceptable or unacceptable 
values for time headway and time to collision. These cases were used for 
modelling acceptability and rejectability functions and then an equation for 
the mental model boundary. A visual inspection of the boundary functions 
shows that these boundaries did not differ much for close car-following 
conditions, which signify safety-critical situations. The differences for both 
function coefficients were significant between the Eco and the Baseline 
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conditions, though. Contrary to expectations, the drivers did not accept lower 
safety margins for eco-driving. On the opposite, it appears that the drivers 
attempted to maintain larger following distances in order to avoid speed 
fluctuations. Similar to the statistical analysis of the cut-in scenario, the 
differences between the boundaries lessened when data with headways of 6 
seconds or less were examined. The largest difference between the Safe 
and the Eco drives was visible in the rejectability function, which is based on 
cases in which the drivers began to apply the brake. It showed that during 
eco-driving some participants braked at headways larger than 6 seconds. 
This behaviour strongly influenced the shape of the boundaries.  
In conclusion, computing mental model boundaries enabled an objective 
identification of a change in safety-critical behaviour during eco-driving. It 
was found that when other vehicles drove into the participants’ lane, and the 
values for time headway and time to collision became very small, the 
participants tended not to compromise on their driving safety and braked 
using similar safety margins for their judgements. This finding is in line with 
the results from the short-notice braking scenario, in which all participants, 
except for one, did not change their behaviour significantly in the Eco 
condition. Hence, safe driving mental models could have bene activated 
instead of eco-driving mental models in the safety-critical situations. 
However, it is also possible that eco-driving mental models have the same or 
similar safety margins in place as ‘normal’ or safe driving mental models. For 
example, if a person is eco-driving on a longer trip, and has to brake due to 
a sudden hazard, the driver is not quitting eco-driving, but merely braking 
and then resuming eco-driving techniques once it is safe to do so. 
 
4.5.4 Findings of interviews and think aloud protocols 
The interviews and think aloud protocols ascertain that every participant had 
some idea of eco-driving and was able to mention at least a few behaviours 
that are effective in reducing fuel consumption. With regard to strategies and 
goals, most of the 16 participants mentioned the maintenance of a constant 
speed, for example by avoiding large speed fluctuations at traffic lights and 
on the motorway, when other cars were cutting in front of them. Referring to 
specific actions, 10 drivers said that they tried to closely control their speed 
by keeping their foot steady on the throttle, and most participants declared 
that they wanted to avoid stepping on the brake. In order to leave room for a 
steady speed, eight participants mentioned a longer headway during the 
motorway part in the Eco drive (“I was leaving more space”). Speed choice 
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was another frequently mentioned topic. Thirteen drivers wanted to keep a 
lower speed, and 9 drivers said that they wanted to drive more slowly than 
the speed limit of 70 mph on the motorway. One participant explained that 
he had not planned to drive more slowly during the Eco drive, but his mild 
acceleration unintentionally resulted in a lower speed. Indeed, thirteen 
drivers mentioned slower acceleration in the urban section (“I shouldn’t be 
using too much gas”). Nine wanted to curb their acceleration on the 
motorway. 
The results of statistically analysing the verbal data indicate a shift in the 
focus of the drivers when they attempted to eco-drive, although most 
significant differences were found between the Eco and the Safe condition. 
The increased focus on one’s own actions and away from the surroundings 
can denote an increased workload. In fact, Birrell et al. (2010) found that 
asking people to eco-drive without further support can have such an effect. 
Rasmussen’s taxonomy (Rasmussen, 1983) suggests that the drivers 
brought mental models of the rule- and skill-level that would otherwise not 
have been considered into consciousness. At the same time the focus was 
partly taken off the surroundings and other safety-critical themes, which 
could mean a safety risk for unassisted eco-driving. 
Comparing verbal with behavioural data indicated that most of the drivers’ 
actions followed their words. In addition, the mismatches were well 
distributed among the participant base. Accelerating mildly at junctions 
keeping the speed lower and more constant appeared to have been feasible 
for the drivers. However, this effect was more applicable when the 
participants’ lane was free from other traffic, and when traffic lights switched 
to amber and red when the host had time to respond. A particular case is the 
cruising speed in the urban section, were the speed limit was posted at 40 
mph. Although only 3 participants said that they would lower it, 15 of 16 
participants did so. The former include the person who drove faster. It is 
possible that the avoidance of accelerations led the drivers to maintain 
speeds that were lower than intended, as one driver explained. 
 
4.5.5 Limitations 
This study has several limitations. Firstly, the sensitive nature of the desktop 
simulator controls could have caused the participants to drive in more erratic 
ways than they would in more realistic vehicles (Jamson and Jamson, 2010). 
This lack of control and feedback by the pedals might have inhibited the 
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maintenance of a constant speed. On the other hand, this lack could have 
provided the potential to easily improve the variation of acceleration and 
deceleration in the Eco drive. The absence of safety-related consequences 
can change drivers’ diligence. Furthermore, motivations for participating in 
an experiment are related to contributing to the research, curiosity about its 
outcomes and financial rewards (Stunkel and Grady, 2011). In the real world 
people drive for reasons such as commuting to work or travelling to leisure 
destinations, or the enjoyment of driving itself. Jamson and Jamson (2010) 
found that a desktop simulator can result in a lack of lateral control, more 
time in shorter headways, and worse self-reported performance ratings. 
Hence, values measured with a simulator may not represent values in the 
real world. Therefore, absolute results cannot be generated, and results 
need to be interpreted as relative, as suggested by Rook and Hogema 
(2005). In addition, the brake pedals may have caused problems for people 
with smaller feet, and therefore the stronger braking actions of the female 
participants. In fact, there are no studies known to the author that have 
found similar behaviours. Secondly, the simulator required the model PHEM 
to approximate fuel consumption with a small number of input variables as 
well as a different, albeit similar, vehicle, which could have led to estimation 
errors. Regarding the validity of the findings, it needs to be kept in mind that 
this study was conducted with a small sample of 16 participants to allow a 
rich data collection per participant. Its findings have to be validated with a 
larger sample size and more realistic driving conditions.  
The mental model approach has allowed to gain valuable insights, but it is 
focussed on people’s cognition and takes neither emotional nor social 
factors into account. In the context of researching drivers’ knowledge and 
skills, this approach is sufficient, although there is still a need to further 
understand other factors that influence behaviour. The think aloud protocol 
allowed capturing momentary thoughts, but the downside of the method is 
the incompleteness of the verbalisations. In some places a mismatch 
between what the drivers said they intended to do and the behavioural data, 
which indicates an eco-driving strategy, but the absence of a lower-level skill 
to execute it. Lastly, modelling mental model boundaries was based on a 
method using a binary function, which only measures a small part of the 
variety of data collected for mental models in this study. Further possible 
applications of this method can be measuring boundaries between stopping 
at amber traffic lights and driving through the junction or testing whether 
there are visual cues related to the size of the car in front that lead a driver 
to brake. The fact that data of all participants are included means that the 
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method indicates individual differences, where a statistical analysis would 
not flag up a significant effect. 
 
4.5.6 Implications for subsequent studies 
The results of the first study in this thesis indicate that regular drivers have 
mental models of eco-driving, but do not usually use them in their every-day 
driving. In this study they were activated following simple, straightforward 
instructions by the experimenter. 
Limitations of education: The results support the idea that drivers know more 
about eco-driving than they are often given credit for (Delicado, 2012). 
Hence, educating drivers how to eco-drive does not address the underlying 
problem, the fact that drivers do not fully utilise their existing knowledge and 
skills. Further research can be conducted regarding the reasons why eco-
driving mental models are not activated. It can be assumed that many 
drivers are sufficiently motivated to eco-drive, as outlined in section 2.3.1, 
with regards to financial rewards, as well as the sense of acting 
environmentally friendly. 
Improvement of mental models: The mental models of eco-driving that were 
identified in the present study include some misconceptions, such as 
believing that slow driving and very mild accelerations are always necessary 
to save fuel (cf. Harvey et al., 2013, van der Voort et al., 2001, Waters and 
Laker, 1980). In these matters informing and educating drivers could mend 
weaknesses and improve the existing eco-driving mental models. Showing 
that eco-driving does not necessarily result in time losses, better practises 
can make it more attractive to drivers. 
Activating eco-driving mental models: Knowing that drivers possess eco-
driving mental models leads to a new question: How can these mental 
models be activated? In a study by Dogan et al. (2014) reminding drivers of 
the reasons to eco-drive, financially or environmentally, was not as effective 
as feedback. In fact, many people tend to be very aware of environmental 
issues, particularly drivers (Stradling et al., 2008), and keen to reduce their 
fuel expenses (Boriboonsomsin et al., 2010). In the present study simple 
instructions by the experimenter were sufficient to get participants to activate 
their eco-driving mental models. These instructions involved asking the 
participants to ‘drive fuel-efficiently’ with neither further explanations nor 
tangible incentives. The question arises whether this effect can be replicated 
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by delivering the instruction in different ways, and even be repeated on a 
regular basis in order to achieve stable behavioural change. 
Long-term behavioural change: The activation of eco-driving mental models 
was achieved in the experimental drive that immediately followed the 
experimental instructions. Afterwards, when the participants were then 
instructed to drive ‘normally’, these behaviour changes diminished. The 
question arises whether it is possible to change driver behaviour in the long-
term, so the eco-driving mental models become the ‘normal’ driving mental 
models. It has been shown that repeated reminders are effective in changing 
behaviour sustainably, regarding environmentally friendly behaviours 
(Seligman et al., 1981) and eco-driving in particular (af Wåhlberg, 2007, 
Siero et al., 1989). Hence, it may be possible to achieve behavioural 
changes by an activation of eco-driving mental models over a period of time. 
The following study, presented in chapter 5 is based on eco-driving primes. 
Such primes could be a tool to make eco-driving more present in the minds 
of drivers and thus cause them to change their behaviour sustainably.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study investigated whether drivers apply different behaviours and have 
different thoughts when they are asked to eco-drive compared to being 
asked to drive normally and safely. This study made a unique contribution, 
as no other study has been found that specifically investigated mental 
models of eco-driving. The results showed that all participants had mental 
models of eco-driving, which were effective in reducing their fuel 
consumption in the Eco drive. The mental models were ranging from higher-
level knowledge-based to tactical rule-based to lower-level skills-based 
behaviour. Drivers were accelerating and braking in smooth ways as well as 
driving slower. They were not, however, keeping the cruising and car-
following speed more constant than in other driving styles. With the 
behavioural changes, each participant managed to reduce their fuel 
consumption in the urban section compared to the Baseline drive. In 
addition, every driver mentioned some idea about eco-driving during the 
interviews and think aloud protocols. The analysis also pointed out individual 
differences in eco-driving mental models, in areas such as the 
understanding of acceleration and speed choice, and their application in 
safety-critical situations. Hence, every participant carried eco-driving mental 
models, and it became evident that these mental models were different in 
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some, but also consistent in many aspects. However, none of the drivers 
used these to their full ability the Baseline drive, when they were instructed 
to ‘Drive normally’. Although eco-driving mental models are present, there is 
a need to improve these mental models, especially with regards to effortful 
behaviours such as accelerating at low rates and choosing low speeds.  
The present study marked a step towards understanding the cognition of 
drivers by measuring mental models with behavioural data, think aloud 
protocols and open interviews. Further studies will be necessary to validate 
the findings with a larger number of participants and to extrapolate the 
conclusions into the real world as well as other transport domains. 
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5 Study 2: The activation of eco-driving mental models  
 
5.1 Introduction  
Eco-driving has the potential to reduce fuel consumption by 5 to 10% 
(Barkenbus, 2010) and therefore carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
considerably. Studies that tried to encourage eco-driving behaviours to be 
adopted indicate that drivers carry more relevant knowledge and skills than 
they are given credit for (cf. Delicado, 2012). In the previous experiment of 
the current thesis, reported in chapter 4, it was concluded that drivers 
possess eco-driving mental models, but do not activate them to their full 
potential during usual, everyday driving. Although some mental models carry 
potential for improvement, their existing mental models were effective in 
reducing fuel consumption in a simulated urban environment. Other studies 
too found effects that support the presence of eco-driving mental models in 
drivers’ minds. For example, an eco-driving support system (EDSS) tested 
by Birrell and Young (2011) did not advise on speed choice, but participants 
decreased mean speed and the time spent speeding. A study investigating 
the effects of an eco-driving training course found behaviour changes, not 
only in the intervention group, but in the control group as well (af Wåhlberg, 
2007). In a study by Tarkiainen et al. (2014) 39% of the participants reported 
that the presence of a support system alone led them to drive more safely 
and economically. Hence, it is assumed that eco-driving mental models exist 
in drivers’ minds, but are not activated to their full potential in usual and 
unsupported driving conditions.  
 
There are several possible reasons for the lack of an activation of eco-
driving mental models. Barriers for behaviour change, as discussed in 
section 2.3.2, include a lack of awareness and knowledge; one’s self-identity 
and status as well as ingrained habits. Training courses provide knowledge, 
but their effects on fuel consumption wane over time (af Wåhlberg, 2007, 
Beusen et al., 2009). EDSS could generate long-lasting effects by providing 
regular feedback and reminders during driving (Hiraoka et al., 2010), both of 
which are able to change old habits (Jackson, 2005). However, these 
systems can be complex and expensive to build, and potentially distracting 
to use. Visual systems, for example, result in more time with the eyes off the 
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road (Engström et al., 2005, Hibberd et al., 2015) and can increase workload 
(van Erp and van Veen, 2004). Auditory signals, on the other hand, could 
annoy drivers (Meschtscherjakov et al., 2009).  
 
The question arises whether and how it is possible to activate existing eco-
driving mental models with regular prime and advice messages. As 
discussed in section 2.3.1, it has been shown that repeated reminders are 
effective in changing behaviour sustainably, regarding environmentally 
friendly behaviours (Seligman et al., 1981) and eco-driving in particular (af 
Wåhlberg, 2007, Siero et al., 1989). The eco-driving mental models 
identified in study 1 were effective, and enabled the drivers to reduce their 
fuel consumption. However, some of the drivers displayed behaviours that 
could still be improved, for example by driving at efficient rather than 
excessively low speeds and accelerating in a swift, but not aggressive 
manner. Therefore, advice messages could not only remind, but address the 
misconceptions found in the eco-driving mental models in study 1. It was 
expected that educational information can improve mental models by 
addressing the shortcomings identified in the previous experiment, and 
ideally invoke behaviour change as well (cf. Abrahamse et al., 2005). In 
sum, it may be possible to activate and improve eco-driving mental models 
with primes and advice in the form of simple, repeated text messages. Text 
messages on mobile phones, with interesting eco-driving content, could be a 
cost-effective tool to make eco-driving more present in the minds of drivers 
and thus cause them to activate the relevant mental models.  
 
5.2 Background 
5.2.1 Rationale and objectives 
In the first study in the present thesis it was found that the participating 
drivers had eco-driving mental models, but they did not activate them to their 
full potential during every-day driving. Consequently, for this study it was 
expected that at least a subgroup of the participants carry eco-driving mental 
models as well, with different degrees of maturation and correctness. The 
aim of the research presented in this chapter was to investigate the effects 
of differing text message interventions on the subsequent activation of eco-
driving mental models and thus changes in driver behaviour. With text 
messages it was tested whether it is possible to encourage the usage of 
existing eco-driving knowledge and skills, and to improve them. Methods 
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that are primarily designed to teach drivers may be built on the assumption 
that the lack of eco-driving is the direct result of a knowledge gap (Delicado, 
2012). Hence, these methods could be more complex and expensive than 
necessary, and potentially distracting. In order to further explore reasons for 
a lack of eco-driving, the study was supplemented with a questionnaire 
about attitudes towards green behaviours, safety, comfort and enjoyment 
and innovation, part of them related to driving. Open questions probed the 
participants about their knowledge of eco-driving and asked for their 
suggestions to motivate and help them. 
For the current study the activation of eco-driving mental models was 
attempted with regular reminders. Because it was important that the 
reminders reliably reached the participants, and that they did not need to 
attend to them during driving, these were sent in the form of text messages. 
The messages included primes and advice about eco-driving. In order to 
compare possible behaviour changes, the experiment also included 
conditions with primes related to driving safety and direct, verbal instructions 
by the experimenter. The aim was to find out whether and to which degree 
these four levels of interventions changed eco- and safe driving behaviour, 
implying an activation of all or a subset of the relevant mental models. 
Driving behaviour was measured with a variety of scenarios in a motion-
based driving simulator before and after the interventions. In order to test 
whether safe or eco-driving behaviours were more prevalent during the 
experimental drives, a number of scenarios were designed to offset these 
goals against each other. 
Assuming that the interventions effect an activation of eco-driving mental 
models, the question arose whether this activation would be stable in the 
face of conditions such as unrelated thoughts or stress. Hence, it was 
attempted to challenge the strength of the activated mental models with a 
moderate workload task. Although a large proportion of drivers are motivated 
to eco-drive and report that they regularly practise it (Delhomme et al., 2013) 
eco-driving is usually not the default driving behaviour (Harvey et al., 2013). 
It is not as familiar and automated as ‘normal’ driving, and not as convenient. 
One reason is that eco-driving can require more effort and increase 
workload, especially when unsupported (Birrell et al., 2010, Birrell et al., 
2013). Hence, it is expected that once drivers have activated their eco-
driving mental models, they might abandon the fuel-saving goal when 
competing demands for their attention arise (cf. Dogan et al., 2011). 
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Study objectives: 
 The activation of all or a subset of existing eco-driving mental models  
 The comparison of interventions using repeated text messages with 
general primes, educational information and direct instructions 
 Challenging of the strength of the activation of eco-driving mental 
models with a cognitive workload task 
 
5.2.2 The activation and deactivation of mental models 
In this study it was examined whether eco-driving mental models can be 
activated with repeated primes, defined in section 3.4.3. For this experiment 
it was attempted to activate eco-driving mental models with text messages 
sent to the mobile phones of the participants. It was tested whether there is 
a possibility of using the concept of repeated primes to activate eco-driving 
mental models in a cost efficient way. 
One of the objectives of the current study was to test whether eco-driving 
mental models, provided they are activated, can then be easily deactivated 
with a cognitive workload task. Rasmussen (1979) explained that a reversal 
to old behaviours can occur under certain conditions such as mind 
wandering, or stress (Davis, 1958). Weick (1990) coined the term regression 
for the return to more habitual, familiar and automated actions. Unfamiliar 
and therefore higher-level mental models (cf. Rasmussen, 1983) usually 
require more cognitive effort, and are therefore vulnerable to interference by 
more automated mental models, particularly when the actions are very 
similar. For example, if the investigation of an infrequent type of error in a 
process plant is disrupted, and the disruption includes cues that remind the 
operator of familiar situations, the operator could settle for an activation of 
more automated mental models and ignore conflicting information. Weick 
(1990) argued that regression to well-learned, but momentarily unsuitable 
mental models can have severe consequences, and played a role in a 
number of aviation accidents. In this research the effects of a cognitive 
workload task on activated, but likely unfamiliar eco-driving mental models 
was tested. 
 
5.2.3 Unique contribution and justification for approach 
This research is unique as to date there is no other study known to the 
author that specifically investigated the activation of eco-driving mental 
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models, for example with regular eco-driving primes. The present research 
particularly assumes that drivers already possess a set of eco-driving mental 
models that need to be activated. In several studies in the past it occurred 
that drivers used their existing eco-driving knowledge and skills, although 
some of the behaviour changes had not been directly encouraged (af 
Wåhlberg, 2007, Birrell and Young, 2011, Tarkiainen et al., 2014). The 
present experiment was designed to test whether regular primes are able to 
induce the activation of eco-driving mental models. With one experimental 
group it was attempted to improve these mental models with eco-driving 
advice messages. The outcomes of these interventions were compared to 
the effects of safety-related primes as well as direct verbal instructions by 
the experimenter. The potential activation of mental models following these 
interventions was then challenged with a workload task.  
In order to conduct the study with a solid theoretical underpinning, the 
mental model approach was applied. Mental models, covered in detail in 
chapter 3, are a suitable framework to investigate the activation and 
deactivation of eco-driving knowledge and skills. Mental models allow 
distinguishing conscious and automated actions. They furthermore provide 
an understanding of learning and the application of the acquired knowledge 
and skills in a variety of settings. This theoretical foundation helps explaining 
why drivers change their behaviour, fully or partly, and whether and why they 
revert back to old behaviours in certain situations. 
 
5.3 Methodology and research environment 
5.3.1 The University of Leeds Driving Simulator  
This second study used a realistic driving environment with a broad range of 
scenarios. The main reason to use a motion-based simulator is that it is able 
to measure smaller, more subtle behaviour changes, which could occur due 
to primes, compared to experimental instructions. In addition, this simulator 
is more suitable for a valid measurement of latitudinal data (Jamson and 
Jamson, 2010), which was now required due a sharp bend scenario as well 
as a workload task on slightly curvy roads. In general, driving behaviour in 
different scenarios, relevant for both eco- and safe driving were of interest.  
Because a workload task can appear artificial (cf. Iqbal et al., 2004), it was 
necessary to create a realistic setting around it. This realistic environment 
also enhances the ecological validity of the findings.  
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This research employed the motion-based version of the University of Leeds 
Driving Simulator (University of Leeds, 2013). The simulator has been 
involved in a number of projects, such as ecoDriver, funded by the EU 
(Hibberd et al., 2013), and Temporary Traffic Management, commissioned 
by Highways England. Previous research has been conducted on topics 
such as driver support systems (Hibberd et al., 2013, Jamson et al., 2012), 
automation (Merat et al., 2012) and road infrastructure (Jamson et al., 2010). 
According to the AIDE project (Rimini-Döring et al., 2005) the simulator can 
be classified as a type E, or advanced, system. It is based on a 2005 Jaguar 
S-type vehicle with fully operational controls, including a real steering wheel 
with force feedback and pedals, as well as rear view and side mirrors. This is 
facilitated with a vehicle cab placed inside a dome, shown in Figure 34, 
which provides the projection area for a spherical screen, showing the road 
environment at 60 Hz and a resolution of 3 x 1920 x 1200 to the front and 
1024 x 768 in the peripheral and rear views. The drivers face a horizontal 
field view of 266°. The rear view and side mirrors provide a field view of 42°, 
which is displayed on and therefore only visible through these mirrors. While 
driving, the participant can perceive forces caused by braking and cornering, 
as well as rough patches on roads and bumps. An immersive sound system 
with a speaker mimics the sound of the vehicle’s engine and other road 
noise. The dome is attached to a hexapod plus X-Y table motion platform 
with eight degrees-of-freedom. Within the Cartesian frame the motion 
system is able to move the dome in six orthogonal degrees-of-freedom (3 
linear, 3 rotational). In addition, rails allow further 5m of movement to the 
front and side to better simulate acceleration and deceleration movements in 
the longitudinal and lateral directions. The vehicle’s software is the same as 
used for the desktop simulator in study 1, with the additional control by a 
motion PC. The software assumes an engine model from a 2002 Jaguar X-
type and braking data from a Ford Mondeo. Accordingly, for modelling 
realistic effects on the fuel consumption with PHEM (Rexeis et al., 2005) a 
Ford Mondeo Ghia with a 16V, Euro 5 petrol engine was assumed. As in 
study 1, the simulator records data at 60 Hz, which is inferred from the 
driver’s inputs, the vehicle movement and position, as well as data related to 
other vehicles on the simulated roads. 
.  
 
138 
 
  
 
Figure 34: The University of Leeds Driving Simulator (University of 
Leeds, 2013) 
 
The benefits of driving simulator experiments are listed in section 4.3.1. A 
simulator, for example, provides the highly controlled environment necessary 
to measure behaviour changes, some of which can be low in magnitude, 
with a consistent set of scenarios (Boyle and Lee, 2010). For this reason 
neither naturalistic driving studies nor FOTs were considered for this 
research. In addition, the large, motion-based simulator in the University of 
Leeds provides a very realistic setting.  
The road layout for this study consisted of urban and rural road segments 
forming a single stretch for a 30-minute drive. The road was setup with one 
lane in each direction and was suitable for scenarios involving traffic lights, a 
sharp bend and interactions with other vehicles. These interactions include a 
car-following scenario, in which the lead car is programmed to drive with an 
oscillating speed, as well as a car crossing the road in front of the participant 
vehicle. The crossing-car event was triggered with a simulated real-time 
measure for TTC.  
 
5.3.2 Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted with the University of Leeds Driving 
Simulator, described in section 5.3.1. A voice recorder was placed into the 
vehicle to record the responses to the workload task. The text messages 
were sent as SMS to UK phone numbers provided by the participants with 
the internet service BulkSMS. 
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5.3.3 Text message interventions and instructions 
The interventions for 3 of the 4 groups in this study were based on text 
messages, which were sent to the mobile phones of the participants for a 
period of two weeks. The messages served as primes for the drivers to drive 
eco-friendly and safely, and to provide eco-driving advice, respective of the 
experimental group. The messages related to eco-driving were supposed to 
effect an activation of eco-driving mental models, and therefore create 
similar behaviour changes as the direct experimental instructions in study 1. 
A list of the text messages are displayed in Table 19. 
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Table 19: Text messages and instructions 
General eco-driving primes (for the Eco-general texts group) 
1: “The Dutch city of Helmond saves 15% of fuel using intelligent traffic 
lights that change to keep traffic moving. Would you prefer such traffic 
lights in your area? Text yes or no” 
2: “Reducing carbon emissions in the transport sector has been 
challenging. Since 1990 only a reduction of 1.7% has been achieved. 
Would you support stronger legal restrictions for car manufacturers to 
achieve larger reductions? Text yes or no” 
3: “Driving in urban conditions can be inefficient, particularly for diesel 
vehicles. Do you avoid driving on urban roads where possible? Text yes or 
no” 
4: “Satellite navigation systems can suggest fuel-efficient routes. Would 
you try such an eco-route? Text yes or no” 
5: “Vehicle emissions can increase local air pollution levels. Do you find 
there is too much traffic in your area? Text yes or no” 
Behavioural eco-driving advice (for the Eco-behaviour texts group) 
1: “Increasing your distance to the car in front, so you pass the same 
landmark after 3 seconds, can help you maintaining a steady speed and 
save fuel. Is this advice helpful? Text yes or no” 
2: “Use engine braking while you approach curves and junctions and avoid 
slamming on your brakes. Are you practising driving like this? Text yes or 
no” 
3: “For fuel efficient driving you may accelerate up to speed swiftly, but not 
aggressively. Have you tried this? Text yes or no” 
4: “Eco-driving is not always slow driving. It is often wiser to get up to an 
efficient speed and keep steady. Would you try this? Text yes or no” 
5: “Gently accelerate before a hill and step off the gas pedal before 
reaching the top. Coast downhill to save fuel. Have you given this a 
chance? Text yes or no” 
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General safety primes (for the Safety-general texts group) 
1: “In the UK the injury rate of cyclists and pedestrians is high compared 
with other European countries. Do/would you feel safe walking or cycling? 
Text yes or no” 
2: “Imagine your car communicates with the road and other vehicles to 
increase safety, particularly at junctions. Would you worry about your 
privacy? Text yes or no” 
3: “Cars will soon be able to take over control in case of a sudden 
obstacle, and automatically steer around it. Would feel safer with this 
feature? Text yes or no” 
4: “Several cities in the UK consider organizing buses and cyclists in 
dedicated lanes, separate from cars, designed to increase the safety of all 
road users. Would you support (more) segregated infrastructure in your 
area? Text yes or no” 
5: “Young drivers are particularly prone to accidents. Do you support an 
increase in the minimum age for driver’s licenses to increase road safety? 
Text yes or no” 
Filler messages (all three groups that received texts) 
1: “From 2007 to 2011, the number of cars purchased by people aged 18 
to 34 fell almost 30%. Are cars too expensive for young people? Text yes 
or no” 
2: “Partly automated cars need to constantly monitor the driver to ensure 
they are able to take over control at any time. Would you feel uneasy? Text 
yes or no” 
3: “‘Range anxiety’ is the term used to describe the concern about the 
remaining battery charge in electric vehicles. Do you think there are 
enough charging stations for electric vehicles in your area? Text yes or no” 
4: “Predicting traffic flows is a large research field in the UK. Would you 
say football games have a strong influence on the amount of traffic? Text 
yes or no” 
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Experimental eco-driving instruction (for the Experimenter instruction 
group) 
Instead of receiving text messages, the participants were instructed to 
eco-drive by the experimenter. The experimental instructions involved the 
following: 
 
 They were given in person by the experimenter 
 They were given before driving, when the participant was seated in 
the simulator 
 They were formulated in a direct way (“Drive fuel-efficiently”) 
 
Text messages for particular groups were alternated with transport-related 
filler messages in order to make their purpose less obvious. A sample 
schedule for one participant from the Eco-general texts group is displayed in 
Table 20. 
 
Table 20: Sample schedule for text messages 
Mo 16 April 
(session 1) 
Tu 17 April Th 19 April Sa 21 April Mo 23 April 
8pm: eco 1 10am: filler 1 10am: eco 2 10am: filler 2 10am: eco 3 
We 25 April  Fr 27 April Sa 28 April Su 29 April Mo 30 April 
(session 2) 
10am: filler 3 10am: eco 4 10am: 
reminder 
10am: filler 4 8am eco 5 
 
In past studies, mostly from the fields of disease prevention and health 
management, text messages have been used to induce behaviour change. 
Phillips et al. (2014) argued that text messages can provide education, clear 
misconceptions and serve as a ‘cue to action’, for example for requesting a 
vaccination at the next medical appointment. Text messages are an 
attractive tool, as they are available, relatively cost-effective, used widely 
and rely on easy technology (Cole-Lewis and Kershaw, 2010). Receivers 
tend to check their mobile phones several times a day and read their 
messages accordingly (Gibbs, 2012). In a study by Hofstetter et al. (2013) 
the targeted Latino population was generally comfortable with receiving 
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health-related text messages at nearly any time of the day. Hence, it could 
be expected that the participants in study 2 would receive the text messages 
and read them within a few hours, and that the messages would not be 
perceived as too intrusive. 
In past research text message campaigns were able to change behaviour 
significantly (Cole-Lewis and Kershaw, 2010). For example, Stockwell et al. 
(2012) conducted a study in a poor US neighbourhood, in which an 
intervention group received text messages besides the usual communication 
based on telephone calls and letters. Five weekly messages resulted in a 
3.7% higher vaccination rate. Durations of such interventions ranged from 
several months (Cole-Lewis and Kershaw, 2010) to three weeks (Stockwell 
et al., 2013). In comparison, most priming studies included only one session 
where the cue was provided, such as reading an article or watching a video 
clip (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, Josephson, 1987).  
The content of text messages is important as well. People who find the 
messages most useful tend to display the strongest effects (Stockwell et al., 
2013). In addition, text messages should clear misconceptions (Stockwell et 
al., 2012), and, accordingly, be able to improve eco-driving mental models. 
Receivers generally tend to appreciate short and informal messages (Gold 
et al., 2010). Hence, the messages were limited to the maximum length of 
an SMS, which is 160 characters, where possible. An element of interaction 
,such as the possibility to reply to a message, can benefit the intervention 
(Fjeldsoe et al., 2009). For this reason, and in order to assure that the text 
messages were read, the messages included simple questions the 
participants needed to answer. There is some disagreement about the 
recency of messages. A review of 29 studies involving appointment 
reminders found no difference between reminders sent one week before and 
a day before a medical appointment (Hasvold and Wootton, 2011). In 
contrast, in priming studies a recency effect has been found (Higgins, 1989). 
It was decided to send the text messages regularly and, the last one, close 
to the second session, in the early morning of the same day.  
Generally, it is suggested to underpin text message interventions with a 
theoretical basis in order to reduce uncertainty (Abraham and Michie, 2008, 
Cole-Lewis and Kershaw, 2010). The mental model theory is able to provide 
a particularly meaningful basis. It provides the justification for primes, meant 
to bring eco-driving mental models into the participants’ minds, and for 
advice for the improvement of mental models. 
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Finally, it was expected that text messages are an intervention that is simple 
to set up. In order to ensure a smooth handling of the messages during the 
experiment, the online service BulkSMS was used. The service allowed 
sending messages larger than 160 characters, where needed, scheduling as 
well as receiving replies from participants. Participants were expected to 
provide their own mobile phones with UK numbers, which was verified in the 
confirmation email sent during the booking process for the study.  
 
5.3.4 Design 
A three-way (2x4x2) mixed design was employed with Drive as within-
subjects factor (2 levels – ‘Drive 1’ and ‘Drive 2’). For the analysis of the 
coherence scenario, which took place twice during each drive, the within-
subjects factor was changed to Task with 4 levels (Drive 1 no TQT, Drive 1 
TQT, Drive 2 no TQT, Drive 2 TQT). The between-subjects factor was 
Intervention (4 levels), Eco-general texts, Eco-behaviour texts, Safety-
general texts and Experimenter instruction, as shown in Table 21. The 
Safety-general texts group was added as a comparison to the Eco-general 
texts group, so the effects of the general, non-advisory primes could be 
compared between these two topics. The Eco-behaviour texts group was 
created to facilitate a comparison between general primes and behavioural 
advice, designed to improve eco-driving mental models. Instead of receiving 
text messages, the Experimenter instruction group was asked by the 
experimenter to drive fuel-efficiently. No further explanations, for example 
what ‘fuel-efficient’ means, were provided with the instructions. This study 
did not involve a control group due to resource limitations, and because 
study 1 offers detailed measures of the behavioural effects of an activation 
of eco-driving mental models. The baseline measures were taken into 
account with Drive. The within-subjects factor Drive refers to the 
experimental Drives in the driving simulator. The levels consisted of Drive 1 
and Drive 2. For Drive 1 the participants were asked to drive ‘normally’, as 
they would every day, so these drives could provide data to measure 
people’s usual driving behaviour as well as to evaluate practice or boredom 
effects by comparing it with Drive 2. The participants were asked to drive 
normally in Drive 2 as well, except for those in the Experimenter instruction 
group, who were instructed to drive fuel-efficiently.  
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Table 21: Design of experiment 
 
Eco-general 
texts  
(n = 15) 
Eco-behaviour 
texts  
(n = 13) 
Safety-
general texts  
(n = 15) 
Experimenter 
instruction  
(n = 15) 
Drive 1 
“Drive 
normally.”  
“Drive 
normally.”  
“Drive 
normally.”  
“Drive 
normally.”  
Inter- 
vention 
General eco- 
driving primes 
Behavioural 
eco-driving 
advice 
General safe 
driving primes 
Experimental 
instructions 
Drive 2 
“Drive 
normally.”  
“Drive 
normally.”  
“Drive 
normally.”  
“Drive fuel-
efficiently.”  
 
5.3.5 Driving scenarios 
The experimental road was about 18 km long, and provided for a drive of 
about 30 minutes. The road of one lane in each direction, leading the 
participant through urban and rural sections. There was no traffic in the 
participant’s lane, except for the coherence and crossing car scenarios. The 
posted speed limits were 30 mph (48 km/h), 40 mph (64 km/h) and 60 mph 
(97 km/h). The speed limit in the cruising scenario was changed from 40 
mph in study 1 to 30 mph in the present road layout, because the single 
drive per experimental session allowed space for more diversity and lower 
speeds. In addition, the 30 mph speed limit is commonly applied in 
residential areas in the UK (UK Government, 2015b). 
Ten scenarios were developed, which allowed testing a wide range of 
behaviours. Five scenarios were designed to primarily provide the possibility 
for eco-driving, and 5 for safe driving. For the former, safety-critical 
situations were prevented with the absence of surrounding vehicles in the 
participants’ trajectory. In addition, the traffic lights involved provided 
sufficient time to stop. These scenarios are described in Table 22 and were 
applicable to study behaviours such as accelerating, cruising and 
decelerating, as well as speed choice. The scenarios involving traffic lights 
were also relevant for anticipatory actions during the approach.  The two-
junction scenario was changed from study 1, because approaching a red 
traffic light from standing caused some participants to drive excessively 
slowly. Hence, it was designed as a ‘catch’ scenario in the present 
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experiment with the traffic lights at the second junction remaining green. This 
design still allowed testing for anticipatory behaviours such as slow 
approaches. Most scenarios occurred once, but there were two occasions of 
each of the speed-change up as well as the long-range braking scenario. 
The coherence scenario was added in this study to research car-following 
behaviour with continuous measures, and a workload task as described in 
the following section. The scenario was placed both at the beginning and the 
end of the Drive. 
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Table 22: Scenarios primarily relevant for eco-driving 
Road layout Scenario description 
Acceleration 
 
The participant was stationary at a 
red traffic light that then switched to 
green. They then accelerated to the 
speed limit.  
Data capture commenced when the 
traffic light turned green and ended 
approximately 350m later. 
This scenario was primarily 
designed to measure acceleration 
behaviour, including mean and 
variation of acceleration, as well as 
the maximum throttle angle. 
Long-range braking 
 
The long-range braking scenario 
involved a junction, where the 
drivers could to bring the vehicle to 
a stop. The traffic lights were red 
from the point where the participant 
was 350m before them.  
Hence, deceleration behaviours 
could be measured, including the 
smoothness and locations when 
stopping actions were initiated. 
Green lights 
 
The green lights scenario involved 
a junction with traffic lights that 
remained green throughout. The 
scenario was designed to measure 
anticipatory behaviour and as a 
‘catch’ scenario to prevent 
participants from preparing for red 
lights at junctions. 
Two-junction  
 
The two-junction scenario was 
designed as a catch scenario. It 
began when the traffic lights at one 
junction turned green and the traffic 
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Road layout Scenario description 
 
lights of another junction, 252m 
further down the road, remained 
green. 
Similar to the green lights scenario 
the two-junction scenario measured 
anticipation, but also acceleration 
behaviour. 
Speed change up 
 
The participants drove on a straight 
road with a speed limit of 30 mph 
(48 km/h) and then into a 60 mph 
(97 km/h) zone, marked by a sign.  
This scenario was designed to 
study acceleration when higher 
speeds, potentially higher than 
efficient, were involved. 
Cruising 
 
 
The cruising scenario consisted of 
road sections with slight curves, 
250m long. This scenario occurred 
several times in both the urban and 
rural sections with a speed limit of 
30 mph. Cruising involved free flow 
driving with no traffic lights present. 
Hence, it was relevant for speed 
choice and variation. The scenario 
had the secondary purpose to 
create space between the 
scenarios involving junctions.  
 
Five scenarios relevant for safe driving were created, as listed in Table 23. 
They were designed to create a conflict between safe and eco-driving. If 
drivers attempted to keep a constant speed, these scenarios would have 
made it unsafe to do so. The scenarios involving traffic lights required strong 
braking or the option to cross an amber traffic light. Those involving other 
cars and a speed limit decrease followed by a sharp bend may result in short 
safety-margins. Events in the scenarios were based on specified values for 
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TTC, which meant that these scenarios still created such conflicts, even 
when drivers approached them with lower speeds. 
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Table 23: Scenarios with conflicts between eco- and safe driving 
Road layout Scenario description 
Coherence 
 
The coherence task was developed 
and first described by Brookhuis et 
al. (1994), and then improved for 
the driving simulator environment 
by Ward et al. (2003). In this 
scenario the host followed a lead 
car that varied its speed between 
50 and 60 mph in an approximate 
sinusoidal cycle with a frequency of 
about 0.03 Hz (this means that the 
lead car reached its 
minimum/maximum speed of 50/60 
mph every 33.3 seconds and 
oscillates between them). In this 
study no instructions, e.g. regarding 
following distance were given. The 
scenario was 3 km long and lasted 
100 seconds. It was relevant for 
measuring car-following 
performance, with and without a 
workload task. 
Short-notice braking and amber 
dilemma 
 
 
The braking scenario involved a 
junction, where the drivers could 
bring the vehicle to a stop at a red 
traffic light or drive through. The 
traffic lights were timed in three 
different ways. In the short-notice 
braking scenario and amber 
dilemma they turned red when 
driver’s TTC with them was 3.5 and 
2.5 seconds, respectively. The 
traffic lights in the amber catch 
scenario remained green. The 
scenario ended when the traffic 
lights turned green or when the 
junction was crossed. These 
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Road layout Scenario description 
scenarios were important for the 
decision whether to cross the 
junction, and for braking 
behaviours. 
Crossing car 
 
The crossing car scenario began 
when the TTC of the host vehicle 
with the stop line of the junction 
was 3 seconds. Then a car that 
stood in a side street crossed the 
road in front of the participant. 
Within just over 2 seconds it 
accelerated to 30 mph before 
clearing the junction. The crossing 
car either provoked strong braking 
reactions or the riskier option of 
keeping a constant speed. 
Speed change down 
 
The scenario began with a speed 
limit of 60 mph and the participant 
drove towards a section with an 
advisory speed limit of 40 mph. 
This scenario was relevant for 
potentially early, anticipatory 
deceleration actions, and 
adherence to speed limits. 
Sharp curve 
 
The sharp curve scenario was 
taking place on a single 
carriageway with no traffic in the 
participant’s lane. The participant 
approached the scenario on a 
straight road with a speed limit of 
60 mph. The sharp curve (100 m 
radius, 72 m length per curve) was 
preceded by the speed change 
down scenario. A bend to the right 
(50%) was followed by a bend to 
the left (50%).  
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Road layout Scenario description 
The sharp curve scenario offset the 
goal of keeping a constant speed 
against navigating the curve with a 
safer, lower speed. 
 
Figure 35 shows the sequence of the scenarios, which were separated with 
cruising sections. The scenarios involving safety conflicts were mixed with 
the scenarios primarily relevant for eco-driving. All participants were 
provided with the same road layout in both sessions. 
 
 
Figure 35: The urban and rural road section with acceleration, braking and 
cruising scenarios 
 
5.3.6 Workload task 
Assuming that some drivers would activate and use eco-driving mental 
models following the interventions, it was tested how they responded, e.g. 
whether they would revert to their usual driving behaviour, as they were 
performing a moderate workload task. For this research the selection of the 
workload task was crucial to ensure that the drivers were engaged in typical, 
natural activities and thoughts. The reason is that a more abstract task, for 
example involving arithmetic operations during driving, could cause untypical 
mental models to be activated. For example, a task based on a set of arrows 
or other symbols projected into the driver’s field of view does not usually 
occur in everyday driving. Such a task can therefore cause the driver to 
engage in abstract problem-solving activities, which potentially interfere with 
the driving task in an unusual way. Similar issues could occur if the task had 
been competitive enough to trigger the participants’ ambition to win 
(Venables and Fairclough, 2009). 
 
Therefore, it was decided that the drivers were presented with a modified 
version of the Twenty Questions Test (TQT, Kafer and Hunter, 1997, Mosher 
and Hornsby, 1966). The TQT is based on a common children’s game and 
has been used in research, particularly in the fields of children’s 
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development and education (Denney, 1973, Denney and Connors, 1974, 
Mosher and Hornsby, 1966) as well as impaired cognitive functioning (Kafer 
and Hunter, 1997, Klouda and Cooper, 1990, Laine and Butters, 1982). The 
task requires cognitive resources for problem solving, planning and the 
working memory (Horrey et al., 2009). It has first been used as a secondary 
workload task for drivers by Horrey et al. (2009). They valued its natural 
conversational style, in contrast to the arithmetic and logical reasoning tasks 
commonly used in driver behaviour studies (e.g. Haigney et al., 2000, 
Kircher et al., 2004, Patten et al., 2004). Merat et al. (2012) used this task in 
a driving simulator study to research the effects of a nonvisual secondary 
task, which is similar to the use of modern sound-based in-vehicle systems. 
However, the original version of the task is competitive, as the participants 
are expected to attempt a good performance by finding as many correct 
answers as possible (Kafer and Hunter, 1997, Mosher and Hornsby, 1966). 
Accordingly, people tend to cognitively engage in the TQT, which can make 
it demanding, frustrating and pressurising as a secondary task for drivers 
(Horrey et al., 2009). 
 
In order to create a more moderate, non-competitive version of the TQT, the 
roles of the experimenter and participant were reversed. Before the 
experimental drives the participants were given one of 9 small cards with for 
words, the ‘answers’. These answers constituted a fruit, vegetable or animal 
and were selected from a list created by Horrey et al. (2009), which was 
partly anglicised for the British audience by Merat et al. (2012). With 15 pre-
formulated questions the experimenter narrowed down to the solution using 
the constraint seeking strategy. This strategy aims to eliminate half of the 
remaining alternatives with each question, and is usually applied by adults 
with normal cognitive functioning (Kafer and Hunter, 1997, Mosher and 
Hornsby, 1966). The participants were instructed to reply to each question 
with either ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘I don’t know’. Some questions were ambiguous to 
avoid having a task that is too simple. For example, one question for the 
word ‘apple’ was: “Is it commonly used in cakes?” On the other hand, the 
participants were instructed not to think too much about a question to avoid 
excessive variation between the participants and questions. Feedback on 
the answers was not provided to avoid influencing the participants’ 
motivation and effort (cf. Venables and Fairclough, 2009). The task was 
given during the coherence scenario, because it provides several measures 
relevant to safe and potentially eco-friendly car-following performance.  
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5.3.7 Questionnaires 
Because the text messages mostly addressed one of the barriers, ingrained 
driving habits, the study was supplemented with questionnaires about other 
reasons for a lack of activation such as the drivers’ attitudes towards green 
behaviours as well as their knowledge of eco-driving. The attitudes 
questionnaire consisted of 45 questions with answers on a 5-point Likert 
scale. It was based on a green attitudes questionnaire developed for the 
ecoDriver project, but to date neither standardised nor validated. It was 
particularly interesting what was important to drivers, in relation to driving, 
and what they think when they are driving. Hence, the questionnaire was 
extended with topics related to safety, comfort as well as fun and innovation. 
Table 24 lists examples of the groups of questions. Two questions 
specifically asked drivers to rank these topics with regards to what they think 
about during driving and what they find important. 
 
Table 24: Excerpts from the attitude questionnaire 
Questions related to eco-driving and green behaviours 
“Most drivers think it is a good idea to drive with the conservation of the 
environment in mind” 
“I buy certain products specifically because they are better for the 
environment than other products” 
Questions related to safe driving and safe behaviours 
“It is important to me that I drive as safely as possible” 
“I buy certain products specifically because they are safer than other 
products” 
Questions related to comfort in driving and other behaviours 
“Drivers generally value driving comfort” 
“I buy certain products because they increase my comfort” 
Questions related to fun and innovation in driving and other behaviours 
“I am happy to pay more for a car that has good information and 
entertainment systems” 
“I consider myself fit and active” 
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Because the study mostly relied on subtle approaches involving text 
message primes and the detailed measurement of resulting behaviour 
changes, it was decided to ask the participants direct questions at the end of 
the second session. Hence, another questionnaire, designed specifically for 
this study, was administered following the debriefing. It consisted of three 
open questions, “What do you know about how to drive fuel-efficiently?”, 
“What would help you to drive fuel-efficiently?” and “What would be reasons 
for you to drive fuel-efficiently?” These questions were intended to confirm 
earlier findings that drivers know how to eco-drive, as well as to gather 
suggestions for making them use their knowledge. 
 
5.3.8 Dependent variables 
The data recorded in this study included objective, behavioural measures as 
well as data collected with questionnaires. Speed and x- and y-position of 
the vehicle on the roadway were used to model the fuel consumption. 
Objective measures were recorded for entire road layouts, except for the 
start section, as well as for the distinct scenarios taking place within each 
drive, which are relevant for each of the measures of interest.  Mean and 
standard deviation values for speed, acceleration and deceleration data 
were extracted. For the accelerator pedal angle and brake pedal pressure, 
maximum values were also identified. The measures used from the 
coherence scenario included headway, coherence, phase shift and modulus. 
The coherence is the squared correlation between the speed of the front and 
the participant car, the phase shift is the delay of reactions to the speed 
fluctuations of the lead car, and the modulus is an amplification factor 
indicating whether the participant is over- or underreacting (Brookhuis et al., 
1994)8. The questionnaires included closed questions about attitudes 
towards green driving behaviours, but also about other driving styles, and 
topics such as automation, comfort and safety. The questionnaire at the end 
of the second session consisted of three open questions regarding one’s 
knowledge about and ideas for support for eco-driving, as well as one’s 
motivations to do so. The replies to the text messages, ‘yes’ and ‘no’, were 
recorded as well. The engagement with the TQT was ensured by recording 
the participants’ answers. Because the task did not focus on performance, 
                                            
8 The MATLAB code for calculating the coherence, phase shift and modulus 
was provided by Michael Daly. 
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and because several questions were ambiguous, the actual replies to the 
text messages and the TQT were not analysed. 
 
5.3.9 Hypotheses  
Hypotheses for eco-driving-relevant scenarios 
Roskos-Ewoldsen et al. (2002) argued that repeated priming over a period of 
time can increase the activation of the targeted mental models. Likewise, 
prompts were expected to lead to automated behaviours being overruled 
(Steg et al., 2012). Transferring these ideas to this study, it was expected 
that general eco-driving primes increase the activation of the eco-driving 
mental models, similar to the direct instructions in the previous study in the 
present thesis. Hence, participants who received general eco-themed 
messages were hypothesised to change their behaviour and lower their fuel 
consumption.  
It was expected that behavioural advice causes a refinement of eco-driving 
mental models and stronger behavioural changes compared to the general 
primes. When drivers use their eco-driving mental models, a lack of practise 
and misconceptions can prevent them from reaching their full potential of 
fuel savings. One common misconception is the belief that low speeds are 
necessary, as shown in previous research (Harvey et al., 2013, van der 
Voort et al., 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980) and the first study in the present 
thesis. Furthermore, it is not necessary to accelerate as slowly as some 
drivers do when eco-driving (Beusen et al., 2009, Birrell et al., 2010, Evans, 
1979).  
 
The members of the Safety-general texts group were hypothesised to 
change their behaviour in some regards and improve their fuel consumption 
slightly. The reason is that several safe and eco-driving practises overlap 
(Young et al., 2011). Safety-themed messages can lead people to adhere to 
the speed limits (Cristea et al., 2012), gently slow down at red traffic lights 
(cf. Summala, 2007) and leave longer headways (Boer et al., 2005, Cristea 
et al., 2012). Usually, these safety margins can serve as margins for eco-
driving, too, for example to avoid stepping on the brake.  
The Experimenter instruction group was expected to display the strongest 
behaviour changes, due to the directly prompted activation of eco-driving 
mental models. For example, Hasvold and Wootton (2011) showed that 
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phone calls are more effective than text messages in reminding patients of 
appointments.  
 
Hypotheses for safety-relevant scenarios 
In safety-relevant scenarios the participants had to trade-off safety and eco-
driving. Summala (1988) defined safety margins as the spatial or temporal 
distance of a driver to a hazard. Drivers tend to control these safety margins 
as their measure of risk. Time headway, for example, is one important safety 
margin (Goodrich and Boer, 2003).  
 
During eco-driving drivers were expected to aim for the maintenance of a 
constant speed. They may keep a longer mean headway during car-
following (Birrell et al., 2014, Boer et al., 2005), but tolerate when the 
headway temporally becomes very short (Mensing et al., 2013), e.g. when a 
car is cutting in the front, to avoid braking. Drivers could also be tempted to 
cross a junction with amber traffic lights to keep their speed constant 
(Andrieu and Pierre, 2012, Delhomme et al., 2013, cited in Haworth and 
Symmons, 2001, Nairn and Partners et al., 1994), when stopping would be 
safer. A speed limit decrease can have implications for eco-driving as well, 
as drivers who activate their eco-driving mental models may coast rather 
than step on the brake pedal and begin to do so early on (Andrieu and 
Pierre, 2012, Birrell et al., 2014, Delhomme et al., 2013, Evans, 1979). 
However, they may be tempted to postpone using the brake pedal and 
compromise safety by driving too fast when passing the traffic sign.  
 
Driving through a sharp curve can present another trade-off between safety 
and fuel-efficiency, as, in order to improve the latter, drivers attempt to keep 
their speed constant and avoid pedal braking. However, drivers tend to 
associate eco-driving with low speeds (Birrell and Young, 2011, Evans, 
1979, Harvey et al., 2013, van der Voort et al., 2001, Waters and Laker, 
1980), which could be measured during the approach and navigation of the 
curve. Hence, it was expected that eco-driving leads to a slower approach to 
the curve and then a more constant speed compared to the Safety-general 
group. 
 
Safety primes were hypothesised to lead to increased driving safety such as 
a stronger adherence to the speed limits (Cristea et al., 2012). In some 
cases safe driving behaviour is different from eco-driving, for example when 
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stronger speed adjustments can help maintaining safety margins (Brookhuis 
et al., 1994, Ward et al., 2003) or when stopping at amber or red traffic lights 
is safer than driving through a junction (cf. Summala, 2007).  
 
 
Hypotheses for the coherence scenario and workload task 
It was predicted that during the first coherence scenario in Drive 1, without 
TQT, the participants would display a relatively accurate car-following 
performance. An activation of eco-driving mental models in Drive 2 can 
cause larger headways in order to attain milder reactions (Boer et al., 2005), 
and lower speeds (Birrell et al., 2010). Hence, in the first coherence scenario 
in Drive 2 car-following was expected to be compromised. 
The workload task, performed during the second coherence scenario, which 
occurred towards the end of both Drives, had the potential to have two types 
of effects. It has been found that higher workload can cause lower 
coherence, a higher phase delay and a lower modulus (Ward et al., 2003). 
For the second session, in particular, it was expected that effects caused by 
Intervention diminished during the workload task, as drivers reverted to old 
habits (cf. Rasmussen, 1979). In that case, previously displayed eco-driving 
behaviours would not be resumed in the long-range braking scenario 
following the task. 
 
Summary of main hypotheses 
 When drivers receive text messages with general eco-driving primes 
they are expected to increase eco-driving behaviours such as lower 
speeds as well as the variation of speed, acceleration and 
deceleration 
 When drivers receive text messages with behavioural eco-driving 
advice they are hypothesised to increase eco-driving behaviours, but 
apply higher speeds and stronger acceleration 
 When drivers receive text messages with general safety primes, they 
are expected to increase anticipatory eco-driving behaviours such as 
coasting, adherence to speed limits and longer headways, but 
prioritise safety in safety-critical scenarios by braking sooner, e.g. at 
higher speeds as well as distances to junctions and hazards, and 
stronger 
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 Experimental instructions to drive ‘fuel-efficiently’ are hypothesised 
result in the strongest increase in eco-driving behaviours including 
lower speeds as well as the variation of speed, acceleration and 
deceleration 
 In scenarios relevant for safe driving, eco-driving interventions are 
expected to increase the prioritisation of eco-driving and therefore to 
maintain a constant speed, also in safety-critical situations, and 
therefore apply the brake less strongly and closer to the junction, 
traffic sign or hazard, and lower the mean and variation of 
deceleration as well as do not lower their speed as much as in 
‘normal’ driving  
 A workload task as well as eco-driving interventions are expected to 
compromise car-following behaviour, measured in a coherence 
scenario with coherence, phase shift and modulus as well as 
headway 
 After the workload task behaviours resulting from interventions are 
not expected to resume 
 
5.3.10 Participants 
Participants were recruited utilising the driving simulator as well as the 
database of the Institute for Psychological Sciences in the University of 
Leeds, both including a diverse range of participants, as indicated in Table 
25. The base consisted of 58 drivers, gender balanced. Every participant 
drove at least 1000 miles per year and held a full EU license for at least two 
years. As a gesture of appreciation all participants were given £20. 
 
Table 25: Participant demographic information 
 
Male Female 
Age 
(years) 
Annual 
mileage 
(miles) 
Driving 
experience 
(years) 
Age 
(years) 
Annual 
mileage 
(miles) 
Driving 
experience 
(years) 
Mean 32.0 8614 11.6 38.4 8045 17.4 
Sd. 11.3 4565 9.6 11.4 4766 10.6 
Max. 63 20000 40 61 25000 38 
Min. 21 1000 3 22 4000 2 
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5.3.11 Procedure 
During recruitment the participants were told that the study was about 
‘driving styles’, without mentioning the eco-driving focus, to prevent the 
participants preparing for the study. When the appointments were confirmed, 
the participants were randomly assigned to an Intervention and an email was 
sent to them. Those in the texts groups were told that the study involved 
regular text messages on their mobile phones for two weeks, at least every 
48 hours. The email also informed the participants of their right to withdraw 
from the study at any point in time. At the beginning of the first session the 
participants were briefed and asked to sign a consent form. Together with 
the experimenter the participants performed a practise drive to become 
familiar with the driving simulator and the TQT. The scenarios involving 
junctions and other vehicles in the participants’ trajectory were not included 
in the practise drive to prevent the drivers from expecting them. For the 
experimental Drives, each participant was asked to drive through a 
combined urban and rural section normally, as they would every day. They 
were told that they would encounter junctions with traffic lights and one 
sharp bend, and that they were expected to handle those as they normally 
would. The coherence scenario was explained to the drivers, who were then 
instructed to follow the lead car as long as it is in front of them on the main 
road. The participants were told that the simulated car is equipped with a 
conventional petrol engine. The Drive lasted around 30 minutes. 
Subsequently, the participants were given questionnaires enquiring about 
their attitudes towards green and other driving behaviours as well as 
demographic information. 
 
After the session the intervention took place according to the assigned 
Intervention. For a period of 2 weeks a text message was sent to each 
participant, except for the Experimenter instruction group, at least every 2 
days. At the end of the period the participants were scheduled for a second 
session in the driving simulator. The second session began with an 
experimental drive, for 30 minutes. For this drive the participants were asked 
to drive normally, except for the Experimenter instruction group, which was 
asked to drive fuel-efficiently. The coherence scenario and the  questions 
task were explained as in the first session. After the drive the participants 
filled in the same attitudes questionnaire. Subsequently, a debriefing took 
place and the participants had the opportunity to ask questions about the 
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study. To finalise the session, another questionnaire was given to the 
participants, with the open questions “What do you know about how to drive 
fuel-efficiently?”, “What would help you to drive fuel-efficiently?” and “What 
would be reasons for you to drive fuel-efficiently?” 
 
During the experimental drives in the first and second session, the drivers 
were presented with the TQT, which is described in detail in section 5.3.6, 
for the duration of the second occurrence of the coherence scenario. The 
participants had been given a set of ‘answers’ on a card, which they took 
with them into the simulator. When the front car of the second coherence 
scenario was placed in front of the participant, the task began with 
instructions by the experimenter. The task was performed as a conversation 
between the participant and the researcher via the hands-free 
communications system in the vehicle. The experimenter asked 15 pre-
formulated questions about each word. The participant was instructed to 
reply to each question with either ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘I don’t know’. They were 
instructed to ask the experimenter to repeat the question, if they wished to 
do so. Once the experimenter ‘guessed’ the word, the participant was asked 
to move on to the next answer on their list. 
 
5.3.12 Analysis 
The raw data collected by the driving simulator was processed in Matlab to 
extract the dependent variables, for the whole drives and separately for each 
scenario. For the behavioural measures a mixed methods ANOVA was 
performed, with the within-subjects factor Drive (2 levels: Drive 1 and Drive 
2), and the between-subjects factors Gender (2 levels) and Intervention (4 
levels). Instead of 2 within-subjects levels the coherence scenario involved 4 
Task levels (Drive 1 no TQT, Drive 1 TQT, Drive 2 no TQT, Drive 2 TQT). In 
order to assure that significant effects were not due to differences between 
the Intervention groups in Drive 1, a separate one-way ANOVA was 
conducted with data from Drive 1 only. Drive*Intervention interaction effects 
were further explored using two-tailed t-tests. Due to a strong literary 
foundation for the hypotheses as well as the findings of study 1, the t-tests 
were one-tailed when comparing Drive 1 and Drive 2 for the Experimenter 
instruction group. When assumptions of parametric testing were violated, 
non-parametric methods were used with Wilcoxon on within-subjects factors, 
the Mann-Whitney U-test on Gender, and the Kruskal-Wallis test on 
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Intervention. In the case of multiple tests, the results were Bonferroni 
corrected. Statistical significance was accepted at p < 0.05. 
Because the questionnaire items were ordinal, they were analysed with the 
Wilcoxon sign-rank test for within-subjects differences and with the Kruskal-
Wallis test for between-subjects effects in Drive 2. Besides analysing the 
items separately, the differences between Drive 1 and Drive 2 scores were 
calculated and then grouped into the categories ‘eco’, ‘safety’, ‘comfort’ and 
‘fun and innovation’ with the latter incorporating items related to innovations, 
information and entertainment systems as well as driving enjoyment. For a 
more detailed analysis, the ‘eco’ items were grouped into the categories 
‘self’ (“It is important to me that I save as much fuel as possible while 
driving”), ‘others’ (“Drivers generally drive with the environment in mind”) and 
‘non-driving’ (“I wash laundry in cold water rather than warm or hot water 
specifically to save energy”). The summed-up scores were then compared 
between the Intervention groups with independent-samples t-tests. Gender 
differences were tested with Drive 1 responses using the Mann-Whitney U-
test. 
 
5.4 Results for scenarios relevant for eco-driving 
5.4.1 Fuel consumption and travel time effects 
There were no significant main effects of Drive, Intervention and Gender for 
mean fuel consumption either for the entire drive or for the cruising scenario. 
For the total time spent in a drive no significant effect was found. However, 
for the time spent in the cruising scenario a Drive*Intervention interaction 
effect could be identified [F(3, 50) = 3.828, p = .015, η2 = .187], as displayed 
in Figure 36. Especially for Experimenter instruction group this time 
increased by 27 seconds to 15:06 minutes, and a t-test prove this difference 
to be significant [t(14) = -2.688, p = .036, r = .583]. 
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Figure 36: Drive*Intervention interaction effects for the time spent in 
the cruising scenario 
 
Table 26: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the total drives and cruising 
sections 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Fuel consumption total (g/s) 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
Fuel consumption cruising 
scenario (g/s) 
-0.008 -0.013 -0.024 -0.022 
Time total (sec) -41s -1s 13s 32s 
Time cruising scenario (sec)* -7s 2s -7s 27s 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
 
5.4.2 Acceleration scenario 
Figure 37 shows the speed profiles in the acceleration scenario for the group 
instructed to eco-drive, compared to the group receiving eco-driving prime 
messages. 
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Figure 37: Speed profile in the acceleration scenario 
 
In this scenario several effects could be attributed to the interventions. For 
mean acceleration a Drive*Intervention interaction effect was found [F(3, 50) 
= 3.049, p = .037, η2 = .155] with the Experimenter instruction group 
accelerating 19% less harshly in Drive 2 [t(14) = 3.343, p = .010, r = .666], 
Figure 38. In order to analyse the mean acceleration in isolation an 
ANCOVA was conducted with the mean cruising speed in Drive 2 as 
covariate. The result showed that the cruising speed affected the speed, and 
the Drive*Intervention became non-significant (p = .054). 
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Figure 38: Drive*Intervention interaction effect for mean acceleration in 
the acceleration scenario 
 
The Experimenter instruction group also accelerated 30% more smooth in 
the acceleration scenario, indicated by another Drive*Intervention interaction 
effect [F(3, 50) = 3.396, p = .025, η2 = .169] and supported by a t-test [t(14) = 
3.772, p = .004, r = .710], as depicted in Figure 39.  
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Figure 39: Drive*Intervention interaction effect for the standard 
deviation of acceleration in the acceleration scenario 
 
Table 27: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the acceleration scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean acceleration (m/s2)* 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.09 
Time with accelerator pedal 
angle above 10° (s) 
-1.20 3.60 4.30 5.90 
Sd. of acceleration (m/s2)** 0.07 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 
Max. accelerator pedal angle (°) 5.00 0.40 5.70 -9.20 
Time over speed limit (s)* 1.90 0.00 2.40 -1.50 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
In addition, in Drive 2 males spent almost 3 more seconds, or about 22% 
more time, above the speed limit, while females 2 seconds less in the 
acceleration scenario. This resulted in a significant Drive*Gender interaction 
effect [F(1, 50) = 4.567, p = .038, η2 = .084], drawn in Figure 40. 
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Figure 40: Drive*Gender interaction effect for the time spent above the 
speed limit in the acceleration scenario 
 
5.4.3 Long-range braking scenario 
The first occurrence of the long-range braking scenario was placed exactly 
half-way along the road layout. The speed profiles in Figure 41 illustrate the 
performance in this scenario for the Experimenter instruction and the Eco-
general texts groups. 
 
 
Figure 41: Speed profile for the Eco-general and the Experimenter 
instruction groups in Drive 2 in the long-range braking scenario 
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The analysis of the mean speed in the long-range braking scenario 
produced several results. For all groups except the group instructed by the 
experimenter mean speed increased in Drive 2 [F(1,50) = 4.354, p = .042, η2 
= .080] with no significant effects emerging for any Intervention group in t-
tests. However, a Drive*Intervention interaction effect F(3,50) = 3.302, p = 
.028, η2 = .165 supports this change in mean speed. Differences between 
the groups in Drive 1, as Figure 42 suggests, were not significant. Hence, 
the effect can be attributed to Intervention. 
 
 
Figure 42: Drive*Intervention interaction effect for mean speed in the 
long-range braking scenario 
 
A main effect for Drive indicated that drivers in all groups lifted their foot off 
the accelerator on average 29 m closer to the junction in Drive 2 [F(1, 50) = 
8.052, p = .007, η2 = .139], Figure 43.  
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Figure 43: Drive effect for location when foot off gas pedal in the long-
range braking scenario 
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Table 28: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the long-range braking 
scenario 1 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets)* 
0.22 
(0.5) 
0.16 
(0.3) 
0.15 
(0.4) 
-0.17 
(-0.3) 
Mean deceleration (m/s2)* -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.04 
Sd. of deceleration (m/s2) 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
Max. brake pressure (N) 1.9 20.1 6.4 5.1 
Location when foot off gas 
pedal (m)** 
-16 -21 -45 -33 
Location when foot on brake 
pedal (m) 
-11 -56 -24 -6 
Time coasting (s) -1.98 -0.08 -1.94 1.93 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
There was a Intervention*Gender interaction effect in the long-range braking 
scenario with females driving slower in the Eco-general and Safety-general 
texts groups (each by 6%), but faster than males in the Eco-behaviour (8%) 
and Experimenter instruction group [4%, F(1,50) = 4.876, p = .005, η2 = 
.226]. However, the effect was already significant in Drive 1 [F(3,50) = 3.319, 
p = .027, η2 = .166], as Figure 44 suggests, which means that the former 
interaction effect cannot be attributed to the interventions. 
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Figure 44: Intervention*Gender interaction effect for mean speed in the 
long-range braking scenario 
 
For mean deceleration there was a significant Intervention*Gender 
interaction effect [F(3, 50) = 3.221, p = .030,  η2 = .162], as illustrated in 
Figure 45, with females decelerating 27% stronger than males in the Eco-
behaviour texts group, and males 31% stronger than females in the Safety-
general texts group. However, because an ANOVA conducted solely with 
the Drive 1 values of the long-range braking scenario concluded with an 
even stronger, significant Intervention*Gender interaction effect [F(3, 50) = 
3.748, p = .017,  η2 = .184], Figure 45, these results were treated with 
caution when drawing conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 45: Intervention*Gender interaction effect for mean deceleration 
in the long-range braking scenario 
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5.4.4 Green lights scenario 
There were no main effects in the scenario involving a junction with green 
traffic lights. 
 
Table 29: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the green lights scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets) 
1.0 
(2) 
0.2 
(1) 
0.4 
(1) 
-0.3 
(-1) 
Mean deceleration (m/s2) 0.027 0.071 -0.013 0.044 
Max. deceleration (m/s2) 0.012 0.141 -0.007 0.110 
Sd. of deceleration (m/s2) -0.005 -0.038 0.014 -0.025 
Min speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets) 
1.4 
(3) 
0.5 
(2) 
0.3 
(1) 
-0.1 
(-1) 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
5.4.5 Two-junction scenario 
This scenario involved traffic lights at one junction turning from red to green 
and the traffic lights of another junction, 252m further down the road, 
remaining green. No main effects for the factors Intervention and Drive were 
found. 
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Table 30: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the two-junction scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean acceleration (m/s2) 0.016 0.035 0.108 -0.051 
Time with accelerator pedal 
angle above 10° (s) 
0.1 1.9 1.8 2.6 
Sd. of acceleration (m/s2) 0.039 0.032 0.107 -0.091 
Max. accelerator pedal angle 
(°)* 
0.50 4.30 9.20 1.80 
Time over speed limit (s)* 3.67 1.98 -0.79 1.33 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
The analysis resulted in two Gender effects for the two-junction scenario. A 
Kruskal-Wallis test flagged up that males pressed the accelerator pedal 39% 
more than females at the maximum following the interventions [χ2(1) = 
5.168, p = .023, φ = .299], as depicted in Figure 46.  
 
 
Figure 46: Gender effect for the maximum accelerator pedal angle in 
the two-junction scenario 
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The other Gender effect in the two-junction scenario [F(1, 50) = 5.385, p = 
.024, η2 = .097] indicated that males speeded longer, by 2.8 seconds in 
Drive 1, and also increased this time by 1.3 seconds in Drive 2, as shown in 
Figure 47. A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed the Gender effect for Drive 1 
[χ2(1) = 3.921, p = .048, φ = .260]. 
 
 
Figure 47: Gender effect for the time spent above the speed limit in the 
two-junction scenario 
 
5.4.6 Speed change up scenario 
In this scenario the speed limit changed from 30 mph (48 km/h) to 60 mph 
(97 km/h). Figure 48 shows the speed profiles for the Eco-general texts and 
Experimenter instruction groups. 
 
175 
 
 
Figure 48: Speed profile for the Eco-general and the Experimenter 
instruction groups in Drive 2 in the speed change up scenario 
 
For mean speed there was a Drive*Intervention interaction effect [F(3, 50) = 
3.378, p = .025, η2 = .169] in the speed change up scenario, with both the 
Eco-general and Safety-general texts groups raising their mean speed, each 
on average by about 2.3 mph, in Drive 2, Figure 49. T-tests confirmed that 
the Experimenter instruction group lowered their mean speed by 6% [t(14) = 
3.036, p = .005, r = .630]. The effect was supported by the fact that 
differences between the Intervention groups in Drive 1 were not significant.  
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Figure 49: Drive*Intervention interaction effect for mean speed in the 
speed change up scenario 
There was no main effect for mean acceleration in this scenario. For the 
standard deviation of speed there was a main effect for Drive [F(1,50) = 
9.815, p = .003, η2 = .164]. T-tests showed that the speed following the 
interventions was steadier in both the Eco-general [17%, t(14) = 2.897, p = 
.048, r = .612] and the Experimenter instruction groups [19%, t(14) = 3.085, 
p = .016, r = .636]. Although Figure 50 suggests relatively large differences 
between the Intervention groups in Drive 1, these were not significant. 
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Figure 50: Drive effect for the standard deviation of speed in the speed 
change up scenario 
 
For the variation of acceleration in the speed change up scenario there were 
significant effects for Drive [F(1,50) = 6.246, p = .016, η2 = .111] and for the 
interaction Drive*Intervention [F(3,50) = 5.460, p = .003, η2 = .247]. Because 
the measure for the Eco-behaviour and Safety-general texts groups in Drive 
2 were not normally distributed, a Kruskal-Wallis test was performed, which 
confirmed a Intervention effect in Drive 2 [χ2(3) = 9.546, p = .023, φ = .406]. 
A t-test showed that for the Experimenter instruction group the measure was 
significantly lowered, by 51%, in Drive 2 [t(14) = 4.910, p < .001, r = .795]. 
This difference is well visible in Figure 51. 
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Figure 51: Drive*Intervention interaction effect for the standard 
deviation of acceleration in the speed change up scenario 
 
The analysis of the maximum speed did not result in main effects attributable 
to Intervention in this scenario.  
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Table 31: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the speed change up scenario, 
from 30 to 60 mph 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets)** 
0.4 
(1) 
-0.2 
(-1) 
0.7 
(1) 
-1.4 
(3) 
Speed at traffic sign (m/s) (mph 
in brackets)* 
0.9 
(2) 
-0.1 
(0) 
1.3 
(3) 
-1.0 
(-2) 
Max. speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets)* 
-0.5 
(-1) 
-0.3 
(-1) 
0.4 
(1) 
-1.8 
(-4) 
Sd. of speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets)** 
-0.68 
(-1.5) 
0.00 
(0.0) 
-0.38 
(-0.8) 
-0.76 
(-1.7) 
Mean acceleration (m/s2)* -0.060 0.012 -0.006 -0.096 
Sd. of acceleration (m/s2)** -0.009 0.013 -0.009 -0.16 
Max. accelerator pedal angle (°) 2.3 4.6 3.8 -2.9 
Time over speed limit (s) -0.92 0.04 0.12 -0.75 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
A Drive*Gender interaction effect for the speed change up scenario indicates 
that the speed when passing the traffic sign increased for males by 5% and 
decreased for females by 4% in the second session [F(1,50) = 5.467, p = 
.023, η2 = .099]. 
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Figure 52: Drive*Gender interaction effect for the speed at traffic sign 
in the speed change up scenario 
 
5.4.7 Cruising scenario 
 
For the mean speed in the cruising scenario there was a Drive*Intervention 
interaction effect [F(3,50) = 3.655, p = .018, η2 = .180] with the largest 
average reduction, 1mph, for the Experimenter instruction group, Figure 53. 
A t-test confirmed this reduction to be significant [t(14) = 2.671, p = .036, r = 
.581]. The mean speed before the intervention was not significantly different 
to other Intervention groups.  
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Figure 53: Drive*Intervention interaction effect for mean speed in the 
cruising scenario 
 
The analysis of the mean acceleration during the cruising scenario resulted 
in a main effect for Drive [F(1,50) = 15.237, p < .001, η2 = .234]. Although all 
groups lowered their acceleration rate, from 4% for the Eco-general texts 
group to 14% for the Eco-behaviour texts group, as shown in Figure 54, t-
tests did not find any of these reductions to be significant (p = .092 for Eco-
behaviour). 
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Figure 54: Drive effect for mean acceleration in the cruising scenario 
 
 
The analysis of the variation of acceleration resulted in several significant  
effects, for Drive [F(1,50) = 4.758, p = .034, η2 = .087] and for the interaction 
between Drive*Intervention [F(3,50) = 3.404, p = .025, η2 = .170]. In the 
cruising scenario the acceleration was smoothened by 20% on average 
between the Drive 1 and 2 for the Experimenter instruction group, Figure 55, 
confirmed by a t-test [t(14) = 2.835, p = .026, r = .604]. 
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Figure 55: Drive*Intervention interaction effect for standard deviation of 
acceleration in the cruising scenario 
 
 
For the smoothness of deceleration a main effect for Drive was found 
[F(1,50) = 7.235, p = .010, η2 = .126]. As Figure 56 illustrates, the 
participants decelerated steadier in Drive 2 in the cruising scenario, on 
average in each, and most substantially by 25% in the Experimenter 
instruction group. Yet, comparisons for the Intervention groups did not 
confirm any reduction to be significant (p = .214 for Experimenter 
instruction). 
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Figure 56: Drive effect for standard deviation of deceleration in the 
cruising scenario 
 
Table 32: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the cruising scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets)* 
0.1 
(1) 
0.0 
(0) 
0.1 
(0) 
-0.5 
(-1) 
Standard deviation of speed 
(m/s) (mph in brackets) 
0.04 
(0.1) 
-0.08 
(-0.1) 
-0.05 
(-0.2) 
-0.04 
(-0.1) 
Mean acceleration (m/s2)*** -0.007 -0.023 -0.014 -0.021 
Sd. of acceleration (m/s2)* 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.052 
Sd. of deceleration (m/s2)* -0.019 -0.047 -0.024 -0.077 
Time over speed limit (s)* 8 -14 15 -50 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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A Drive*Gender interaction effect for the cruising scenario was due to 
females reducing their standard deviation of acceleration on average by 14% 
in Drive 2 [F(1,50) = 6.532, p = .014, η2 = .116], as shown in Figure 57.  
 
 
Figure 57: Drive*Gender interaction effect for standard deviation of 
acceleration in the cruising scenario 
 
A Intervention*Gender interaction effect [F(3,50) = 3.228, p = .030, η2 = .162] 
occurred in the cruising scenario. However, an interaction effect for Drive 1 
alone [F(3,50) = 2.939, p = .042, η2 = .150] clarified that already then 
females accelerated more erratically in the Experimenter instruction group, 
but more smoothly in the Eco-general texts group, as opposed to males, 
Figure 58.  
 
 
186 
 
 
Figure 58: Intervention*Gender interaction effect for standard deviation 
of acceleration in the cruising scenario 
A Intervention*Gender interaction effect for the variation of deceleration for 
the cruising scenario pinpointed large differences [F(3,50) = 3.082, p = .036, 
η2 = .156]. These were, however, already apparent when considering Drive 1 
alone [F(3,50) = 4.019, p = .012, η2 = .194], as indicated in Figure 59.  
 
 
 
Figure 59: Intervention*Gender interaction effect for standard deviation 
of deceleration in the cruising scenario 
 
A Drive*Gender interaction shows that females reduced the time they spent 
above the speed limit during cruising in Drive 2 by 45 seconds [F(1,50) = 
4.432, p = .040, η2 = .081], and males increased it by 13 seconds, Figure 60. 
 
 
187 
 
 
Figure 60: Drive*Gender interaction effect for time over speed limit in 
the cruising scenario 
 
5.5 Results for scenarios relevant for safe driving 
5.5.1 Short notice braking scenario 
In the short-notice braking scenario traffic lights at a junction turned red 
when the drivers’ TTC with them was 3.5 seconds. For the maximum brake 
pedal pressure in the short notice braking scenario there was no significant 
effect for the factor Intervention.  
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Table 33: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the short notice braking 
scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Driving through (count) -1 0 -1 1 
Mean speed excl. those driven 
through (m/s) (mph in 
brackets) 
0.12 
(0.2) 
-0.02 
(0.0) 
0.13 
(0.3) 
0.38 
(0.9) 
Max. brake pressure excl. 
those driven through (N)* 
34 11 -1 -19 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
A Drive*Gender interaction effect was found for those who stopped at the 
short notice braking scenario [F(1,42) = 4.686, p = .036, η2 = .100], with 
males putting their foot down 26% more in Drive 2, while females reduced 
the maximum brake pedal pressure by 16%, Figure 61. 
 
 
Figure 61: Drive*Gender interaction effect for maximum brake pedal 
pressure in the short notice braking scenario 
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5.5.2 Amber dilemma scenario 
In the amber dilemma scenario the traffic lights at a junction turned red at a 
TTC of 2.5 seconds. There was no main effect for mean speed. 
 
Table 34: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the amber dilemma scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Driving through (count) -1 -1 1 -2 
Mean speed for those driven 
through (m/s) (mph in brackets)* 
0.7 
(1) 
-0.9 
(-2) 
-0.2 
(-1) 
-1.0 
(-2) 
Mean speed for those stopped 
(m/s) (mph in brackets) 
-0.2 
(0) 
-0.1 
(0) 
-0.1 
(0) 
-0.5 
(-1.0) 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
5.5.3 Crossing car scenario 
The crossing car scenario involved a car crossing the road in front of the 
participant. In Figure 62 the speed profiles for the Experimenter instruction 
and the Eco-general texts group are depicted. 
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Figure 62: Speed profile for the Eco-general and the Experimenter 
instruction groups in Drive 2 in the crossing car scenario 
 
A main effect for Drive indicates that the mean deceleration in the crossing 
car scenario was reduced [F(1,50) = 5.923, p = .019, η2 = .106], with 38% 
particularly for the Safety-general texts group and with 23% for the 
Experimenter instruction group. Although Figure 63 suggests relatively high 
differences before the intervention, the Drive 1 measures was not 
significantly different between the Intervention groups. Comparisons 
between Drive 1 and Drive 2 only support a reduction for the Experimenter 
instruction group [t(14) = -2.566, p = .044, r = .566] (p = .312 for Safety-
general texts). 
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Figure 63: Drive effect for mean deceleration in the crossing car 
scenario 
 
A Drive effect for the variation of deceleration in the crossing car scenario 
indicated a reduction for the second session [F(1,50) = 10.243, p = .002, η2 
= .170], visible in Figure 64. When Drive1 and Drive 2 values were 
compared for each group, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirmed that the 
difference of 32% for the Eco-general texts group was significant [Z(15) = -
2.499, p = .048, -.645]. In addition, the Experimenter instruction group 
decelerated significantly more smoothly, by 42% [t(14) = 2.938, p = .022, r = 
.785]. 
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Figure 64: Drive effect for the standard deviation of deceleration in the 
crossing car scenario 
 
The maximum brake pedal pressure was lowered in the crossing car 
scenario during Drive 2, as illustrated in Figure 65, supported by a main 
effect [F(1,50) = 4.775, p = .034, η2 = .087]. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
confirmed significant reductions for the Eco-general [50%, Z(15) = -2.499, p 
= .048, r = -.645] and Safety-general [44%, Z(15) = -2.668, p = .032, r = -
.689] texts groups. 
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Figure 65: Drive effect for maximum brake pedal pressure in the 
crossing car scenario 
 
Table 35: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the crossing car scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean speed (m/s) (mph 
in brackets) 
0.3 
(1) 
0.1 
(0) 
-0.9 
(-2) 
-0.1 
(0) 
Mean deceleration 
(m/s2)* 
0.258 -0.114 0.356 0.118 
Sd. of deceleration 
(m/s2)** 
-0.27 -0.06 -0.43 -0.27 
Max. brake pressure (N)* -22.2 -2.4 -20.8 -12.3 
Location when foot off 
gas pedal (m) 
-4 -8 1 -1 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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5.5.4 Speed change down scenario 
In a scenario involving a decrease in the speed limit, 31 participants did not 
coast during Drive 1. Hence, a statistical analysis of the time spent coasting 
was not conducted. It could be observed, however, that the number of 
people not coasting increased in each Intervention group in Drive 2.  
Nevertheless, the mean speed was lowered in Drive 2 [F(1,50) = 13.874, p < 
.001, η2 = .217], with t-test showing significant reductions for the Safety-
general texts [t(14) = 2.934, p = .044, r = .617] and Experimenter instruction 
groups [t(14) = 3.156, p = .014, r = .645], each by about 2 mph, visible in 
Figure 66. 
 
 
Figure 66: Drive effect for mean speed in the speed change down 
scenario 
On average all groups drove past the traffic sign, which showed the lower 
speed limit, slower in Drive 2, supported by a main effect for Drive [F(1,50) = 
15.493, p < .001, η2 = .237]. T- and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed 
significant reductions for the Safety-general texts [t(14) = 3.338, p = .020, r = 
.666] and the Experimenter instruction groups [Z(15) = -2.897, p = .008, r = -
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.748], each by 4 mph. A Intervention effect [F(3,50) = 3.150, p = .033, η2 = 
.159] occurred, with pairwise comparisons showing a significant difference 
between the Eco-general and Eco-behaviour texts group (p = .028), with the 
latter being 4 mph faster before and after the intervention. There was an 
effect for Intervention in Drive 1 only [F(3,57) = 3.129, p = .033, η2 = .148], 
but post-hoc tests did not confirm this to be significant, Figure 67. 
 
 
Figure 67: Drive effect for the speed at traffic sign in the speed change 
down scenario 
 
For mean deceleration in the speed change down scenario there was a main 
effect for Drive [F(1,50) = 4.357, p = .042, η2 = .080]. T-tests confirmed a 
significantly stronger deceleration in Drive 2 for the Experimenter instruction 
group [t(14) = 2.764, p = .030, r = .594], with an increase of 47%. A 
Intervention effect could be identified as well [F(3,50) = 3.271, p = .029, η2 = 
.164]. Pairwise comparisons clarified that the absolute value was higher for 
the Eco-general than for the Eco-behaviour texts group, by 58 % in Drive 2 
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(p = .033). An ANOVA with the Drive 1 values did not find a significant 
difference before the intervention (p = .089).  
 
 
 
Figure 68: Drive effect for mean deceleration in the speed change down 
scenario 
 
There were several effects for the smoothness of deceleration in the speed 
change down scenario. A Intervention effect was found [F(3,50) = 6.049, p = 
.001, η2 = .266] with pairwise comparisons revealing that the Eco-general 
texts group drove more erratically than the other Intervention groups [Eco-
behaviour: p =.003, Safe: p = .009, Instruction: p = .011)], but the 
Intervention effect was already significant in Drive 1 [F(3,54) = 3.617, p = 
.019, η2 = .167], as visualised in Figure 69. A Drive*Intervention interaction 
effect showed that, on average, the Eco-general texts group then reduced 
their standard deviation of deceleration in the second Drive, contrary to the 
others [F(3,50) = 3.011, p = .039, η2 = .153]. However, a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test did not confirm the significance of this reduction (p = .560). 
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Figure 69: Drive*Intervention interaction effect for the standard 
deviation of deceleration in the speed change down scenario 
 
Table 36: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the speed change down 
scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets)*** 
-0.6 
(-1) 
-0.3 
(-1) 
-1.2 
(-2) 
-0.9 
(-2) 
Speed at traffic sign (m/s) (mph 
in brackets)*** 
-0.4 
(-1) 
-0.3 
(-1) 
-1.8 
(-4) 
-1.6 
(-4) 
Mean deceleration (m/s2)* 0.023 -0.029 -0.188 -0.111 
Sd. of deceleration (m/s2)** -0.084 0.022 0.033 0.023 
Time over speed limit (s) 0.06 0.24 -0.49 -0.67 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
An Intervention*Gender interaction effect [F(3,50) = 3.107, p = .035, η2 = 
.157] revealed that the strong deceleration in the Eco-general texts group in 
the speed change down scenario was performed by females. This 
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interaction effect, however, was present in Drive 1 [F(3,50) = 3.407, p = 
.025, η2 = .170], as shown in Figure 70. This effect could be attributed to two 
outliers, who decelerated excessively strongly in both Drives. 
 
 
 
Figure 70: Intervention*Gender interaction effect for mean deceleration 
in the speed change down scenario 
A Gender effect in the speed change down scenario, shown in Figure 71, 
indicated that females decelerated more erratically than males [F(1,50) = 
6.694, p = .013, η2 = .118], by 78 % in the Drive 1 and then only by 37 % in 
Drive 2. 
 
 
Figure 71: Gender effect for the standard deviation of deceleration in 
the speed change down scenario 
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An Intervention*Gender interaction pinpoints the erratic deceleration of the 
females in this scenario to the Eco-general texts group [F(3,50) = 5.599, p = 
.002, η2 = .251], visible in Figure 72. However, this effect was present in 
Drive 1 [F(3,50) = 11.732, p < .001, η2 = .413], which denies that the 
interventions were the cause. A Drive*Intervention*Gender interaction effect 
also highlighted that females then reduced the standard deviation in their 
second Drive on average by 13%, as opposed to males [F(3,50) = 4.201, p = 
.010, η2 = .201]. 
 
 
 
Figure 72: Intervention*Gender interaction effect for the standard 
deviation of deceleration in the speed change down scenario 
 
5.5.5 Sharp curve scenario 
Figure 73 depicts the speed profiles for the group instructed by the 
experimenter to drive fuel-efficiently and for the group that received eco-
driving prime text messages.  
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Figure 73: Speed profile for the Eco-behaviour and the Experimenter 
instruction groups in Drive 2 in the sharp curve scenario 
 
For mean deceleration in the sharp curve scenario there was a main effect 
for Drive [F(1,50) = 6.085, p = .017, η2 = .108], indicating weaker 
decelerations in Drive 2, as shown in Figure 74. A t-test showed that this 
was the case, significantly for the Safety-general texts group [t(14) = -3.362, 
p = .020, r = .668] with a reduction of 18 %. However, there was a 
Intervention effect during Drive 1 [F(3,57) = 3.502, p = .021, r = .163], in 
which the Safety-general texts group already decelerated 31% stronger than 
in the Eco-general texts group (p = .015). 
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Figure 74: Drive effect for mean deceleration in the sharp curve 
scenario 
 
Analysing the standard deviation of deceleration resulted in a main effect for 
Drive [F(1,50) = 18.317, p < .001, η2 = .268] with all Intervention groups 
decelerating more steadily on average in Drive 2 in the sharp curve 
scenario. This effect is visible in Figure 75, and significant for the Safety-
general texts group [Z(15) = -2.726, p = .024, r = -.704], which lowered it by 
26 %, and the Experimenter instruction group [t(14) = 3.420, p = .008, r = 
.675], which achieved a 42% reduction. 
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Figure 75: Drive effect for the standard deviation of deceleration in the 
sharp curve scenario 
 
There was a main effect for Drive for the maximum brake pedal pressure in 
the sharp curve scenario [F(1,50) = 19.918, p < .001, η2 = .285]. T-tests 
indicated significant reductions between the Drives, by 20% for the Eco-
general [t(14) = 3.467, p = .016, r = .680] and by 26 % for the Safety-general 
texts groups [Z(15) = -2.840, p = .020, r = -.733], illustrated in Figure 76. 
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Figure 76: Drive effect for the maximum brake pedal pressure in the 
sharp curve scenario 
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Table 37: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the sharp curve scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets)** 
0.0 
(0) 
0.7 
(2) 
0.0 
(0) 
-0.4 
(-1) 
Min. speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets)* 
0.0 
(0) 
0.6 
(2) 
0.8 
(1) 
0.3 
(1) 
Mean acceleration (m/s2)* 0.081 -0.042 -0.015 -0.133 
Max. accelerator pedal angle (°) 7.5 2.3 7.8 1.4 
Sd. of lateral acceleration 
(m/s2)** 
0.02 0.11 0.1 0.05 
Mean deceleration (m/s2)* -0.001 0.005 0.162 0.131 
Sd. of deceleration (m/s2)*** -0.139 -0.030 -0.150 -0.251 
Max. brake pressure (N)*** -7.6 -3.6 -7.7 -6.4 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
A Gender effect for the sharp curve scenario [F(1,50) = 9.105, p = .004, η2 = 
.154] indicated that males drove faster than females, about 4 mph before 
and 2 mph after the intervention, as illustrated in Figure 77. 
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Figure 77: Gender effect for mean speed in the sharp curve scenario 
 
In addition, females had a lower minimum speed than males in this scenario 
[F(1,50) = 7.117, p = .010, η2 = .125], by 4 mph in the Drive 1 and 2 mph in 
Drive 2, Figure 78. 
 
 
Figure 78: Gender effect for minimum speed in the sharp curve 
scenario 
For mean acceleration there was a Drive*Gender interaction [F(1,50) = 
5.071, p = .029, η2 = .092] with males increasing and females decreasing 
their acceleration while navigating the sharp curve in Drive 2, by 11 and 27 
%, respectively, Figure 79. 
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Figure 79: Drive*Gender interaction effect for mean acceleration in the 
sharp curve scenario 
 
A Gender effect indicates a lower variation of lateral acceleration for females 
[F(1,50) = 8.026, p = .007, η2 = .138], 24 % during the first and 15 % in the 
second session in the sharp curve scenario, Figure 80. 
 
 
Figure 80: Gender effect for the standard deviation of lateral 
acceleration in the sharp curve scenario 
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5.6 Coherence and workload 
The measures relevant in the coherence scenario included the coherence, 
phase shift and modulus. The coherence is the correlation between the 
speed of the front and the participant car, the phase shift is the delay of 
reactions to the speed fluctuations of the lead car, and the modulus is an 
amplification factor. The analysis of the coherence and phase shift measures 
did not result in significant main effects for the factors Intervention, Task and 
Gender for the coherence scenario. The analysis of the modulus, however, 
flagged up a Task effect [F(3,150) = 9.929, p < .001, η2 = .166]. This effect 
was due to the values being higher when driving without TQT (Drive 1 no 
TQT: p = .001, p < .001, Drive 2 no TQT: p = .025, p = .005), visible in 
Figure 81. 
 
 
Figure 81: Task effect for the modulus in the coherence scenario 
 
For mean speed there was a main effect for Task [F(1.870,93.511) = 9.593, 
p < .001, η2 = .161]. Post-hoc tests clarified that the participants drove faster 
during the coherence scenario without the TQT (Drive 1 no TQT: p = .001, 
Drive 2 no TQT: p = .004, Drive 1 TQT: p = .001, Drive 2 TQT: p = .004), 
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Figure 82. Because the measures for the Eco-behaviour and Experimenter 
instruction groups were not normally distributed, the Friedman Test was 
performed, and it confirmed the Task effect [χ2(3) = 29.234, p < .001, φ = 
.710]. 
 
Figure 82: Task effect for the mean speed in the coherence scenario 
 
The analysis of the speed variation during the coherence scenario resulted 
in a Task effect as well [F(3,150) = 10.561, p < .001, η2 = .174]. Post-hoc 
tests clarified that it was higher in the Drive 1 no TQT condition compared to 
both conditions with questions task (p < .001, p = .015), coloured in red in 
Figure 83. It was also higher in the Drive 2 no TQT compared to the Drive 1 
TQT condition (p < .001). Due to the distributions of the measures during the 
Drive 2 TQT condition, a Friedman Test was conducted, which confirmed the 
significance [χ2(3) = 18.848, p < .001, φ = .570]. 
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Figure 83: Task effect for the standard deviation of speed in the 
coherence scenario 
 
For the standard deviation of lateral acceleration during the coherence 
scenario there was a significant effect for Task [F(2.11,105.5) = 10.427, p < 
.001, η2 = .173], visualised in Figure 84. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
clarified that both conditions without TQT had higher values than the 
conditions with Task (Drive 1 no TQT: p < .001, p = .015, Drive 2 no TQT: p 
= .001, p = .001). The Friedman test, performed due to the distribution of the 
Drive 2 TQT values, confirmed the difference [χ2(3) = 32.524, p < .001, φ = 
.749]. 
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Figure 84: Task effect for the standard deviation of lateral acceleration 
in the coherence scenario 
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Table 38: Results for the coherence scenario 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Coherence 
Drive 1 no 
TQT 
.263 .176 .281 .327 
Drive 1 TQT .251 .199 .249 .189 
Drive 2 no 
TQT 
.264 .216 .177 .198 
Drive 2 TQT .271 .132 .172 .191 
Phase shift 
Drive 1 no 
TQT 
3.12 4.74 7.56 5.14 
Drive 1 TQT 5.32 6.67 4.52 2.90 
Drive 2 no 
TQT 
4.39 5.11 6.76 4.09 
Drive 2 TQT 3.42 5.89 5.98 5.08 
Modulus*** 
Drive 1 no 
TQT 
.96 .67 1.04 .90 
Drive 1 TQT .78 .62 .74 .73 
Drive 2 no 
TQT 
.89 .78 .96 .79 
Drive 2 TQT .73 .63 .78 .66 
Mean speed 
(m/s) (mph in 
brackets)*** 
Drive 1 no 
TQT 
25.2 
(56) 
25.5 
(57) 
25.3 
(57) 
25.1 
(56) 
Drive 1 TQT 
24.5 
(55) 
24.7 
(55) 
24.9 
(56) 
24.8 
(55) 
Drive 2 no 
TQT 
25.2 
(56) 
25.3 
(57) 
25.4 
(57) 
25.2 
(56) 
Drive 2 TQT 
24.6 
(55) 
24.8 
(55) 
24.6 
(55) 
23.8 
(53) 
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Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Sd. of speed 
(m/s) (mph in 
brackets)*** 
Drive 1 no 
TQT 
1.69 
(3.8) 
1.39 
(3.1) 
1.93 
(4.3) 
1.65 
(3.7) 
Drive 1 TQT 
1.42 
(3.2) 
1.10 
(2.5) 
1.41 
(3.2) 
1.30 
(2.9) 
Drive 2 no 
TQT 
1.60 
(3.6) 
1.63 
(3.6) 
1.81 
(4.0) 
1.60 
(3.6) 
Drive 2 TQT 
1.47 
(3.3) 
1.21 
(2.7) 
1.52 
(3.4) 
1.42 
(3.2) 
Mean 
headway(s) 
Drive 1 no 
TQT 
6.55 6.28 5.02 5.70 
Drive 1 TQT 6.72 6.94 5.96 6.19 
Drive 2 no 
TQT 
4.95 7.08 4.96 6.70 
Drive 2 TQT 6.25 7.32 7.52 11.2 
Mean headway 
max. 6 seconds 
(s)* 
Drive 1 no 
TQT 
.90 .97 .93 .61 
Drive 1 TQT .56 .63 .74 .78 
Drive 2 no 
TQT 
.66 .58 .85 .69 
Drive 2 TQT .67 .52 .81 .78 
Min. headway 
(s) 
Drive 1 no 
TQT 
4.75 4.05 3.13 4.06 
Drive 1 TQT 4.52 5.32 4.17 4.49 
Drive 2 no 
TQT 
3.41 4.42 3.15 4.67 
Drive 2 TQT 4.36 4.96 5.19 6.27 
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Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Standard  
deviation of 
lateral 
acceleration 
(m/s2)*** 
 
Drive 1 no 
TQT 
.837 .837 .828 .810 
Drive 1 TQT .790 .801 .798 .793 
Drive 2 no 
TQT 
.834 .836 .840 .825 
Drive 2 TQT .789 .800 .793 .744 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
A Task*Gender interaction effect indicates that females had a lower variation 
of speed compared to males when performing the TQT in the coherence 
scenario [F(3,150) = 3.028, p = .031, η2 = .057], Figure 85. 
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Figure 85: Task*Gender interaction effect for the standard deviation of 
speed in the coherence scenario 
 
When the headway during this scenario was limited to 6 seconds, there was 
a Task*Gender interaction effect [F(3,57) = 2.802, p = .048, η2 = .129]. 
Figure 86 suggests that males drove at shorter headways when answering 
the questions. 
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Figure 86: Task*Gender interaction effect for the mean headway, 
limited to 6 seconds, in the coherence scenario 
 
The second long-range braking scenario occurred directly after the second 
coherence scenario, which involved the TQT. In this scenario no main 
effects were found, for the factors Intervention, Drive and Gender. 
 
216 
 
Table 39: Drive 1 to Drive 2 changes for the long-range braking 
scenario 2 
Variable 
Eco-
general 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction 
Mean speed (m/s) (mph in 
brackets) 
0.7 
(2) 
0.4 
(1) 
0.2 
(0) 
-0.5 
(1) 
Mean deceleration (m/s2) -0.031 -0.031 -0.047 -0.002 
Sd. of deceleration (m/s2) 0.006 0.011 -0.003 -0.017 
Max. brake pressure (N) -1.4 0.3 3.8 -3.4 
Location when foot off gas pedal 
(m) 
-6 -13 -6 -5 
Location when foot on brake 
pedal (m) 
-25 -19 11 4 
Time coasting (s) -2.43 1 -0.69 0.68 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
5.7 Questionnaires 
A comparison of the questionnaire items between the Drive 1 and Drive 2 
conditions resulted in significant differences for 5 of the total of 55 questions, 
Table 40. Regarding questions about eco-driving, both groups that received 
text messages, with either eco-driving primes or advice, increased the score 
for the item ‘Drivers generally drive with the conservation of the environment 
in mind’. Conversely, the group instructed by the experimenter reduced the 
ranking for ‘environment’ in the questions about what they think about and 
what they find important during driving. For a more concise analysis, the 
items were grouped into the categories ‘eco’, ‘safety’, ‘comfort’ and ‘fun and 
innovation’, as well as ‘self’, ‘others’ and ‘non-driving’. Summing up the 
scores according to these categories did not result in significant effects. 
217 
 
Table 40: Questionnaire items† with significant differences between the 
Drive 1 and Drive 2 sessions 
Variable 
Eco-
gener
al 
Eco-
behaviour 
Safe Instruction P (Z) 
Drivers 
generally drive 
safely* 
Drive 1 2.60 2.77 2.73 3.14 
.021 
(-2.31) Drive 2 3.13 2.92 3.07 3.29 
Drivers 
generally drive 
with the 
conservation of 
the environment 
in mind* 
Drive 1 1.80 1.85 1.93 2.36 
.049 
(2.00), 
.039 
(-2.07) 
Drive 2 2.07 2.62 2.07 2.36 
It is important to 
me that my 
driving style is 
comfortable* 
Drive 1 4.47 4.92 4.40 4.64 
.034  
(-2.12) Drive 2 4.40 4.38 4.40 4.43 
Ranking: When 
you drive what 
do you think 
about? – 
environment* 
Drive 1 2.60 2.54 2.53 2.79 
.039 
(-2.06) Drive 2 3.27 2.85 2.93 2.00 
Ranking: When 
you drive what 
do you find 
important? – 
environment* 
Drive 1 2.67 2.46 2.33 3.21 
.027 
(-2.21) Drive 2 2.80 2.38 2.80 2.14 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
† Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
Significant difference between Drive 1 and Drive 2 conditions 
 
Analysing differences between Intervention groups with the Kruskal-Wallis 
test did not result in significant effects. However, the Mann-Whitney U-test 
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indicated that for a number of items male and female responses in the Drive 
1 session differed significantly. These items are presented in Appendix A. 
When summing up the scores for categories, only the ‘fun and excitement’ 
category produced a significant effect, related to Gender [t(58) = 4.879, p < 
.001, r = .539], with males scoring higher in this category. 
The open questionnaires provided some insights into the higher-level 
knowledge of eco-driving, as well as drivers’ suggestions towards motivating 
and helping them to eco-drive. Each of the 58 participants was able to write 
at least one point into the first answer field. Forty-five mentioned the 
avoidance of potentially harsh accelerations and decelerations (“gentle 
acceleration”), but 3 drivers from the Eco-behaviour texts group reported 
swift acceleration to an efficient speed, as communicated in one of the 
advice messages sent to them. Twenty-six commented on an optimal gear 
and the engine revolutions per minute (rpm), respectively (“under 2000 
revs is efficient”). Twenty-eight participants would aim for a steadier 
speed (“driving at a steady speed”), 9 of them were in the Eco-
behaviour texts group, in line with one advice message. Twenty-four would 
choose an efficient speed, but none of the participants in the Eco-behaviour 
texts group referred to the advice that eco-driving is not slow driving. Twelve 
drivers, 5 of them from the Eco-behaviour texts group, added coasting to 
their answer. In fact, engine braking and coasting, respectively, were 
mentioned in two advice messages. Also mentioned were vehicle 
maintenance, fuel-efficient technologies and environmental factors such as 
less traffic. 
When asked what would help them to drive fuel-efficiently, 32 participants 
suggested in-vehicle feedback systems, while 18 wished for more 
information, education or training. Seventeen see potential in innovative 
technologies. Six drivers, 3 of them from the Experimenter instruction group, 
would find reminders useful and 5 would consider government programmes 
and campaigns as helpful. Five also mentioned eco-route guidance systems. 
Most would be motivated by financial savings (54) and by benefitting the 
environment (46), but 7 said that safety would be a consideration. 
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5.8 Summary of main results 
 When drivers received text messages with general eco-driving primes 
they did not increase eco-driving behaviours, but displayed more 
constant speeds and milder decelerations in some situations 
 When drivers received text messages with behavioural  eco-driving 
advice they did not increase eco-driving behaviours 
 When drivers received text messages with general safety primes they 
displayed stronger acceleration and deceleration behaviours as well 
as higher speeds when it was safe to do so, but lower speeds and 
milder decelerations in safety-critical situations 
 Experimental instructions to drive ‘fuel-efficiently’ resulted in several 
effects on driving behaviour, including lower speeds as well as milder 
and more smooth accelerations and decelerations 
 In scenarios relevant for safe driving, eco-driving interventions did not 
increase the prioritisation of eco-driving in most cases 
 A workload task, but not eco-driving interventions, compromised car-
following behaviour 
 After the workload task behaviours resulting from interventions did not 
resume 
 
5.9 Discussion 
For the current study the activation of eco-driving mental models was 
attempted using text messages, containing eco-driving primes and advice. In 
order to compare possible behaviour changes, the experiment also included 
conditions with primes related to driving safety and instructions delivered 
verbally by the experimenter. The aim was to find out whether and to what 
degree these four interventions changed eco- and safe driving behaviour, 
implying an activation of all or a subset of the relevant mental models. 
Driving behaviour was measured in a variety of scenarios using a motion-
based driving simulator before and after the interventions. In order to test 
whether safe or eco-driving behaviours were more prevalent during the 
second Drive, a number of scenarios were designed that required drivers to 
potentially offset these goals against each other. Assuming that the 
interventions effect an activation of eco-driving mental models, the question 
arose whether this activation would be stable in the face of conditions such 
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as unrelated thoughts or stress. Hence, it was attempted to challenge the 
strength of the activated mental models with a moderate workload task.  
 
5.9.1 Effects of text messages on eco-driving 
It appears that the Intervention groups receiving eco-driving primes and 
behavioural advice did not activate their eco-driving mental models in Drive 
2. These groups displayed some behavioural changes, but these were not 
consistent enough to be classified as eco-driving. For example, contrary to 
expectations, there was a tendency that both groups increased their mean 
speed in Drive 2 in the long-range braking scenario. However, in line with 
typical eco-driving behaviours, the Eco-general texts group achieved 
significantly steadier speeds in the speed change up scenario. It also 
reduced the variation of deceleration as well as the maximum brake pedal 
pressure when a car crossed the road in front of them, and the latter 
measure again in the sharp curve scenario. However, among the wide range 
of scenarios and measures, these effects do not stand out. For the Eco-
behaviour texts group there were no notable significant changes, and often 
the average measures were more stable between the Drives than for other 
groups. Hence, the significant results could have occurred due to chance, 
and it was concluded that none of the text message interventions had the 
desired effect. 
Possible explanations for the absence of an activation of eco-driving mental 
models include the timing, the delivery mode, and the lack of directness. 
Firstly, in studies utilising prompts, it has been found that such messages 
are most effective when provided close to the targeted behavioural decisions 
(Geller et al., 1971). Studies investigating the effects of training have shown 
that the timing can have an influence on the magnitude of behaviour change 
(af Wåhlberg, 2007, Chapman et al., 2002, de Groot et al., 2011). For this 
study it was assumed that sending the last message at 8am on the day of 
the second appointment would be sufficiently close. However, the time 
between the last message and the actual driving session could have 
provided the participants with sufficient time to attend to other topics. Hence, 
effects of the eco-driving message could have been faded, once the 
participants arrived at the simulator. Secondly, it is possible that text 
messages are less effective than messages delivered by a person. The 
human brain responds differently to voice (Latinus and Belin, 2011), which 
enhances the interaction with a message, potentially leading to more trust 
and increased adherence (Large and Burnett, 2014). Lastly, it may have 
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been insufficient that the messages were not directly prompting drivers to 
eco-drive. They were intended to make the drivers think about eco-driving 
and inform them about it, respectively. The advice messages also included 
instructions about how to implement such behaviours. However, they did not 
ask drivers to actually change their behaviour, which is more likely to be 
effective (Sarason and Minard, 1962). In addition, advice messages that are 
in conflict with existing knowledge can result in distrust (Risto and Martens, 
2013). As an alternative explanation, contrast effects could mitigate the 
effects of the text messages. These effects can occur in the context of 
priming, when a prime is too obvious and the receivers have negative 
attitudes towards the target behaviours (Herr, 1986, Herr et al., 1983, Martin, 
1986). However, in the case of participants reacting adversely to obvious 
primes, one would also expect some participants to purposefully please the 
experimenter (Fiske and Taylor, 1984), which was not the case. The steadier 
speeds and decelerations of the Eco-general texts group could mean that 
the eco-driving primes increased an activation of a few lower-level mental 
models where it did not require a lot of effort. A study by Beusen et al. 
(2009) showed that, following an eco-driving course, participants were 
maintaining behaviours such as coasting longer than other, possibly more 
effortful, behaviours related to acceleration and idling time. However, since 
the behaviour changes in the Eco-general texts group occurred during 
safety-critical scenarios and were partly confounded by Drive 1 measures, 
definite conclusions cannot be drawn. 
The group that received safety primes displayed hardly any behavioural 
changes in Drive 2. For instance, in the long-range braking scenario, there 
was a tendency that this group released the accelerator pedal closer to the 
junction. Unlike higher speeds and deceleration rates, stronger accelerations 
are not a reliable predictor for crash risk (Gettman and Head, 2003, Lajunen 
et al., 1997, Young et al., 2011). In study 1 there were no significant 
differences between ‘normal’ and safe driving behaviour. Hence, it may be 
possible that such a change is not related to an activation or deactivation of 
safe driving mental models. Instead, this behaviour could signify increased 
familiarity with the driving environment (cf. Martens and Fox, 2007), possibly 
leading to thoughts about other, unrelated topics. It needs to be taken into 
account, that the large range of measures and scenarios employed in this 
research can lead to statistically significant results due to chance. Hence, it 
was decided that the sporadic differences found due to the text message 
interventions, for both eco- and safe driving, could be seen as indications, 
but definite conclusions cannot be drawn. 
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5.9.2 Effects of experimental instructions on eco-driving 
In contrast to the effects of the text messages, the results of the eco-driving 
instructions by the experimenter support the finding of study 1 that drivers 
possess eco-driving mental models and activate them when asked to do so. 
Because no further explanations were given, it was expected that these 
drivers activated their eco-driving mental models and consequently applied 
their existing eco-driving knowledge and skills. Accordingly, the strongest 
effects were apparent in the Experimenter instruction group. This group 
drove at lower speeds and spent more time in the cruising section. When 
setting off from stopping at a junction, this group lowered both the mean and 
the variation of acceleration. In the long-range braking scenario there was a 
tendency that this group’s mean speed decreased significantly, while it 
increased for the other groups. The experimental instructions also led to 
slower driving when the speed limit increased from 30 to 60 mph. 
Furthermore, in this scenario the instructed drivers accelerated more 
smoothly. This group also accelerated less erratically when cruising. These 
behavioural changes, provoked by asking drivers to eco-drive, are consistent 
with previous studies (Birrell et al., 2010, van der Voort et al., 2001, Waters 
and Laker, 1980), as well as the first study in the present thesis. It is 
interesting to notice that the experimental instructions had the strongest 
impact on driver behaviour. The explanation may be related to the way the 
instructions were provided. For examples, studies with prompts found that 
these are most effective when provided close to the target behaviour in a 
direct (Balas et al., 2000) and simple manner (Geller et al., 1982). Hence, 
the timing could have played a crucial role. In both studies in the present 
thesis the instructions to drive fuel-efficiently were provided directly before 
driving, when the participants were seated in the simulator. In contrast, the 
last text message was sent at 8am of the day of the second session, while 
the first appointment was scheduled for 9:30am and the last one for 4pm. 
There may have been enough opportunity to get distracted from the 
messages’ themes before the drive began. In addition, the experimental 
situation could have had an effect, as participants generally tend to obey 
when the experimenter asks them to perform tasks such as filling in a 
questionnaire. The drivers could also have been compliant in order to please 
the experimenter. However, in that case it would have been expected the 
advice messages, and possibly the general prime messages had a similar 
effect, provided the participants guessed the study’s purpose. Such 
compliance, however, was not the case, and several participants in the Eco-
behaviour texts group reported that they had engaged with the texts. 
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Although it would have been possible for this group to please the 
experimenter, they did not do so. 
However, no significant effects on fuel consumption could be found, neither 
for the entire Drives, nor regarding the cruising scenario separately. This 
could be attributed to inefficient behaviours such as driving too slowly, which 
is inefficient in a 30-mile zone (Samaras and Ntziachristos, 1998), and 
accelerating too mildly (Mensing et al., 2014, Mensing et al., 2013). The 
nature of the driving scenarios could have played a role as well, as they did 
not provide many opportunities to plan behaviour ahead. For example, 
slowly approaching a junction with red traffic lights did not prevent the 
participant from stopping, because the scenario was designed for the car to 
stop. Similarly, events such as changing traffic lights and a car crossing the 
road were triggered by the participants’ approach. Hence, their effect on 
speed fluctuations could not be avoided with anticipatory behaviours. 
 
5.9.3 Effects of the interventions on safe driving 
Eco-driving text messages and experimental instructions had varying effects 
on the safety-critical scenarios, with the Experimenter instruction group 
displaying the strongest effects. Approaching a sign indicating a lower speed 
limit, this group decelerated at a higher rate; and their mean speed was 
lower altogether. Once they passed the sign their speed was significantly 
lower than the speed of the other groups. In this case, driving eco-friendly 
with the early anticipation of a lower speed limit was congruent with safe 
driving behaviour. It has been argued that slower driving, particularly 
adhering to speed limits, is considered safe (Taylor et al., 2000, Taylor et al., 
2002). On the other hand, for this group the standard deviation of 
deceleration decreased in scenarios such as the crossing car and the sharp 
curve scenario. Despite these situations being safety-critical, milder 
decelerations were applied. Hence, eco-driving was not fully abandoned. 
The eco-driving prime messages resulted in sporadic effects in the safety-
critical scenarios as well. This group, for example, decreased the maximum 
brake pedal pressure in the sharp curve scenario. For the Eco-behaviour 
texts group the mean speed decreased for those who drove through the 
amber dilemma scenario. Hence, although softer decelerations and lower 
speeds are in line with typical eco-driving mental models, these Intervention 
groups may have prioritised safety in most cases. However, in line with the 
scenarios relevant for eco-driving, the absence of consistent behavioural 
changes indicates that some of these results could have occurred due to 
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chance and it could not be concluded that eco-driving mental models were 
not activated. 
In scenarios relevant for safe driving the Safety-general texts group 
displayed several behaviour changes towards safer behaviour in Drive 2. 
The text messages led to a lower mean speed. Consequently, the drivers 
passed the traffic sign with a significantly slower. In this case, the Safety-
general texts group adhered more to the speed limits, which is known to 
reduce crash risk (Elvik et al., 2004, Nilsson, 2004, Taylor et al., 2000, 
Taylor et al., 2002), particularly on curvy roads (Taylor et al., 2002). In the 
sharp curve scenario the maximum brake pressure decreased significantly. 
In the same scenario the mean deceleration decreased, and the group 
smoothed their deceleration. Hence, the Safety-general texts group tended 
to handle the sharp bend less erratically in Drive 2. Glaser et al. (2007) 
developed a curve navigation system and found that drivers felt safer when 
approaching a curve with a lower speed, as opposed to braking too far in the 
curve. Despite its relationship with driving safety (O'Hanlon et al., 1982), no 
Intervention effects for the lateral variation were found. Hence, the stable 
speed when navigating a curve can indicate an increased activation of safe 
driving mental models, but this needs to be confirmed with further studies. If 
such behaviour changes would be supported, it would mean that safety 
primes are effective and able to bring safe driving behaviours into the 
drivers’ minds when such behaviour was beneficial. One possible 
explanation for the effectiveness of these messages, compared to eco-
driving primes, could be that drivers are more familiar with safe driving. For 
example, in study 1 there were no differences between the safety and eco-
driving instructions. Hence, it could have required not as much effort to 
activate safe driving as to activate eco-driving mental models. 
 
5.9.4 The effects of the TQT on mental models of eco-driving 
Drivers activate eco-driving mental models when directly instructed, but 
abandon them following an interruption such as the TQT. This was found in 
the coherence scenario, which involved following a vehicle that changed its 
speed in a sinusoidal manner. In each Drive this scenario was presented 
towards the beginning, without a workload task, and again towards the end, 
with the TQT. There were no Task*Intervention interaction effects, which 
indicates that the text messages were not influencing behaviour differentially 
in each Intervention group. Instead, several Task effects occurred. 
Performing the TQT in both Drives resulted in a lower modulus, a lower 
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mean speed, lower variation in speed and lower variations in the lateral 
acceleration, compared to when the task was absent. These behavioural 
changes are consistent with earlier studies from the field of driver distraction 
(Funkhouser and Chrysler, 2007, Hatfield and Chamberlain, 2005, Salvucci 
et al., 2007, White et al., 2006). Therefore, the TQT, although simplified in 
this study, reveres any effects of the text messages and instructions. The 
effects of the task even lasted beyond the coherence scenario, spilling into 
the second long-range braking scenario. The first occurrence of this scenario 
in the middle of the Drive generated a number of significant effects, 
particularly relevant for eco-driving. In comparison, in the second occurrence 
of the scenario, which directly followed the TQT, all significant effects 
diminished. As predicted, raising the workload of the driver and talking about 
unrelated topics led to the regression to familiar habits (cf. Rasmussen, 
1979). The distinct behaviour changes in the first study in this thesis, as well 
as in the Experimenter instruction group, suggest that eco-driving is not the 
default driving behaviour for drivers. It appears to require effort, indicated by 
an increased workload when no support system is present (Birrell et al., 
2010). Where behavioural changes were present, it required the simple 
interruption by a questions task to abandon behavioural changes and to 
revert back to old habits. 
 
5.9.5 Findings from the questionnaires 
Because the questionnaires were distributed after the Drives, it needs to be 
taken into account that the interruption by the TQT took place before the 
participants filled them in. However, one interesting result could be found by 
comparing the attitudes questionnaires of both sessions. The Experimenter 
instruction group significantly lowered the ranking of ‘environment’ when 
asked what they think about and what they find important during driving. It is 
possible that these drivers, who exhibited the strongest behavioural changes 
following the interventions, were aware of their reversal into old, familiar 
habits. In some cases it is believed that people are able to access lower-
level mental models and thus are aware of their actions, particularly when it 
is made difficult to maintain them (Vallacher and Wegner, 1987).  
The open questions regarding knowledge, help with eco-driving as well as 
motivations provided some further insights into the drivers’ minds. Overall, 
the participants had a good understanding of eco-driving, mostly mentioning 
steady speed by avoiding accelerations and braking, and by coasting. In 
addition, most participants reported that in-vehicle guidance would help them 
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to drive fuel-efficiently. The effectiveness and acceptance of such systems 
are well-founded, as described in section 2.3.4. Only slightly more than a 
quarter of the drivers mentioned information, education or training, indicating 
that most drivers are confident with their eco-driving knowledge. About 10 % 
specifically asked for reminders, and half of them were in the Experimenter 
instruction group. Yet, it needs to be taken into account that this 
questionnaire was distributed after the debrief session, when the participants 
were aware of the study’s purpose. It was noticeable, however, that the Eco-
behaviour texts group reported the techniques mentioned in the advice 
messages more often compared to the other groups. Although this group 
tended to recall about half of the advice, they did not mention that eco-
driving does not necessitate driving at a lower speed. Only 3 referred to the 
swift acceleration. It could be the case that the information targeting 
misconceptions were not as successful as messages confirming existing 
knowledge such as messages related to coasting. However, considering the 
low number of participants, such findings need to be confirmed in further 
studies. 
 
5.9.6 Gender effects 
Several Gender effects were found, but only some of them can be attributed 
to the interventions. For instance, males drove faster, accelerated stronger 
and spent more time speeding, either in both or in the Drive 2 session. When 
setting off at junctions, males increased the maximum pedal pressure when 
another junction with green lights was in sight, and the time spent speeding. 
Females tended to keep these measures constant or lower them. In both 
sessions, males drove at a higher speed when approaching a junction with 
green traffic lights, and in Drive 2 when the speed limit increased. In the 
cruising scenario, males spent more time speeding in Drive 2. In contrast, 
females lowered their speed when passing the traffic sign with a higher 
speed limit following the intervention period. When it came to safety-related 
scenarios males and females displayed differences as well. In the short-
notice braking scenario males pushed their brake pedal harder in Drive 2, 
while females kept the pedal pressure at about the level as before the 
intervention. In the sharp curve males increased and females decreased 
their mean acceleration in Drive 2. In several scenarios in both Drives males 
drove faster than females, with females also having a lower minimum speed, 
as well as a lower variation of lateral acceleration, which is understood to be 
a predictor for driving safety (O'Hanlon et al., 1982). Several interaction 
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effects could indicate that the interventions had different effects on males 
and females. In addition, analyses of Drive 1 flagged up significant 
differences before the interventions occurred, which negate influences from 
the interventions. On the whole, the Gender effects are in line with previous 
research. It has been found that male drivers are less motivated than 
females to comply with traffic laws (Yagil, 1998), and are more likely to drive 
aggressively (Shinar and Compton, 2004). These differences can explain the 
dynamic driving behaviour of males in this study. In addition, the fact that 
males gave higher scores when asked about driving innovation and fun are 
in line with a literature review by Gilbert et al. (2003), showing that 
technology tends to appeal more to a masculine gender identity. 
 
5.9.7 Discussion of the methodology 
It appears that activating eco-driving mental models requires effort, indicated 
by an increased workload when no support system is present (Birrell et al., 
2010) and the increased focus on one’s own actions in study 1. As a result 
of such potential effort, as explained in section 3.3.1, the message content 
could have been simply ignored by the currently activated mental models. 
Priming studies tend to target more subtle behaviour changes, such as the 
judgement of foreign countries (Brewer et al., 2003). Increasing the 
accessibility of constructs and increasing their importance in one’s attitudes 
could be easier to perform compared to changing driving behaviour. When 
the experimenter personally asked drivers to drive fuel-efficiently, these 
instructions could have been strong enough to justify such efforts. The 
advice messages targeting eco-driving misconceptions either did not 
improve eco-driving mental models or did not lead to their activation. Drivers 
might need to see results to confirm the correctness of the messages and 
increase their trust in them, before adhering to them (Risto and Martens, 
2013). 
Values measured with a simulator may not represent values in the real 
world. Therefore absolute results cannot be generated, and results need to 
be interpreted as relative, as suggested by Rook and Hogema (2005). 
However, a comparison of similar scenarios in both studies in the present 
thesis is provided in section 6.1, and sheds some light on the validity of the 
measures. 
It was attempted to challenge the strength of any activated eco-driving 
mental models with a moderate workload task. The TQT is a conversational 
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workload task (Horrey et al., 2009). In order to create a milder version, the 
experimenter questioned the participants, who then provided simple ‘yes/no’ 
answers to words provided in advance. The task prove to be very effective, 
but it can still be argued whether it required too much concentration from the 
drivers and appeared unnatural, possibly interrupting potential eco-driving 
more than a simple conversation with a passenger would. Hence, future 
studies could involve even more moderate and natural tasks such as 
simplified conversations with only one ‘answer’ for the TQT and the 
experimenter as passenger, for example.  
 
5.9.8 General discussion and conclusions 
The present research was built upon the findings of the first study in the 
present thesis, which found that many drivers already possess a set of eco-
driving mental models. This study then attempted to activate them with 
primes and advice, and to compare the effects with experimental 
instructions. It was found that text messages including these eco-driving 
primes and advice led to some behavioural changes, but not consistent eco-
driving. If drivers do not drive eco-friendly, it is not a simple lack of 
knowledge and skills (Delicado, 2012) or their unwillingness (Delhomme et 
al., 2013). The problem appears to be connected to routine behaviour, which 
is inherently difficult to change. Regular drivers are usually very skilled in 
tasks such as braking, accelerating and car-following. These tasks tend to 
be automated and can be carried out without conscious attention (Boer and 
Hoedemaeker, 1998, Michon, 1985). It is possible to access lower-level 
behaviour and change it (Vallacher and Wegner, 1987). However, bringing 
mental models from the skill level into consciousness requires effort, and it is 
convenient to revert back to old behaviours (Rasmussen, 1979). There are 
several ways that have been shown to be able to change drivers’ behaviour 
to eco-driving, and regular feedback has been shown to be particularly 
effective (Barkenbus, 2010). The present study showed that regular 
reminders do not result in sufficient behaviour changes towards eco-driving. 
In contrast, experimental instructions provided in person and immediately 
before driving were much more successful in activating eco-driving mental 
models. Once challenged with a workload task, however, these were 
interrupted, and ‘normal’ driving behaviour was resumed. 
Further studies will be necessary to investigate the potentials found in this 
study. For instance, the impact of the experimental instructions can be 
investigated in order to find out what it was exactly that was successful in 
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changing behaviour. It could have been the timing, which was just before the 
participants stated driving, or the interpersonal nature, not just anonymous 
text messages. Hence, in future studies text messages can be provided 
directly before driving, for example using an application on the participant’s 
mobile phones. A voice message could possibly lead to more adherence as 
well. Besides ‘strengthening’ the text messages, the experimental 
instructions could be ‘weakened’. Using an instrumented car instead of a 
driving simulator could help the participants feel more natural and 
unsupervised during driving. It would be interesting to find out whether 
instructions as employed in this study have the same effects in this situation, 
before the participants are driving away on their own. Some of the effects 
found in this experiment can be investigated further. For example, the 
behaviour changes following general the safety-themed as well as the 
general eco-driving text messages could be investigated with a larger 
number of participants in order to find out whether the effects in this study 
were incidental, or whether they indicate potential of the text messages, for 
example for behaviours that are easier to implement. Lastly, the successes 
of EDSS warrant further explorations, as it is possible that they do not only 
guide, but prompt and prime drivers, just like the text messages were 
designed to in this study. Such explorations can control for the types of 
feedback, such as suggesting gear changes, and measure whether eco-
driving mental models are activated, for example by measuring changes in 
mean speed and acceleration behaviours. 
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6 Discussion and conclusion 
6.1 Overview 
The present thesis is concerned with the measurement and activation of 
eco-driving mental models. In chapter 1 several issues in past research were 
outlined. Of particular importance is the necessity to tackle carbon dioxide 
emissions, and eco-driving has the potential to achieve considerable 
reductions. However, despite plausible motivations, financially and 
environmentally, it is problematic to encourage eco-driving. In addition, 
education does not solve the problem, as drivers appear to already have 
some idea of effective behaviours. These issues highlighted the need for an 
in-depth exploration of drivers’ eco-driving knowledge and skills. Therefore 
the studies reported in this thesis used the mental models approach. The 
first study explored what drivers do and think when they are asked to eco-
drive. The second study was designed to test text message interventions to 
encourage drivers to activate their eco-driving mental models. One these 
mental models were activated, it was attempted to interrupt them with a 
workload task, provoking a reversal to old driving habits. Combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods, this research answered the questions 
asked at the beginning of the present thesis and arrived at the following 
conclusions: 
 
 Do drivers have mental models of eco-driving? 
The primary aim of the first study in this thesis was the exploration of mental 
models that drivers employ during eco-driving on different cognitive levels. 
For this purpose a driving simulator experiment with a varied road layout 
comprising urban and motorway sections was designed and enriched with 
think aloud protocols and open interviews. The study used simple driving 
task instructions to investigate changes in the participants’ behaviour as well 
as thoughts in three conditions. Sixteen drivers with a minimum of 5 years 
driving experience were asked to ‘Drive normally’, ‘Drive safely’ or ‘Drive 
fuel-efficiently’. Behavioural measures and verbalisations were compared 
and analysed. The emphasis of this study was on eco-driving relevant 
indicators such as accelerating, braking, coasting and car-following.  
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The results support that each of the 16 participants in this study possessed a 
set of eco-driving mental models. Their existence became evident, as these 
drivers changed their behaviour when they were asked to eco-drive. These 
changes resulted in a reduction of fuel consumption in some road sections. 
Additional consistent behaviour changes included milder accelerations, on 
average and at the maximum. Most drivers chose lower speeds. These 
patterns, as well as the results of statistical tests, are consistent with 
previous studies (Birrell et al., 2010, van der Voort et al., 2001, Waters and 
Laker, 1980). Eco-driving behaviour was not just different from ‘normal’ 
driving, but also from behaviour following instructions to drive safely. In fact, 
this ‘safe’ driving behaviour did not result in differences to the baseline 
condition in study 1. Hence, the behaviour change in the Eco drives cannot 
solely be explained by an allocation of additional attentional resources to the 
driving task. Further analyses of the first experiment’s data support that the 
participants possess and activated eco-driving mental models. For instance, 
the results from modelling mental model boundaries showed that drivers 
tended to keep longer distances to the front cars to maintain constant 
speeds. The think-aloud protocols and interviews recorded during and after 
driving, respectively, revealed that each participant was able to mention 
some idea of eco-driving.  
 
 What is the content of eco-driving mental models? 
The first study provided insights into eco-driving mental models on the 
higher as well as lower levels of the mental model hierarchy (cf. Rasmussen, 
1983). With regard to the higher-level strategies and goals, participants 
mentioned the maintenance of a constant speed in the think-aloud protocols 
and during the interviews. This was attempted by avoiding large speed 
fluctuations at traffic lights and on the motorway, when other cars were 
cutting in front of the drivers. Referring to specific actions, most reported that 
they tried to closely control their speed by keeping their foot steady on the 
throttle, and declared that they wanted to avoid stepping on the brake. In 
order to leave room for a steady speed, half of the participants mentioned a 
longer headway during the motorway part in the Eco drive (“I was leaving 
more space”). Speed choice was another frequently mentioned topic. Almost 
all drivers planned to keep a lower speed, particularly on the motorway, 
where they drove slower than the speed limit of 70 mph (113 km/h). One 
participant explained that he had actually not planned to drive more slowly 
during the Eco drive, but his mild acceleration unintentionally resulted in a 
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lower speed. Indeed, most drivers mentioned slower acceleration in the 
urban section (“I shouldn’t be using too much gas”). About two thirds of the 
participants wanted to curb their acceleration on the motorway. 
With regards to behaviours associated with lower-level mental models, the 
first study found that the acceleration was less erratic during eco-driving 
compared to other driving styles. When the participants set off from a 
junction when a second junction with a red light was in sight, they tended to 
terminate their accelerations at lower speeds, possibly anticipating these 
traffic lights to switch to green before arriving at the junction. Approaching 
red traffic lights the mean deceleration decreased significantly during the 
Eco drives and the participants attempted to avoid stopping. Anticipation in 
order to limit speed fluctuations at junctions is an effective way to save fuel 
(Johansson et al., 2003) and therefore suggests an effective part of eco-
driving mental models. These behaviours were particularly pronounced 
when the participants’ lane was free from other traffic, and when the drivers 
had sufficient time to act, for example at junctions. 
The verbalisations and behaviours were not always congruent. One 
particular case was the cruising speed in the urban section in study 1, where 
the speed limit was posted at 40 mph (64 km/h). Although only 3 participants 
said that they would lower it, nearly every participant did so. It is possible 
that the avoidance of accelerations led the drivers to maintain speeds that 
were lower than intended, as one driver explained. In addition, the speed 
variation was not decreased during eco-driving, although 10 of 16 
participants mentioned a steady speed as part of their strategy. Lower 
variations in speed can reduce fuel savings (cited in Haworth and Symmons, 
2001, Nairn and Partners et al., 1994). Yet, it may be too difficult to 
consciously access and change the lower-level mental models, such as the 
usually highly automated control of the accelerator pedal (Goodrich and 
Boer, 2003, Rasmussen, 1983). Unfamiliarity with the desktop simulator 
pedals could have added to the problem. 
 
 How effective are the eco-driving mental models? 
Although the mental models activated during both studies resulted in a 
reduction in fuel consumption, the effects were not consistent and did not 
achieve the strong reductions suggested in the literature. Some reports 
mentioned savings of 5 to 25%, mostly achieved with changes in the driving 
style (Barkenbus, 2010, International Transport Forum, 2007). For instance, 
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the reductions in study 1 were not significant when cruising and were 
relatively low in motorway sections (only changed by 2.8%).  
One possible explanation is the misconception that eco-driving necessarily 
involves slow driving. When the participants in the first study were instructed 
to drive fuel-efficiently, their mean cruising speed was slower than during 
‘normal’ and safe driving. Conversely, in the literature it has been argued 
that lower speeds are considered safe (Taylor et al., 2000). Other studies 
support that drivers consider eco-driving slow driving (Harvey et al., 2013, 
van der Voort et al., 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980). In an experiment by 
Birrell and Young (2011) drivers were reducing their speeds, although the 
tested eco-driving support systems did not encourage them to do so. In fact, 
efficient speeds are not necessarily low (Samaras and Ntziachristos, 1998). 
It is not more fuel-efficient to drive more slowly than an urban speed limit of 
40 mph (64 km/h), but driving below the motorway speed limit of 70 mph 
(113 km/h) can be beneficial. As a consequence of the lower speed during 
eco-driving, the time needed to complete the urban part was 9% longer than 
in the baseline condition. Speed reductions and resulting time losses were 
previously explored by Eriksson and Svenson (2012). They found that such 
beliefs can discourage people from eco-driving. Hence, the speed choice is 
an aspect in eco-driving mental models that can benefit from corrections. In 
several experiments where participants used in-vehicle, eco-driving 
feedback devices, time losses were either low or not present at all (Birrell et 
al., 2014, Birrell and Young, 2011, Birrell et al., 2010, van der Voort et al., 
2001).  
Another issue can be the belief that eco-driving necessarily involves mild 
accelerations. Lower acceleration rates occurred during eco-driving in both 
studies, and were also mentioned in the verbalisations. In fact, eco-driving 
research tends to emphasize to avoid excessive accelerations (Ericsson, 
2001, Waters and Laker, 1980), but suggests swift accelerations up to an 
efficient speed (Mensing et al., 2014, Mensing et al., 2013). 
Elements of the experimental setup such as the driving simulator and the 
road layout might not have provided sufficient opportunities for reducing fuel 
consumption. For example, events involving hazards and junctions with red 
traffic lights were triggered by the participant’s approach. Hence, it was not 
possible for the drivers to entirely prevent their effects on speed fluctuations. 
Furthermore, it could have been difficult for the participants to control the 
simulator and achieve steadier speeds, for example. Nevertheless, the 
results suggest that there is potential to improve the eco-driving mental 
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models of drivers. Educational materials can provide information, but in 
order for drivers to accept information that is changing their mental models, 
they need to be sufficiently motivated to incorporate it into their knowledge. 
Previous research supports the provision of feedback that is reassuring 
drivers with the results of their efforts (Seligman et al., 1981) or making them 
uncomfortable with their current mental models (Minsky, 1974, Schank and 
Abelson, 1977), for example by illustrating potential fuel savings over time.  
 
 Are there individual differences in eco-driving mental models? 
The directions of the behaviours as well as statements in the drivers’ 
verbalisations were able to give insights into the content of eco-driving 
mental models. Naturally, several individual differences could be identified. 
Generally, there was a considerable amount of coherence between 
participants.  
Accelerating and decelerating mildly and smoothly as well as keeping the 
speed lower and more constant appeared throughout when drivers were 
asked to drive fuel-efficiently. These behaviours occurred in a variety of 
settings, supporting the idea that mental models are generic and not 
compiled for each new situation, as assumed in section 3.3.1. Yet, several 
behavioural differences could be observed. For example, some participants 
exhibited very low acceleration rates, as visualised in Figure 87, low cruising 
speeds as well as excessively long headways on the motorway. Such 
differences were a likely cause for the relatively high variability in fuel 
consumption figures. Hence, a subgroup of drivers could particularly benefit 
from means that improve eco-driving mental models. 
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Figure 87: Speed profiles of the acceleration scenario in study 1, see 
also Figure 19 
 
Most individual differences became apparent in the verbalisations, 
particularly in the think aloud protocols in study 1. While some participants 
spoke on a high level (“I was leaving more space”), or generally did 
not talk about their driving actions, others described details of their lower-
level behaviours (“Touching the brakes as little as possible”). 
Vallacher and Wegner (1987) described how people talk in more detail about 
their actions during difficult tasks and novel situations. Hence, more detailed 
descriptions about people’s actions can indicate that mental models are not 
well-learned. 
Several Gender effects occurred, but only some of them can be attributed to 
the interventions. For instance, males have been found to drive faster, 
accelerate stronger and speed more, while females decelerated stronger in 
some situations. The effects are consistent with previous research. It has 
been found that male drivers are less motivated than females to comply with 
traffic laws (Yagil, 1998), and are more likely to drive aggressively (Shinar 
and Compton, 2004). The brake pedals in both simulators may have caused 
problems for people with smaller feet, and therefore resulted in the harsher 
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braking behaviours in females. There are indeed no studies known to the 
author that have found similar patterns. 
 
 What are the implications of the existence of eco-driving mental 
models? 
Knowing that drivers possess eco-driving mental models leads to a new 
question: How can these mental models be activated? In a study by Dogan 
et al. (2014) reminding drivers of the reasons to eco-drive, financially or 
environmentally, was not as effective as feedback. According to self-reports, 
many people tend to be very aware of environmental issues, particularly 
drivers (Stradling et al., 2008), and keen to reduce their fuel expenses 
(Boriboonsomsin et al., 2010). The instructions in the first study involved 
asking the participants to ‘drive fuel-efficiently’ with neither further 
explanations nor tangible incentives. In this regard the mental model 
approach allowed insights beyond what the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB, Ajzen, 1991) would be able to provide, for example. When people 
carry the ‘right’ beliefs, attitudes as well as effective knowledge and skills, 
the prerequisites for eco-driving may be fulfilled. As study 1 showed, these 
prerequisites do not guarantee that drivers actually perform eco-driving. The 
fact that knowledge and skills alone are insufficient can also explain the lack 
of effects of educational campaigns (Delicado, 2012). The potential in the 
finding that many drivers possess eco-driving mental models lies in the 
possibility that existing eco-driving mental models could to be activated in 
order to for drivers to drive fuel-efficiently. When experimental instructions 
are sufficient to encourage the activation of eco-driving mental models, there 
could be other ways, which are potentially practical and cost-efficient, to 
encourage this.  
Another challenge arising from study 1 is the maintenance of new behaviour. 
Following the eco-driving condition participants were instructed to drive 
‘normally’ in a baseline condition. In this drive all fuel-efficient behaviour 
changes diminished. It appears that activating eco-driving mental models 
requires effort. ‘Normal’ driving mental models are built and refined during 
years of continuous driving practise, which leads to well-ingrained 
behaviours. By repeated practice some behaviours become automated, as 
they move down in the hierarchy of mental models. These skills are then 
difficult to access and exchange with ‘unusual’ mental models such as eco-
driving. It was possible to activate eco-driving mental models by asking 
drivers directly before driving. However, instead of carrying these over into 
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subsequent experimental conditions, such new or unusual behaviours were 
abandoned in favour of habitual actions. In addition, mental models do not 
usually incorporate complex information (Johnson-Laird, 1988). This could 
mean that monetary gains accrued over time are not present enough during 
actual driving (Harvey et al., 2013), or why intentions to perform 
environmentally friendly actions are neglected in many every-day behaviours 
(Whitmarsh, 2009). Hence, it is still a challenge to motivate drivers 
sufficiently to eco-drive. Accrued financial savings over time as well as the 
consciousness of behaving in a way that is more environmentally friendly 
can motivate, as several studies suggest (e.g. Dogan et al., 2014, Harvey et 
al., 2013). It would not be sufficient to rely on these motivations alone. Social 
norms, for example by communicating that others are eco-driving as well, 
can be very an effective addition. The following study investigated did not 
focus on motivations, but on repeated reminders to activate mental models 
that are not as habitualised and familiar as ‘normal’ driving mental models. 
 
 Can text primes and advice be effective in the activation of eco-
driving mental models, and how do any effects compare to 
experimental instructions? 
The underlying question of study 2 was whether the effect of experimental 
eco-driving instructions can be replicated by other means that are more cost-
efficient and feasible for large numbers of drivers. The results showed that 
sending text messages regularly, at least every second day, with eco-driving 
primes or behavioural advice did not effect a sufficient activation of eco-
driving mental models. In contrast, the participants receiving these 
messages even increased their mean speed in some situations. Some 
measures indicate steadier speeds and milder decelerations following eco-
driving primes. However, these effects were too sporadic and could have 
occurred due to chance. Interestingly, the safety primes had some effects 
regarding speed choice in safety-critical scenarios. Overall, the experimental 
instructions directly before driving were more effective, resulting in behaviour 
changes similar to those found in study 1. Accordingly, the participants who 
received these instructions tended to drive more slowly as well as 
accelerated and decelerated in milder ways. 
There are various possible explanations for the lack of the effectiveness of 
the text messages. For instance, the time window could have been too short 
to have an impact. Future experiments could also increase the strength of 
text messages and refine their frequency. Previous research also suggests 
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that messages are stronger when provided by human voice (Large and 
Burnett, 2014). Such future research questions are further explored in 
section 6.3.2. 
 
 How does a workload task affect the activation of eco-driving 
mental models? 
In study 2 it was found that the participants who were instructed by the 
experimenter to drive fuel-efficiently activated eco-driving mental models. 
Once these behavioural changes occurred, it was attempted to challenge the 
activation of these mental models with a workload task presented during a 
coherence scenario, which required the participants to follow a lead car with 
varied its speed. At the beginning of each Drive the coherence scenario was 
presented without the workload task. Towards the end of the Drive the 
coherence scenario occurred again, but this time with the driver performing 
the task. This task was a modified version of the TQT (Twenty Questions 
Task), which was more moderate and less competitive than the original 
version (cf. Kafer and Hunter, 1997, Mosher and Hornsby, 1966). When the 
task was performed, no effects attributable to the text message interventions 
and experimental eco-driving instructions were found. Instead, performing 
the TQT in both Drives resulted in slower driving and worse car-following 
parameters. The effects of the task even lasted beyond the coherence 
scenario, apparent in an additional long-range braking scenario placed at the 
end of the road layout. In contrast to the first long-range braking scenario, in 
the occurrence directly following the TQT, no significant effects for measures  
such as lower deceleration rates occurred. Hence, a workload task involving 
talking about unrelated topics led to the deactivation of eco-driving mental 
models. Instead, drivers were reverting to more familiar behaviours (cf. 
Rasmussen, 1979), in this case to ‘normal’ driving. The distinct behaviour 
changes in the first study in this thesis support the findings that eco-driving is 
not the default driving behaviour for drivers. Hence, drivers activate eco-
driving mental models when directly instructed, but once they are interrupted 
by a task such as the TQT, old, more familiar driving habits are resumed. 
This behaviour could be similar to findings from Morrow et al. (1987) 
showing that people’s situation models during reading texts are more 
accurate in locations close to the protagonist. Similarly, it can be possible 
that, once interrupted, the eco-driving mental models may not have been 
sufficiently present in the drivers’ minds to be re-activated. 
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 What are the implications of the activation of eco-driving mental 
models for driving safety? 
Both studies in the present thesis included scenarios designed to create a 
conflict between safe and eco-driving. If drivers attempted to keep a 
constant speed, for example, these scenarios would have made it unsafe to 
do so. Events were based on specified values for TTC, which means that 
these scenarios created such conflicts, even when drivers approached them 
with lower speeds. In such scenarios no significant differences between the 
safe- and eco-driving conditions were found. These results suggest that in 
most safety-critical scenarios safe driving was prioritised. In addition, during 
car-following, drivers tended to facilitate eco-driving with larger headways. 
When the safety margins were shorter, they prioritised safety. The only 
measure that differed was the headway when braking was terminated. When 
other vehicles cut in the front of the participants, this measure was lower 
during eco-driving. This implies that they braked, but ended braking at lower 
safety margins during eco-driving in order to avoid decreasing the speed too 
much. When traffic lights turned red at a short notice, behavioural 
differences between safe and eco-driving hardly occurred. This prioritisation 
of safety, however, was not unified. The fact that one participant in study 1 
and three participants in study 2 crossed this junction without stopping 
indicates that a few drivers may well accept small risks for the benefit of a 
constant speed (cf. Young et al., 2011). In the second experiment the 
scenarios relevant for safe driving generated a few behavioural changes for 
those participants instructed by the experimenter to eco-drive. They tended 
to lower their speed, but these deceleration actions were conducted in a 
more gradual and steady manner. Hence, despite taking steps to safely 
navigate such scenarios, some drivers were still bearing the fuel efficiency 
goal in mind when braking. 
In the first study the computation of mental model boundaries enabled an 
objective identification of a change in safety-critical behaviour during eco-
driving. It was found that when other vehicles drove into the participants’ 
lane, and the values for time headway and time to collision became very 
small, the participants tended not to compromise on their driving safety. In 
fact, they initiated braking actions at relatively high time headways, 
compared to the Safe condition. 
The results of statistically analysing the verbal data indicate a shift in the 
focus of the drivers when they attempted to eco-drive, although most 
significant differences were found between the Eco and the Safe condition. 
240 
 
The increased focus on one’s own actions and away from unrelated 
thoughts can denote an increased workload. In fact, Birrell et al. (2010) 
found an indication for an increase in workload when people are asked to 
eco-drive. The main aim of their study was to test the effects of an EDSS 
they had designed. In one experimental condition they asked their 
participants to eco-drive without the system. A questionnaire revealed that, 
although the participants achieved reductions in fuel-consumption, their 
workload was elevated. Rasmussen’s taxonomy (Rasmussen, 1983) 
suggests that the drivers brought mental models of the rule- and skill-level 
that would otherwise not have been considered into consciousness. At the 
same time the focus was partly taken off the surroundings and other safety-
critical themes, which could mean a safety risk for unassisted eco-driving. 
Eco-driving could also be risky for drivers whose eco-driving mental models 
are not sufficiently mature, and involve unnatural behaviours such as the 
maintenance of excessively low speeds and long headways. 
These findings link back to the foundational ideas behind mental models, in 
particular to the understanding that mental models are placed between the 
outside world and human information processing. Mental models influence 
perception (Schank and Abelson, 1977), which could also explain the shift in 
focus found in the think-aloud protocols. It does not necessarily mean that 
cues relevant for safe driving are ignored during eco-driving, but that it might 
require more effort to absorb the same amount of information from the 
driving environment. The results of modelling mental model boundaries 
suggest that eco-driving can lead drivers to maintain high safety margins, 
which can account for deficiencies in information processing and an elevated 
workload. 
 
 Were the methods involved suitable for studying mental models of 
eco-driving? 
Driving simulators were ideal for the purposes of both studies in this 
research, which required the collection of detailed behavioural data in the 
face of the experimental drives, differing in single instructions and the 
content of text message interventions, respectively. A driving simulator 
provides a highly controlled environment, in which variables such as weather 
and traffic flow can be held constant, thus each driver is faced with the same 
conditions (Boyle and Lee, 2010). However, driving simulators have 
limitations. The sensitive nature of the desktop simulator controls could have 
caused the participants to drive in more erratic ways than in the more 
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realistic motion-based simulator employed in study 2 (Jamson and Jamson, 
2010). The absence of safety-related consequences can change drivers’ 
diligence. Furthermore, motivations for participating in an experiment are 
related to contributing to the research, curiosity about its outcomes and 
financial rewards (Stunkel and Grady, 2011). In the real world people drive 
for reasons such as commuting to work or travelling to leisure destinations, 
or the enjoyment of driving itself. Participants tend to comply with 
experimental instructions, for example when asked to fill in a questionnaire. 
Hence, they could have been motivated to eco-drive, because they were 
asked to do so by the experimenter. 
Jamson and Jamson (2010) found that a desktop simulator can result in a 
lack of lateral control, more time in shorter headways, and worse self-
reported performance ratings. Hence, values measured with a simulator may 
not be consistent with values in the real world. For example, it cannot be 
expected that the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable car-
following states, modelled in section 4.4.7, are the same on a real motorway. 
Therefore absolute results cannot be generated, and results need to be 
interpreted as relative, as suggested by Rook and Hogema (2005). In 
addition, the brake pedals did not provide realistic feedback and may have 
been more difficult to use by people with smaller feet, and therefore caused 
the stronger braking actions of the female participants.  
Both study 1 and study 2 included a comparable set of experimental 
conditions, one Baseline condition and one in which the drivers were 
instructed to drive fuel-efficiently. It was expected that these instructions had 
the same effect in both experiments, and that differences in behaviour could 
be attributed to the type of driving simulator used.  
Table 41 displays the p-values and effect sizes of comparisons of the mean 
values for the Baseline and Drive 1 conditions on the one hand and for 
instructed eco-driving on the other. Effect sizes are important to consider, as 
these provide information about the size of an effect, not confounded by 
participant numbers (Coe, 2002). They allow the comparison of intervention 
effects across different contexts. The results show that Cohen’s d in the 
case of experimental instructions was higher across several measures in 
study 1. The difference is most pronounced with regard to the variation of 
acceleration (Study 1: p = .001, d = 3.10, Study 2: p = .013, d = 1.52). This is 
surprising, because the motion-based simulator is more realistic and 
considered easier to control (Jamson and Jamson, 2010). However, the 
higher speed limit in the urban section in the first experiment provided more 
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room for changes in speed as well as acceleration behaviour. In addition, the 
pedals in the desktop simulator are looser compared to the pedals of the 
motion-based version. Accordingly, in the Baseline Drive in study 1 the 
throttle was pressed by 47° at the maximum, resulting in a significantly less 
harsh acceleration in the Eco Drive (p = .001, d = 3.10). In contrast, in Drive 
1 in study 2 the maximum pedal angle was only 25°, with a weaker effect 
following eco-driving instructions (p = .005, d = 1.79). Hence, it may have 
been easier to implement changes with the desktop simulator pedals. 
 
Table 41: p-values and Cohen’s d of t-tests comparing Baseline and 
Instructed eco-driving conditions 
Cruising scenario: 
Measure 
Study 1 Study 2 
p d p d 
Time spent in 
scenario 
.002 1.99 .018 1.44 
Mean speed < .001 2.88 .018 1.43 
Standard 
deviation of 
acceleration 
.001 3.10 .013 1.52 
Acceleration scenario: 
Measure 
Study 1 Study 2 
p d p d 
Mean 
acceleration 
.001 3.10 .005 1.79 
Standard 
deviation of 
acceleration 
.001 2.08 .002 2.02 
 
The mental model approach has allowed gaining valuable insights, 
particularly in understanding driver’s cognition with regards to eco-driving, 
beyond what theories based on the TPB or economic theories could have 
found. Mental model theory is relatively new as underpinning in experimental 
psychology, particularly in driver behaviour studies (e.g. Goodrich and Boer, 
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2003, Henning et al., 2008). The approach could be applicable for research 
questions beyond eco-driving, for example with regards to driver support 
systems. On the downside, in the driver behaviour studies known to the 
author, the mental model approach was only focussed on people’s cognition 
and took neither emotional nor social factors into account. There is still a 
need to further understand other factors that influence behaviour, such as 
social norms, defined in section 2.3.1. The think aloud protocol was a 
valuable qualitative addition to the first experiment in this research. It 
allowed capturing momentary thoughts and finding explanations for 
behaviour changes. The method, however, captures incomplete data. In 
some places a mismatch between what the drivers said they intended to do 
and the behavioural data occurred. This can indicate eco-driving strategies, 
but the absence of a lower-level skill to execute them. 
The methodology of the second study relied on text messages, delivering 
primes and advice about eco-driving to the participants’ mobile phones. Text 
messages have been used widely in health interventions and achieved 
significant effects (Cole-Lewis and Kershaw, 2010). These effects, however, 
were related to higher-level actions such as attending medical appointments 
and enquiring about vaccinations (Phillips et al., 2014). Priming studies on 
the other hand have targeted subtle changes in attitudes and behaviour, 
often without the participants noticing the changes (Bargh et al., 1986). The 
question arises whether the text messages were not strong enough to 
replace well-learned, automated driving behaviours with less familiar eco-
driving mental models. 
The workload task employed in study 2 proved to be very effective, but it can 
still be argued whether it required too much concentration from the drivers 
and appeared unnatural, possibly interrupting potential eco-driving more 
than a simple conversation with a passenger would. 
The questionnaires offered only limited insights into the attitudes of drivers. 
One reason is that they were distributed after the driving sessions to prevent 
the participants from guessing the study’s goals. Because the workload task 
led to a reversion to old behaviours, it cannot be assumed that any effects of 
the interventions were still present after driving, when the questionnaires 
were filled in. 
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6.2 Implications  
 What are the implications for improving eco-driving? 
In the first study in the present thesis simple instructions by the experimenter 
resulted in each participant to perform some form of eco-driving. These 
instructions only involved asking the participants to ‘drive fuel-efficiently’ with 
no further explanations. Hence, first of all one can conclude that drivers 
already possess mental models of eco-driving and do not need to be taught 
every single aspect of it, as often assumed (Delicado, 2012). In fact, it 
appears that drivers carry a large part of the necessary knowledge and skills 
in order to reduce their fuel consumption. However, there is potential for 
improvement and refinement, with respect to excessively low speeds and 
mild accelerations, for example. Nevertheless, knowing about the presence 
of eco-driving mental models in many drivers’ minds means that their 
behaviour cannot be changed with education alone. It also signifies that 
efforts to encourage eco-driving can be based on the activation of present 
knowledge and skills. In addition, previous studies suggest that many drivers 
have the ‘right’ attitudes and motivations, but these results relied on self-
reported measures, and are only the prerequisites for eco-driving. The 
second major finding of the first study is that simple instructions were 
sufficient to change the behaviour of drivers, and result in the activation of 
eco-driving mental models. It was not necessary to teach drivers, or to 
improve factors predicting behaviours by the Theory of Planned Behaviours 
such as attitudes and motivations. The impact of these simple instructions 
was further investigated in the second study in the present thesis. There was 
some variation in the behaviours and fuel consumption figures among the 
participants when driving ‘normally’. This could mean that some drivers 
already practise eco-driving to some degree during every-day driving. Still, 
when an experimenter asked them to drive fuel-efficiently, participants 
seemed to be able remember, retrieve and activate more eco-driving mental 
models.  
The second study aimed to replicate the effect of experimental instructions 
by delivering eco-driving content in the form of text messages on drivers’ 
mobile phones. The rationale was that prime and advice messages would 
make such mental models more present in drivers’ minds. Yet, the 
messages did not have the desired effect. Hence, at this point large-scale 
text message campaigns for eco-driving, as employed in this research, 
cannot be recommended. Definite solutions for ways to activate eco-driving 
mental models cannot be derived.  
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In the studies presented in this thesis, eco-driving instructions were provided 
by the experimenter in person and directly before driving. It can be 
considered whether elements of these instructions can be effectively 
conveyed in messages to drivers. It is possible that the message has to be 
strong enough to provide the driver with enough reason to retrieve and 
activate the more unusual mental models. When an experimenter asks a 
participant to eco-drive, the instruction could be as strong as asking the 
participant to appear to the experimental session without wearing glasses, to 
read the briefing sheet and to fill in a questionnaire. Experience shows that 
such instructions are usually adhered to. The text messages and advice 
inherently provided the option to disregard them. They may have brought the 
idea of eco-driving into the drivers’ minds, but the increased accessibility of 
these mental models may not have been enough to invest the effort to use 
them during driving. A number of ideas of how to strengthen eco-driving 
messages and to further investigate the effective elements of the 
experimental instructions are discussed in section 6.3.2. 
Where drivers employed eco-driving mental models, it required the simple 
interruption by a questions task to abandon behavioural changes and to 
revert back to old habits. As new behaviours are vulnerable to interruptions, 
eco-driving is easily abandoned following elevated workload or unrelated 
thoughts. This means that the timing of an eco-driving message, provided it 
is effective in the first place, is crucial. First of all, communicating it just 
before driving appears to be necessary. Hence, it could be delivered at the 
point when a driver enters a car, or turns the ignition on. In addition, the 
message needs to be repeated, either at regular intervals or following an 
interruption. The latter would assure that eco-driving is continued as much 
as possible. The challenge lies in recognising the interruption, or the 
consequential deactivation of eco-driving.  
 
 What are the implications for sustainable behavioural change? 
The question arises whether people possess more knowledge than 
commonly assumed in areas beyond driving, for example regarding 
sustainable transport in general. It has been shown that drivers often have 
the ‘desired’ knowledge and attitudes, such as higher-than-average 
environmental concern (Stradling et al., 2008). Yet, during every-day life 
ingrained habits appear to overrule good intentions. Education and 
campaigns have been shown to have some effect, although they tend to set 
the conditions for environmentally friendly behaviour, and not result in its 
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widespread practise. Stronger messages, such as campaigns making use of 
social norms, seem to create enough pressure to change behaviour 
(Jackson, 2005). 
One long-standing problem in encouraging environmentally friendly 
behaviour are ingrained habits. Routine behaviour is inherently difficult to 
change (Goldenbeld et al., 2000). The second study in the present thesis 
emphasised that regular reminders have a limited effect. As daily life gets 
into the way of good intentions, people may simply maintain, or revert to old 
behaviours, particularly when new behaviours require effort (Whitmarsh, 
2009). Hence, some studies on environmentally friendly behaviours with 
successful outcomes focussed on the most convenient behaviours, such as 
changing a shower head, which hardly impair every-day life (e.g. Dietz et al., 
2009).  
As the experimental instructions in the studies in this thesis were effective, 
the question arises whether such instructions can be used in areas beyond 
driving. An effective message could be communicated at the point when a 
person has the opportunity to behave in a more sustainable way. This 
moment can be when a person is leaving the home in the morning for work, 
or when planning a holiday.  
 
6.3 Further research 
The current thesis gained insights into mental models of eco-driving, 
particularly their existence, activation and interruption. At the same time this 
research has generated a number of questions that warrant further research. 
 
6.3.1 Research potential derived from study 1 
Future research needs to address the fact that drivers do not fully utilise their 
existing knowledge and skills. Ingrained habits appear to pose a particular 
barrier for behaviour change, and ways to change these habits need to be 
further investigated. Interventions could be influential at the stage when 
habits are formed. Tarkiainen et al. (2013) investigated the effects of a driver 
support system with eco-driving advice on novice drivers. They found the 
system to be effective in reducing fuel consumption. Further studies could 
explore the resulting formation of ‘normal’ and eco-driving mental models. 
Studying the formation of driving mental models also applies to eco-driving 
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lessons for beginners in driving schools. To date the studies investigating 
eco-driving training courses, known to the author, were conducted with 
experienced drivers (af Wåhlberg, 2007, Siero et al., 1989).  
The mental models of eco-driving that were identified in the first study 
included some misconceptions, such as believing that slow driving and very 
mild accelerations are always necessary to save fuel (cf. Harvey et al., 2013, 
van der Voort et al., 2001, Waters and Laker, 1980). In these matters 
informing and educating drivers should mend weaknesses and improve 
existing eco-driving mental models. However, the text messages giving this 
information did not result in behavioural changes related to speed choice 
and acceleration. It needs to be further investigated how eco-driving mental 
models can be improved. For sustainable behaviour change it is a hurdle 
that regular drivers tend to be very skilled in driving tasks. Some driving 
tasks are automated and can be carried out without conscious attention 
(Boer and Hoedemaeker, 1998, Michon, 1985). It can be possible to access 
lower-level behaviour and change it (Vallacher and Wegner, 1987). 
However, this requires effort, and it is convenient to revert back to old 
behaviours (Rasmussen, 1979). One solution could be support systems that 
target lower-level skills such as direct manipulation interfaces suggested by 
McIlroy and Stanton (2014). Such technology, for instance haptic pedals, 
guides people’s motion and teaches without involving the conscious mind. 
Research in these systems is relatively young, and warrants more 
exploration.  
In the field of general car use the question arises what drivers know about 
the use of public transport, and therefore whether they have ‘public transport 
mental models’. The approach used in this thesis has the potential to explore 
the underlying cognitive mechanisms in this area as well, and to identify the 
information needs of drivers that could encourage them to use more 
sustainable modes.  
Finally, simulator studies generally create a need for validation studies. The 
experiments presented in this thesis provide the means for controlled 
research, which can be suitable in early stages of novel concepts. However, 
further studies will be necessary, involving a larger number of participants 
and real-world studies bearing the findings into realistic implementations. 
Real-world studies are crucial, as in both studies the experimental setting 
could have motivated drivers to eco-drive. Hence, on-road studies could 
involve instructing drivers in similar ways, and measure the outcomes in less 
‘experimental’ environments, for example in instrumented vehicle. In such a 
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study instructions could be provided in person or on the telephone. Ideally, 
participants would feel less monitored, which could change the motivation to 
comply with the experimenter’s instructions. 
 
6.3.2 Research potential derived from study 2 
Because the text messages were not sufficiently effective in the second 
study, future research could attempt to increase their ‘strength’. Such studies 
could increase the frequency of the messages to several times a day (cf. 
Abrahamse et al., 2005) or time them closer to the point of action (cf. 
Seligman et al., 1981), for example by delivering them when the driver gets 
into the car. A longer time period of at least three weeks, as used in text 
message studies in the health sector (e.g. Cole-Lewis and Kershaw, 2010, 
Stockwell et al., 2013), could also result in stronger effects. Information that 
makes drivers feel uncomfortable with their usual driving practise could be 
effective as well (cf. Vallacher and Wegner, 1987), for example using social 
norms. Considering the finding that verbal instructions were effective in 
changing behaviour, the question arises whether the messages sent in the 
present study would be more effective in a vocal (cf. Large and Burnett, 
2014) and more direct form (cf. Sarason and Minard, 1962). The latter could 
be implemented with messages such as “Drive fuel-efficiently.” 
The difficulty of changing ingrained habits leads to the question of the 
potential of eco-driving during the early formation of driving habits. Future 
studies need to consider novice drivers, for example when they take driving 
lessons. These drivers could be more susceptible to eco-driving behaviours, 
as the success of in-vehicle eco-driving feedback for novice drivers in the 
Trafisafe project (Tarkiainen et al., 2013, Tarkiainen et al., 2014) suggests. 
Hence, it would be interesting to repeat elements of the current experiment 
with people who take driving lessons or who recently passed their driving 
test. Conversely, the problem of clearing eco-driving misconceptions poses 
new questions. Possibly, simple advice messages are insufficient without 
presenting actual time or fuel-efficiency gains. Hence, further studies could 
add such information to assure drivers and increase trust in the advice (cf. 
Risto and Martens, 2013).  
There were a few effects in the study that warrant further exploration. For 
instance, the Eco-general texts group displayed isolated effects such as 
more constant speeds and milder decelerations in some scenarios. In 
addition, the Eco-behaviour texts group was more able to recall messages 
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related to coasting compared to messages targeting the misconception that 
lower speeds are necessary to eco-drive. These findings do not allow 
conclusive answers due to the sporadic effects and low participant numbers 
in the Intervention groups. Nevertheless, these effects pose the question 
whether primes have the potential to increase an activation of more 
convenient and familiar actions. Further studies with a larger number of 
drivers can consider eco-driving behaviours such as smooth speeds and 
coasting on the one hand, compared to actions possibly requiring more effort 
to change such as acceleration and speed choice. In addition, it was found 
that Gender confounded some of the results in this study. Experiments with 
only females or male participants, in larger numbers, can account for such 
effects. 
The ecoDriver project has developed and tested the effectiveness and 
acceptance of a diverse range of feedback systems (e.g. Jamson et al., 
2015a, Jamson et al., 2015b). It has been shown to be particularly effective 
in encouraging eco-driving (Barkenbus, 2010). Feedback does not only 
educate, but also reward, motivate (Seligman et al., 1981) and reinforce new 
behaviours (Fischer, 2008). Interestingly, in a study by Birrell et al. (2014) 
participants reduced their speed although the employed system did not 
advise on speed choice. Hence, it would be interesting to investigate why 
this unforeseen effect was arising. Further research can examine to which 
degree feedback causes the activation of existing eco-driving mental 
models. Studies could control for the types of information provided by a 
support system. In this way, the impact on the targeted as well as other eco-
driving actions can be systematically examined. Results can provide further 
insights into the way feedback works; as well inform the design of more 
effective messages. 
The effects of the workload task supported the idea that new behaviours are 
often vulnerable in the face of interruptions and workload. Daily stressors 
and unrelated thoughts can lead to old habits resurfacing (cf. Rasmussen, 
1979). Future research can examine different types of interruptions drivers 
face when eco-driving. This way it could be found out whether there are 
‘acceptable’ tasks as well as driving situations, which allow a continuation of 
eco-driving. Findings could also highlight situations that are likely to require 
another reminder or instructions for the driver to re-activate eco-driving 
mental models. 
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8 Appendix A 
 
Results for the analysis of the questionnaire following Drive 
1 in study 2 
Table 42: Significant differences in questionnaire items† in the Drive 1 
session 
Question Males Female Differences p U/Z 
I have a good 
understanding of 
innovations in vehicle 
automation 
3.65 2.08 
Male > 
Female 
< 
.001 
144/ 
-4.696 
I am happy to pay 
more for a car that 
has good information 
and entertainment 
systems 
3.22 2.44 
Male > 
Female 
.012 
293.5/ 
-2.510 
It is important to me 
that my driving style is 
dynamic 
3.43 2.60 
Male > 
Female 
.006 
280/ 
-2.722 
Drivers generally drive 
safely 
2.97 2.40 
Male > 
Female 
.014 
301.5/ 
-2.449 
I have a good 
understanding of what 
driving behaviours 
lead to saving fuel 
4.22 3.52 
Male > 
Female 
.001 
250.5/ 
-3.224 
Drivers generally 
know how to drive 
safely 
3.38 2.44 
Male > 
Female 
< 
.001 
227/ 
-3.527 
I am happy to pay a 
bit more for fuel if it 
means I can drive the 
way I want 
2.81 2.28 
Male > 
Female 
.041 
327.5/ 
-2.041 
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Question Males Female Differences p U/Z 
In-car information and 
entertainment 
systems are important 
to me 
3.46 2.44 
Male > 
Female 
.001 
238/ 
-3.349 
Most drivers think it is 
a good idea to drive 
safely 
3.86 3.16 
Male > 
Female 
.012 
302/ 
-2.517 
I buy certain products 
to increase my status 
2.36 1.60 
Male > 
Female 
.011 
286/ 
-2.530 
I find partially and fully 
automated cars 
innovative 
3.73 2.56 
Male > 
Female 
< 
.001 
192.5/ 
-4.022 
It is important to me 
what my friends think 
about my car 
2.53 1.60 
Male > 
Female 
.002 
251/ 
-3.072 
I have a good 
understanding of what 
driving behaviours are 
environmentally 
friendly 
4.16 3.52 
Male > 
Female 
.002 
262/ 
-3.086 
Ranking: When you 
drive what do you 
think about? – fuel-
efficient driving 
behaviours 
3.54 2.84 
Male > 
Female 
.023 
308.5/ 
-2.269 
† Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
 
 
